Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane, husband and
wife v. Timberbrook Village, LTD., a Utah Limited
Partnership; Heart Marketing and Development,
Inc., a Utah Corporation in its capacity as general
partner of Timberbrook Village, Ltd.; Leisure
Sports, Inc., a Utah Corporation; and Dixie Title
Company, a Utah Corporation : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael D. Hughes; Thompson, Hughes and Reber.
Willard R. Bishop; Bishop and Ronnow, P.C..
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Crane and Crane v. Timberbrook Village, No. 890041 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1539

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50

DOCKET NO.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

89-

CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE
CRANE, husband and wifef

•s^ig

g

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
vs.
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a
Utah Limited Partnership; HEART
MARKETING and DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah Corporation in its
capacity as general partner of
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.;
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., a Utah
Corporation; and DIXIE TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,

Case No. 870366

Argument P r i o r i t y
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : 14b

Defendants/Respondents.
* # • # <

* * * * *

On Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County
*

i

i

i

i

*

Willard R. Bishop, #0344
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C.
Attorneys at Law
36 North 300 West
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720

Michael D. Hughes
THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER
Attorneys at Law
148 East Tabernacle Street
St. George, UT 84770

? 1

APR
i „

*/Oyit Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE
CRANE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
vs.
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a
Utah Limited Partnership; HEART
MARKETING and DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah Corporation in its
capacity as general partner of
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.;
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., a Utah
Corporation; and DIXIE TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,

Case No. 870366

Argument Priority
Classification: 14b

Defendants/Respondents.
* * * * * * * * * *

On Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County
* * * * * * * * * *

Willard R. Bishop, #0344
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C.
Attorneys* at Law
36 North 300 West
P. 0. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720

Michael D. Hughes
THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER
Attorneys at Law
148 East Tabernacle Street
St. George, UT 84770

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
NO.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

vi

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT

8

POINT

I

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT A LETTER WRITTEN BY MR. DEAN
MIXON ON FEBRUARY 15, 1985, WHICH
WAS
DISPATCHED
NO
LATER
THAN
FEBRUARY 21, 1985, WAS NOT A VALID,
TIMELY ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONDENTS'
OFFER TO PURCHASE APPELLANTS' SHARES
IN TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., SO AS
TO REQUIRE DIXIE TITLE COMPANY TO
RELEASE FUNDS PLACED IN ESCROW TO
APPELLANTS

8

THE CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN MR.
MIXON'S LETTER OF FEBRUARY 18, 1985,
WERE
IMPLIED
IN
THE
ORIGINAL
CONTRACT AND AS SUCH COULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED
A COUNTEROFFER WHICH
RESPONDENTS WERE FREE TO ACCEPT OR
REJECT

12

CONCLUSION

16

ADDENDUM
A.

„

001

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3) (i)

001

STATUTES

li

CASES CITED
Burkhead v. Farlow, 266 NC 595, 146 SE2d 802,
16 ALR3d 1416, 1421 (N.C. 1966)

005

Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Rider, 42 P.2d
842, 843 (Okl. 1935)

013

Northwest Properties Agency, Inc. v. McGhee,
462 P.2d 249, 253 (Wash.App. 1969)

016

Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Smith,
637 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Wyo. 1981)
'

022

Parks Enterprises v. New Century Realty,
652 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah 1982)..
.

031

Pravorne v. McLeod, 383 P.2d 855,
857 (Nev. 1963)

036

OTHER AUTHORITIES
17 AmJur2d, Contracts §48

039

17 AmJur2d, Contracts, §64

046

58 AmJur2d, Novation §16

053

77 AmJur2d, Vendor and Purchaser §22

055

Corbin on Contracts, Acceptance by Mail
or Wire §78
Selections From Williston on Contracts,

057

Acceptance of Offers §81

062

RECORD AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
Complaint filed by Plaintiffs on June 26,
1985. (R.001)
Answer filed by Russell J. Gallian for
Heart Marketing and Development, Inc.,
on July 29, 1985. (R.030)
Answer filed by Russell J. Gallian for
Timberbrook Village, Ltd., on July 29,
1985. (R.33)
Answer filed by Russell J. Gallian for
Dixie Title Company, on July 29, 1988.
(R.36)
iii

065
087
090

093

Answer and Counterclaim filed July 29, 1985,
by Russell J. Gallian for Leisure Sports,
Inc. (R.40)

0 97

Reply to Counterclaim filed by Willard R.
Bishop on August 12, 1985. (R.075)

101

Pretrial Order, filed October 7, 1986, by
Willard R. Bishop. (R.184)

105

Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Michael
D. Hughes, on January 23, 1987. (R.206).,

123

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Defendants1 Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed by Michael D. Hughes, on
January 26, 1987. (R.210)

125

Affidavit of Clifford G. Crane, filed by
Willard R. Bishop on February 2, 1987.
(R.238)

153

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Defendants1 Motion for
Summary Judgment Plaintiffs on February 2,
1987. (R.248)

163

Addendum to Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in opposition to Defendants1
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on
February 2, 1988. (R.266)

178

Memorandum Ruling on Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment filed on March 9,
1987. (R.276)

184

Minute Entry dated August 4 and 5, 1985.
(R.301)
C.

186

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
filed on September 4, 1987. (R.305)

187

Notice of Appeal filed on October 1, 1987,
(R.320)

198

Agreement for Sale of Ltd. Partnership
Interest. (Plaintiff's Exhibit P-8)

200

Agreement for Sale of Ltd. Partnership
Interest. (Plaintiff's Exhibit P-9)

204

Copy of envelope addressed to Mr. Doug
Westbrook of Dixie Title Company.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 19A)

208

1 TT

Letter addressed to Clifford G. Crane from
Russell J. Gallian, dated November 13, 1984.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit P-7)

209

Letter addressed to Mr. Doug Westbrook from
Dean A. Mixon, dated February 18f 1985.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit P-18)

210

Letter addressed to Mr. Dean Mixon from
Russell J. Gallian, dated February 11, 1985.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 12)

212

Substitution of Guarantor, dated November.
20, 1984. (Plaintiff's Exhibit P-14)

213

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
NO.
STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3) (i)

1

CASES CITED
Burkhead v. Farlow, 266 NC 595, 146 SE2d 802,
16 ALR3d 1416, 1421 (N.C. 1966)

13

L i n c o l n N a t . L i f e I n s . Co. v . R i d e r , 42 P..2d
8 4 2 , 843 ( O k l . 1935)

16

Northwest Properties Agency, Inc. v. McGhee,
462 P.2d 249, 253 (Wash.App. 1969)

13

Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Smith,
637 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Wyo. 1981)

13

Parks Enterprises v. New Century Realty,
652 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah 1982)...

11

Pravorne v. McLeod, 383 P.2d 855,
857 (Nev. 1963)

13

OTHER AUTHORITIES
17 AmJur2d, Contracts §48

9

17 AmJur2d, Contracts, §64

13

58 AmJur2d, Novation §16

16

77 AmJur2d, Vendor and Purchaser §22
Corbin on Contracts, Acceptance by Mail
or Wire §78
Selections From Williston on Contracts,
Acceptance of Offers §81

VI

9
11
10

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is taken pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section
78-2-2(3) (i) and challenges the Judgment and Decree executed by
the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County on or about
August 24, 1987, which was duly filed and entered on September 4,
1987 and challenges the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered and filed on the same dates.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
This appeal presents the following issues for resolution:
1.
written

Did the trial court err in concluding that a letter
by

Mr. Dean

Mixon

on

February

18, 1985, which was

dispatched no later than February 21 f 1985, was not a valid,
timely acceptance of Respondents" offer to purchase Appellants1
shares in TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., so as to require DIXIE TITLE
COMPANY to release funds placed in escrow to Appellants?
2.

Did Mr. Mixon1s letter of February 18f 1985, contain any

new conditions, in addition to those which were already a part of
the

contract,

which

amounted

to

a

counteroffer

requiring

Respondents• acceptance ?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case presented on appeal seeks to uphold a contract
between

the

CRANES

and

Respondents

LEISURE

SPORTS,

INC. ,

(hereinafter LEISURE SPORTS), HEART MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT,
INC.,

(hereinafter

HEART MARKETING), and TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE,

LTD., (hereinafter TIMBERBROOK) so as to require Respondent DIXIE
TITLE COMPANY (hereinafter DIXIE TITLE) to release funds held in
escrow to the CRANES.
-1-

On

June

26, 1985,

CLIFFORD

AND

BONNIE

CRANE

filed

a

Complaint in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County,
State of Utahf seeking specific performance of an agreement for
the sale of their limited partnership interest in TIMBERBROOK to
HEART MARKETING and LEISURE SPORTS and requesting that the courts
aid in forcing DIXIE TITLE to relinquish documents and monies
held in escrow to CRANES.

At this time the CRANES also requested

that alternative damages, interest, and attorney fees be awarded.
(R. 001)
On July 29, 1985f all Respondents answered the Complaint by
way of general denial of the allegations and by asserting that no
deal was in fact consummated inasmuch as the CRANES supposedly
changed the terms of the agreement and Respondents withdrew their
original

offer.

(R.

030f

033f

036,

040)

DIXIE

TITLE

specifically claimed to be a neutral party, but asserted its
inability to release the escrowed documents and monies until all
conditions of the escrow had been fulfilled.

(R., 036)

LEISURE

SPORTS also counterclaimed against the CRANES alleging it had
been damaged as a result of the CRANES1 wrongful claim.

(R. 040)

Respondents also sought an award of costs and reasonable attorney
fees.

(R. 030, 033, 036, 040)
On August 12, 1985, the CRANES replied to LEISURE SPORTS1

counterclaim by general denial and by asserting that any damage
caused by their claim was the result of LEISURE SPORTS' own
actions.

The CRANES further affirmatively asserted the matters

set forth in their Complaint and the fact that LEISURE SPORTS had
failed to mitigate its damages.
-2-

(R. 075)

On October 2, 1986, Judge J. Harlan Burns signed a Pretrial
Order

in this case which was filed on October 7, 1986 which

further delineated the issues to be considered at trial,

(R.

184)
On January 23, 1987f Respondents filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment claiming that there were no remaining issues of material
fact and that Respondents were entitled to judgment as a matter
of law inasmuch as the CRANES had imposed new conditions in their
attempted acceptance, which act voided the Respondents1 offer and
constituted a counterclaim,

(R. 206 and 210)

On or about February 2 f 1987f the CRANES filed an affidavit
and memorandum opposing Respondents1 motion.

(R. 238 and 248)

An addendum to the memorandum was also filed on or about February
3, 1987.

(R. 266)

The trial court entered its Memorandum Ruling on Defendants1
Motion for Summary Judgment on March 9f 1987, which ruling denied
the motion on the basis that genuine issues of fact remained for
resolution at the time of trial.

(R. 276)

Trial in this matter was commenced on August 4, 1987 and
concluded

on

August

5f

1987,

with

Respondents and against the CRANES.

the

Court

finding

for

(R. 301)

On August 24, 1987f the Court entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, which were filed on September 4, 1987, by
which the Court expressed its conclusions that no contract had
been formed prior to the Respondents1 revocation of their offer
and that the CRANES1

attempted

acceptance was too late, and

constituted a counteroffer which Respondents had rejected.
-3-

The

Court

concluded

that

Respondent's

counterclaim

dismissed upon Respondents1 noted acquiescence.

should

be

(R. 305)

The Court entered its Judgment and Decree in accordance with
these findings on August 24, 1987 and the same was filed on
September 4, 1987.
Notice of Appeal was filed by the CRANES, acting through
counsel, on October 1, 1987r by which the CRANES challenge the
conclusions of the trial court that no contract was formed, that
their acceptance was too late, and that such acceptance added new
terms to the agreement and thereby became a counteroffer.

(R.

320)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, is a Utah limited partnership which is
in the business of real estate development and sales in southern
Utah.

(Findings

corporation

which

of

Fact

serves

TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE.

1(2)
as

HEART

general

MARKETING,

or managing

(Findings of Fact 1[3)

also a Utah corporation.

is a Utah
partner

of

LEISURE SPORTS, is

(Findings of Fact 1(3) Mr. Barry Church

is the President of HEART MARKETING as well as LEISURE SPORTS.
(Tr. Vol. 1, page 231)
LEISURE SPORTS.

Mr. Russell Gallian is a shareholder of

(Tr. Vol. 1, page 255)

CLIFFORD CRANE, is a limited partner of TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE,
owning twenty-five percent
(Findings of Fact 112)

(25%) of the partnership interest.

California, where the CRANES reside, is a

"community property" state.
In November, 1984, the CRANES reached in principle an oral
agreement with LEISURE SPORTS and TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, which was
-4-

to be reduced to writing by Russell Gallian, for the sale of
CLIFFORD CRANE'S limited partnership interests.
Fact H4)

(Findings of

Pursuant to the agreement, LEISURE SPORTS and HEART

MARKETING placed $175,000 in escrow in reliance upon their belief
that a deal had been struck and two separate agreements were
prepared by Mr. Gallian and forwarded to the CRANES on November
13f 1984.

(Findings of Fact 1[s 6, 7)

One agreement outlines the sale of a five percent

(5%)

interest in TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE TO LEISURE SPORTS in exchange for
Unit 210, Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums.

(Plaintiffs1

Exhibit

an

8)

This

property

was

encumbered

by

existing

construction loan with Nebraska Savings and Loan Association and
conveyance was to be made subject thereto, but title later was to
be cleared.

(Tr. Vol. 2, page 19)

an Assignment

of Limited

Attached to the agreement was

Partnership Interest.

(Plaintiffs'

Exhibit 8)
The other agreement recited provisions which would transfer
a

twenty

percent

(20%) interest

in TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE from

Plaintiff CLIFFORD G. CRANE to LEISURE SPORTS in exchange for the
sum

of One Hundred

Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars

(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 9)

($175f000).

Attached to this agreement was a second

Assignment of Partnership Interest conveying Plaintiffs' interest
to LEISURE SPORTS.
On

February

(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 9)
13f

1985f

the

CRANES

executed

both

these

agreements and deposited them with their California attorney, Mr.
Dean Mixon.

(Findings of Fact 1112)

Mr. Mixon dictated a letter

of transmittal on February 18, 1985, to accompany the documents.
-5-

(Findings of Fact 1(13)

The letter and the documents were sent

to DIXIE TITLE, the escrow agent for the transaction, on February
21, 1985.

(Findings of Fact 1[13)

The postmark of this letter

clearly indicates that it was placed in the mail on February 21,
1985.

(Findings of Fact 1113; Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 19A)
The letter instructed DIXIE TITLE to proceed in closing the

transactions with LEISURE SPORTS and TIMBERBROOK
confirmation

was

Association

that

obligations

by

agreement

received

from

Plaintiffs
acceptance

entered

between

Nebraska

had

of
that

a

been

as soon as

Savings

and

released

Substitution
Association

of

of

and

Loan
their

Guarantor
Russell

J.

Gallian, Chairman of the Board of Directors of LEISURE SPORTS
(Substitution

of

Guarantor

was

dated

November

20,

1984).

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19A)
The February 18th letter contained the following language:
There are three conditions to closing from our
side:
1. Your mailing to me by registered mail, the
original of the above-referenced affirmation
and warranty by Nebraska Savings and Loan
Association;
2. Your mailing to me by certified mail, a
fully executed Warranty Deed to Unit 210,
Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums;
3. Your disbursing by wire transfer, the sum
of $175,000 into my client's account at Home
Savings of America, 179 N. Tustin, Orange,
California 92667, Account No. 125-900624-3.
If the above-referenced closing does not occur
by Friday, March 8, 1985, you are instructed
to return all documents to me and to terminate
the escrow.
If you have any question or
comment, please do not hesitate to call.
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 19A)
-6-

The trial court found, however, that despite the fact that
an oral agreement had been reached in principle in November,
1984, the parties continued to act as though negotiations were in
process.

(Findings of Fact Ks 4 f 9f 10).

In this lightf the

court determined that the CRANES considered the sales agreements
merely an offer which they were free to accept or reject and not
a memorialization of a binding agreement.
Mr. Gallianf

(Findings of Fact 1[17)

as representative of Respondents, considered the

status of the dealings in the same posture.

(Findings of Fact

1(18)
The trial court further concluded that because Mr. Mixon's
letter of February 18 was not received into escrow on the morning
of February 22 when, by telephone, Mr. Gallian informed Mr. CRANE
that the deal was off, no contract was formed.
Ks 14, 16)

(Findings of Fact

This conclusion was reached despite the court's

finding that the letter was postmarked on February 21, 1985.
(Findings of Fact 1fl3)
Furthermore, despite its finding that agreement had been
reached

in November 1984, concerning the "transfer of money,

release of the Plaintiffs from the guarantee of a construction
loan,

preparation

of

a

deed

by

the

Defendants,

and

the

preparation and completion of two assignments by the Plaintiffs,"
(Findings of Fact 1[5) , the trial court went on to find that the
letter of February 18 "which accompanied Exhibits P-8 and P-9,
and deposited in escrow, in fact, only conditionally accepted the
outstanding offer and requiring (sic) that Defendants submit yet
additional documents into escrow."
-7-

(Findings of Fact 1[19)

The

court

determined

that

the

letter

"created

a

counteroffer

requiring the Defendants to supply a new document not previously
part of the offer, that document being a verification of the
authenticity

of

the

release

of

the

Plaintiffs

construction loan on Timberbrook Village, Ltd.

from

the

(Findings of Fact

1119)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in its conclusion that the letter
written

by

Mr. Dean

Mixon

on

February

18, 1985, which was

dispatched no later than February 21, 1985f was not a validf
timely acceptance of Respondents1 offer to purchase Appellants1
shares in Timberbrook Villagef Ltd., so as to require Dixie Title
Company to release funds placed in escrow to Appellants.

The

court should have concluded that a valid and binding contract was
consummated no later than February 21, 1985 when Mr. Mixon1 s
letter was placed in the United States Post Office.
The
implied

"conditions"
in the

contained

original

in

contract

Mr.
and

Mixon1s

as such

letter
could

were

not be

considered a counteroffer which Respondents were free to accept
or

reject.

In other wordsf

a request

to see the original

Substitution of Guarantor was not a material variance from the
anticipated construction loan release.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT A
LETTER WRITTEN BY MR. DEAN MIXON ON FEBRUARY
18 , 1985, WHICH WAS DISPATCHED NO LATER THAN
FEBRUARY 21, 1985f WAS NOT A VALID, TIMELY
ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONDENTS' OFFER TO PURCHASE
APPELLANTS' SHARES IN TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE,
LTD., SO AS TO REQUIRE DIXIE TITLE COMPANY TO
RELEASE FUNDS PLACED IN ESCROW TO APPELLANTS.
-8-

The trial court committed reversible error by ignoring its
own conclusion of fact that the letter of February 18, 1985,
which was postmarked on February 21, 1985, constituted a valid
and timely acceptance of Respondents' offer to contract for the
sale of Mr. CRANE'S limited partnership interest.

The law of

contracts makes this error strikingly clear:
For
the
purpose
of
consummating
the
contract. . .where the offer is made by mail
or otherwise contemplates and authorizes an
ac eptance by mail, the acceptance dates from
the time the letter of acceptance is duly
mailed, without regard to the time of its
receipt or whether it is in fact received. In
such
cases, the courts, upon balancing
conveniences and inconveniences, have deemed
it more consistent with the purpose and
intention of the parties to consider the
contract complete and absolutely binding on
the the transmission of the acceptance through
the post as the medium of communication which
the parties themselves contemplate, instead of
postponing its completion until the acceptance
has been received by the offeror. By treating
the post office as the agency of both parties,
the courts have managed to harmonize the legal
notion that it is necessary that the minds of
the
parties
meet
with
the
equally
well-established
principle
that
the
determination to accept is ineffectual if not
communicated either actually or by legal
implication.
77 AmJur2d, Vendor and Purchaser §22.
Accordingly, where acceptance by mail is
authorized, the contract is completed- ^at the
moment the acceptor deposits in the post
office the letter of acceptance directed to
the offeror's proper address and with the
postage prepaid, provided he does so within
the proper time and before receiving any
intimation of the revocation of the offer. It
follows that, in such a case, it is immaterial
whether the letter of acceptance actually
reaches the offeror.
17 AmJur2d, Contracts §48.
-9-

This rule of lawf otherwise known as the "mailbox rule", has
been uniformly accepted throughout the various jurisdiction of
the United States as is indicated by Williston's statements that
"it was early decided that the contract was complete upon the
mailing of the acceptance," and that "the law is so well settled
as to make discussion academic."

Selections From Williston on

Contracts, Acceptance of Offers §81.

Professor Corbin adds to

our understanding of the rationale underlying this principle:
Where the parties are negotiating at a
distance from each other, the most common
method of making an offer is by sending it by
mail; and more often than not the offeror has
specified no particular mode of acceptance.
In such a case, it is now the prevailing rule
that the offeree has power to accept and close
the
contract
by
mailing
a
letter
of
acceptance, properly stamped and addressed,
within a reasonable time.
The contract is
regarded as made at the time and place that
the letter of acceptance is put into the
possession of the post office department.
•

*

*

When an offer is by mail and the acceptance
also is by mail, the contract must date either
from the mailing of the acceptance or from its
receipt. In either case, one of the parties
will be bound by the contract without being
actually aware of that fact.
. '.
The
business community could no doubt adjust
itself to either rule; but the rule throwing
the risk on the offeror has the merit of
closing the deal more quickly and enabling
performance more promptly. . . . Also it is
the offeror who as invited the acceptance.
*

*

*

An offeror can always so word his offer and so
limit the power of acceptance as to make the
receipt of the acceptance necessary to the
creation of a contract.

-10-

Corbin on Contracts, Acceptance by Mail or Wire §78.
The Supreme Court of the state of Utah does "not question
these

general

principles

of

contract

formation."

Parks

Enterprises v. New Century Realty, 652 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah 1982).
There can be no doubt under the facts of the present case
that the parties were dealing with each other at a considerable
distance, the Respondents residing in Utah and* the CRANES in
California.

In fact, the documents which constituted LEISURE

SPORTS and HEART MARKETING'S offer were transmitted by mail from
St. George, Utah, to Santa Ana, California.
7)

(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit

Furthermore, the letter accompanying these documents clearly

invites

acceptance

by

mail

as

the

following

paragraph

demonstrates:
Enclosed you will find documents which you
should execute and send to the closing agent
in connection with your sale of your Limited
Partnership interest in Timberbrook Village
Ltd.
The closing agent is Dixie Title Co.
Inc. , 205 East Tabernacle, St. George, Utah,
84770 (a self addressed envelope is enclosed
for your convenienceK
(Emphasis added)
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 7)
There is absolutely no indication here or -in any written or
implied escrow agreement concluded between these parties that
would indicate that receipt of the acceptance was to supplant the
traditional and well accepted principles of contract law.
the trial court found that:
.the agreement states, as do the cover
letters of Gallian, said agreements were to be
executed and delivered by the Plaintiffs in
escrow
to
complete
their
end
of
the
transaction. The Court finds that this event
had not occurred when Mr. Crane had been told,
as had Mr. Westbrook, by Mr. Gallian that the
deal was off.
-11-

Yet,

(Findings of Fact 1(16)

This conclusion is totally incorrect and

unsubstantiated by the evidence produced at trial.
Fully supported, however, by documentation produced at trial
is the fact that the CRANES'' letter of acceptance, written and
sent by their California attorney, Mr. Mixon, was postmarked on
February 21, 1985, prior to the time when Mr. Gallian attempted
to revoke the offer on February 22 of the same year.
of Fact 1fl3)

(Findings

In other words, the CRANES fully complied with the

express requirements to "execute and send" the documents which
had

been

forwarded

revocation.

to

them

to Respondents1

prior

attempted

(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 18)

The demonstrated facts of this case, the trial court's own
Findings of Fact, and the law of contracts demand that this Court
reach the conclusion that Mr. Mixon1s letter of February 18,
1985, constituted a valid and timely acceptance to Respondents'
continuing offer and, this being the case, DIXIE TITLE should be
required to release the funds in escrow, along with interest, to
the CRANES.
POINT II
THE CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN MR. MIXON'S LETTER
OF FEBRUARY 18r 1985, WERE IMPLIED IN THE
ORIGINAL CONTRACT AND AS SUCH COULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED A COUNTEROFFER WHICH RESPONDENTS
WERE FREE TO ACCEPT OR REJECT.
In reaching
behalf

of

a conclusion

Plaintiffs

created

that
a

"Mixon1 s cover

counteroffer

letter

requiring

on
the

Defendants to supply a new document not previously part of the
offer. . .", the trial misconstrued the nature of the essential
facts as well as the law of contracts pertaining to offer and
acceptance.

(Findings of Fact 1(19)

The general rule is that for an offer and
acceptance to constitute a contract, the
acceptance must meet and correspond with the
offer in every respect. The corollary of this
rule is that any material variance between
offer and and acceptance precludes formation
of a contract. (Citations omitted)
*

*

*

However, if the condition added by the
intended acceptance can be implied in the
original offer, then it does not constitute a
material variance so as to make the acceptance
ineffective.
Northwest Properties Agency, Inc. v. McGhee, 462 P.2d 249, 253
(Wash.App. 1969); see also, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v.
Smith, 637 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Wyo. 1981); Pravorne v. McLeod, 383
P.2d 855, 857 (Nev. 1963); 17 AmJur2d, Contracts, §64.
Furthermore, it has been stated that "sometimes an acceptor
from abundance of caution inserts a condition in his acceptance
which merely express what would be implied in fact or in law from
the offer.

As such a condition involves no qualification of the

acceptor's assent to the terms of the offer, a contract is not
precluded."

Burkhead v. Farlow, 266 NC 595, 146 SE2d 802, 16

ALR3d 1416, 1421 (N.C. 1966)
Moreover, although the offeree expressly
qualifies his acceptance by making it a
condition thereof that he is to have a right
to which he would by law have been entitled if
his acceptance had been absolute in terms,
there being no reference to such right in the
offer, it seems that the acceptance is in
reality absolute, does not vary from the
offer, and operates to form a contract."
17 AmJur2d, Contracts, §64.
The facts of the present case make it abundantly clear that
Mr.

Mixon's

letter

of

February
-13-

18,

1985,

though

sounding

conditional, requested nothing more than that which was intended
by the parties throughout their negotiations and that which would
be implied by law.

The letter contained the following language:

There are three conditions to closing from our
side:
1. Your mailing to me by registered mail, the
original of the above-referenced affirmation
and warranty by Nebraska Savings & Loan
Association;
2.
Your mailing to me by certified mail, a
fully executed Warranty Deed to Unit 210,
Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums;
3. Your disbursing by wire transfer, the sum
of $175,000 into my clients account at Home
Savings of American, 179 N. Tustin, Orange,
California 92667, Account No. 125-900624-3.
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 18)
It is important to note that the trial court considered only
the first of these supposed "conditions" to be a new addition:
The Court further finds that the letter of
Dean Mixon of February 18th, 1985, which
accompanied
Exhibits
P-8
and
P-9, and
deposited
in
escrow,
in
fact,
only
conditionally accepted the outstanding offer
and requiring that Defendants submit yet
additional documents into escrow.
As a
result, the Court finds that Mixon1s cover
letter on behalf of Plaintiffs created a
counteroffer
requiring the Defendants to
supply a new document not previously part of
the offer, that document being a verification
of the authenticity of the release of the
Plaintiffs
from
construction
loan
on
Timberbrook Village, Ltd.
(Findings of Fact 1(19)
Given the facts and evidence as produced during the course
of proceedings in this case, it is impossible to justify the
court's

conclusion.

During

the course

-14-

of negotiations, the

parties specifically agreed that Mr. CRANE was to be released
from

the

obligations

he

had

incurred

as

a

guarantor

of a

construction loan with Nebraska Savings & Loan in connection with
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE.
specifically

(Tr. 69, 257)

In fact, Mr. Gallian

testified that "we had agreed with Mr. Crane to

obtain a novation where he would be released from the loans and
someone else would replace him.

That turned out to be me."

(Tr.

257)
When Mr. Gallian forwarded

the written agreement to the

CRANES for signature, he did not enclosed anything which amounted
to a release of from the construction loan.
until

much

later,

February

11, 1985,

(Tr. 72)
that

a

"Substitution of Guarantor" was sent to Mr. Mixon.
Exhibits 12 and 14)

It was not

"copy"

of

a

(Plaintiffs1

Though the copy of the Substitution of

Guarantor appeared to be signed by Mr. Gallian and Mr. Dewey
Crouch

on

behalf

of

Nebraska

Savings

and

Loan

it was not

notarized nor authenticated in any manner whatsoever.

(Tr. 84;

Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 14)
At this point, out of an "abundance of caution" Mr. Mixon
included

a request

above-referenced

in his

letter

substitution

be

that the original
produced

for

of the

inspection.

(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 18). Given the substance and nature of the
transactions under consideration it can hardly be said that such
a

request was a material alteration of the agreement.

hundreds

of

reasonable

thousands
that

of

dollars

something

are

more

unauthenticated photocopy be produced.
-15-

at
than

When

stake, it is only
an

unnotarized,

This is particularly true

where neither the CRANES nor Mr. Mixon were acquainted with Mr.
Dewey Crouchf the signator for Nebraska Savings and Loan.

(Tr.

85)
The reasonableness of Mr. Mixon1s request is reflected in
the

law

of

novations

which

requires

that

"all

the

parties

concerned must agreef and in the absence of such agreement or
consent a novation cannot be affected."

58 AmJur2d, Novation

§16f see also; Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Rider, 42 P.2d 842,
843 (Okl. 1935).
The facts and circumstances surrounding this case, indicate
that the trial court was mistaken in reaching a conclusion that a
request to see the original

Substitution of Guarantor was a

material variance from that which was anticipated by the parties
throughout the course of negotiations.

With this in mind this

Court should overturn the ruling of the lower court and require
DIXIE TITLE to release

funds held

in escrow along with all

accrued interest to the CRANES.
CONCLUSION
As the Court considers this appeal, the CRANES respectfully
urge

it

to

conclude

that

the

trial

court

has

mistakenly

interpreted the rules of contract law by finding that no contract
was consummated, despite the fact that a letter of acceptance was
deposited

with

the

United

States

Respondents1 attempted revocation.

Post

Office

prior

to

Furthermore, the Court should

find that a request to see something more than an unnotarized,
unauthenticated
variance

to

the

photocopy
agreement

of

a

which
-16-

novation
was

was

not a material

sufficient

to

reach a

conclusion that the same constituted a counteroffer capable of
being rejected by the Respondents,
If the Court reaches these conclusions, the CRANES also
respectfully request that the Court vacate the decision of the
trial

court

and

remand with

instructions

to enter

a proper

judgment which requires DIXIE TITLE to disburse the $175,000,
along with all appropriate interest, held in escrow to them and
that they be awarded costs on appeal and reasonable attorneys
fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

l~7ft- day of April, J.988.

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that

I mailed four

(4) full, true and

correct copies of the above and foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF

to

Mr. Michael D. Hughes, Attorney for Respondents, of THOMPSON,
HUGHES & REBER, Attorneys at Law, at 148 East Tabernacle, St.
George, Utah 84770 this /~^C.day of April 1988.
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78-2-1 5

JUDICIAL CODE

Membership on state law library board,
§ 37-1-1
Proceedings
unaffected
by
vacancy,
§ 78 7 21

Qualifications of justices, Utah Const, Art
VIII, Sec 7
Retirement, Utah Const, Art VIII, Sec 15,
$ 4 9 7a-1 et seq , §§ 78-7 29, 78-7-30
Salary, Utah Const, Art VIII, Sec 14

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jur 2d Courts
§§ 67, 68
C.J.S. — 21 C J S Courts § 465, 48A C J S
Judges §§ 3, 7, 8, 21 to 25, 85

78-2-1.5.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Section 78-2 1 5 (L 1969, ch
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court

78-2-1.6.

Key Numbers. — Courts «=» 101, 248,
Judges «=. 1, 7 to 12

justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch 182,
§4

Repealed.

Repeals. — Section 78 2 1 6 (L 1979, ch
134, § 1, 1981, ch 156, § 1), relating to salaries of justices, was repealed by Laws 1981, ch
267, <* 2, effective July 1, 1982

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective until J a n u ary 1, 1988].
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals,
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers,
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in cases oiigmatmg«in
(l) the Public Service Commission;
(n) the State Tax Commission,
(in) the Board of State Lands;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and
(v) the state engineer,
(0 a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony,
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony, and
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(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of t h e
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except for the following matters:
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, b u t the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).

Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective J a n u a r y 1,
1988].
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over: x
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and
(v) the state engineer;
(D a final judgment or decree of any court of record-holding a s t a t u t e of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except for the following matters:
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions;
7
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(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(0 taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b,
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, c h . 161, § 303.
Amended effective J a n u a r y 1, 1988. —
Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 303 amends this section
effective J a n u a r y 1, 1988. See catchline
"Amendment Notes," below.
R e p e a l s and E n a c t m e n t s . — Laws 1986,
ch. 47, § 41 repeals former § 78-2-2, as enacted
by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 1, relating to original
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, and
enacts the above section.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective J a n u a r y 1, 1988, added Subsection (6).
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Appeals from juvenile courts, § 78-3a-51.
Appeals in criminal cases, U.R.Cr.P. 26.

Certiorari, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 4;
U.R.C.P. 65B.
Chief justice to preside over impeachment of
governor, § 77-6-3.
Election
contest
appeals,
§§ 20-3-35,
20-15-14.
Extraordinary writs, U.R.C.P. 65B.
Industrial commission orders, review of,
§ 35-1-36.
Jurisdiction, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3.
Public service commission orders, exclusive
jurisdiction to review, §§ 54-7-16 to 54-7-18.
State bar, promulgation of rules, review of
disciplinary orders, §§ 78-51-14, 78-51-19.
Unemployment compensation decisions, review of, § 35-4-10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Appellate jurisdiction.
— Probate orders.
Certiorari.
Original jurisdiction.
—Equity.
—Extraordinary writs.
Rehearings.
—District judge filling vacancy.
—Newly elected justice.
Scope of review.
In g e n e r a l .
Supreme Court is exclusive judge of its own
jurisdiction. Nations) Bank v. Lewis, 13 Utah
507, 45 P. 890 (1896).
The Supreme Court is not a court of general
original jurisdiction; it is a reviewing court.
Nielsen v. Utah Nat'l Bank, 40 Utah 95, 120 P.
211 (1911).
Supreme Court can inquire into its own jurisdiction no matter how that question is called
to its attention and regardless of whether par-

ties desire it to do so. Woldberg v. Industrial
Comm'n, 74 Utah 309, 279 P. 609 (1929).
Question of Supreme Court's jurisdiction to
hear and determine « n appeal is one that can
be raised by the court on its own motion. City
of Logan City v. Blotter, 75 Utah 272, 284 P.
333 (1929).
Appellate jurisdiction.
—Probate o r d e r s .
Final orders in probate were appealable un-

003

SUPREME COURT
der former § 20-2-2, Code 1943. In re Cliffs
Estate, 101 Utah 343, 122 P.2d 196 (1942).
Certiorari.
Even prior to express statutory authorization, Supreme Court had original jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari. Young v. Cannon,
2 Utah 560 (1880).
Where district court exceeded its jurisdiction
on appeal from justice of peace, Supreme Court
had power by certiorari to review such jurisdictional question, judgment not being reviewable
by further appeal. Oregon Short Line R.R. v.
District Court, 30 Utah 371, 85 P. 360 (1906).
Supreme Court, and not justice thereof, was
authorized to issue writ of certiorari, and statute, which conferred such power on justice of
Supreme Court, had to give way to Constitution. Robinson v. District Court, 38 Utah 379,
113 P. 1026 (1910).
Supreme court can exercise a reasonable discretion in granting or refusing a writ of certiorari. Rohwer v. District Court, 41 Utah 279,
125 P. 671 (1912).
Original j u r i s d i c t i o n .
—Equity.
Supreme Court no longer possesses any original jurisdiction in equity cases; in making its
own findings in such cases, the court acts
merely as an appellate or reviewing tribunal.
In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128,158 P. 705
(1916).
—Extraordinary writs.
Even prior to express statutory authorization, Supreme Court had jurisdiction to issue
writ of mandamus in a proper case. Maxwell v.
Burton, 2 Utah 595 (1880).
It did not necessarily follow from fact that
Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to issue writs, enumerated in former Utah Const.,
Art. VIII, Sec. 4, that it was court's duty to
issue such writs in every instance merely on
applications for them. State v. Booth, 21 Utah
88, 59 P. 553 (1899).
Former Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 4, in conferring authority upon the Supreme Court to
issue writs of prohibition, contemplated a writ
having the same character and functions as the
writ defined by the territorial statute then in
existence. Barnes v. City of Lehi City, 74 Utah
321, 279 P. 878 (1929).
After remittitur had gone down to district
court, Supreme Court did not have exclusive
jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition in the
cause. Plutus Mining Co. v. Orme, 76 Utah
286, 289 P. 132 (1930).
Where situation called for relief more nearly
analogous to purpose of writ of mandamus
rather than to writ of prohibition, and neither
standing alone would bring about desired result, Supreme Court had authority to issue
both writs of mandamus and prohibition. Child

78-2-2

v. Ogden State Bank, 81 Utah 464, 20 P.2d
599, 88 A.L.R. 1284 (1933).
Whether district court had jurisdiction was
not determinative of whether Supreme Court
would entertain application for writ of prohibition; whether there was a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy at law was determinative.
Mayers v. Bronson, 100 Utah 279, 114 P.2d
213 (1941).
Objections to jurisdiction of administrative
tribunals are to be first presented to such tribunal before applying to Supreme Court for a
writ of prohibition. Furbreeders AgrL Coop. v.
Wiesley, 102 Utah 601, 132 P.2d 384 (1942).
Supreme Court's discretion was exercised in
favor of making writ of prohibition permanent
to prevent enforcement of city (now circuit)
court criminal contempt judgment, as against
contention that petitioner had plain, speedy
and adequate remedy by appeal, where alleged
contempt was not committed in presence of
court or judge, and court did not acquire jurisdiction over either person of petitioner or of
offense claimed because of absence of initiatory
affidavit required by former § 104-45-3, so
that contempt proceedings were void. Robinson
v. Citv Court, 112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256
(1947).
Rehearings.
—District j u d g e filling v a c a n c y .
A district judge called to sit in lieu of disqualified justice is a member of the court for all
purposes so far as his right to participate in the
case and in its decision and should sit in on a
rehearing even after the vacancy is filled. In re
Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 269 P. 103
(1927).
—Newly e l e c t e d j u s t i c e .
Member of Supreme Court, elected after case
had been decided, was not entitled to participate in consideration for rehearing. Cordner v.
Cordner, 91 Utah 474, 64 P.2d 828 (1937).
S c o p e of r e v i e w .
In original proceeding in Supreme Court to
review proceedings of district court, Supreme
Court will ignore mere irregularities or legal
errors in trial court, and^would limit review to
question of whether district court exceeded its
jurisdiction or was without jurisdiction in making and entering the judgment complained of.
Jeffries v. Third Judicial District Court, 90
Utah 525, 63 P.2d 242 (1936).
Where no motion w a s m a d e for directed verdict or new trial, Supreme Court was precluded
from reviewing sufficiency of evidence in cause
at law, since under former Utah Const., Art
VIII, Sec. 9 and predecessor of this section review could be made only on questions of law.
Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d
292, 470 P 2 d 393 (1970).
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JOHN A. BUKKHEAD
v
LESTER M. FARLOW ct al.
North Carolina Supreme Court -— March 2, 1966
266 NC 595, 146 SE2d 802, 16 ALR3d 1416
SUMMARY OF DECISION
The vendee under an alleged contract for the sale of land instituted an
action against the vendors for specific performance in the Superior Court,
Randolph County, North Carolina, James F. Latham, J. An "Option of
Purchase," which did not require payment or tender of the purchase price until
delivery of the deed and acceptance of title, was accepted by the plaintiff, who
stated that the money would be available when title examination was completed,
but the defendants attempted to revoke the offer and refused to execute a
deed. The trial court allowed the defendants' motion for judgment of nonsuit.
On appeal by the plaintiff, the trial court's judgment was reversed by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, which, in an opinion by Sharp, J., held,
inter alia, that (1) an acceptance of an offer to sell land making no specifications
or limitations as to title was not made conditional by including a provision requiring marketable title, since merchantability was implied in a contract to
convey land, absent an agreement to the contrary, and (2) the vendee's acceptance in the case at bar was unconditional, not specifying any requirement other
than a good or marketable title.
HEADNOTES
Classified to ALR Digests
Contracts §§ 93, 94 — option — withdrawal
— acceptance
1. An option to purchase realty, not under
seal and without consideration, is a mere
oiler to sell which the vendors may withdrawal any time before acceptance, but after unconditional acceptance, there is a valuable
consideration to support the contract.

Trial § 249 — nonsuit^— consideration of
plaintiff's evidence
2. In considering a motion for nonsuit, the
plaintiff's evidence must be taken as true,
Contracts § § 9 9 , 10$ —.written option —
parol acceptance — statute of frauds
3. A wiitten option offering to sell, at the

SUBJECT O F A N N O T A T I O N
Beginning on page 1424
Variance between ofTer and acceptance in regard to title as
afTccting consummation of contract for sale of real property
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election of the optionee, can become bindone that he will be willing to accept; the
ing on the owner by verbal notice to the
fact that the title is not satisfactory to a
owner, but a parol acceptance does not repel
particular purchaser or his attorney does not
the statute of frauds and thus cannot bind
necessarily mean that the title is, in fact, not
the optionee.
marketable.
Contracts § 102 — unconditional acceptance
4. T o consummate a valid contract an
acceptance must be unconditional and must
not change, add to, or qualify the terms of
the offer.
Contracts § 102 — acceptance of option —
condition implied in fact or law
5. An optionee's insertion in his acceptance of a condition which merely expresses
that which would be implied in fact or in
law by the offer does not preclude the consummation of the contract, since such a condition involves no qualification of the acceptor's assent to the terms of the offer.
Vendor and Purchaser §§ 38, 40 — marketable title — reasonable doubt
6. In any contract to convey land, unless
the parties agree differently, the law implies
an undertaking on the part of the vendor to
convey a good or marketable title to the
purchaser; a marketable title is one free
from reasonable doubt in law or fact as tc
its validity, and it must be one which can
be sold to a reasonable purchaser or mortgaged to a person of reasonable prudence.
Contracts § 102 — sale of land — acceptance — provision requiring marketable
title
7. Since, in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, merchantability is implied
in a contract to convey land, the acceptance
of an offer to sell land making no specifications or limitations as to title is not made
conditional by including a provision requiring marketable title.
[Annotated]
Vendor and Purchaser § 40.5 — marketable
title — satisfaction of vendee or attorney
8. Although the law implies an obligation
on the part of the vendor to furnish a good
or marketable title, it does not imply any
obligation to furnish a title that will be
satisfactory to the vendee or his attorney or

Contracts § 102 — sale of land — acceptance — title satisfactory to vendee's
attorney
9. An acceptance of an offer to sell land
which provides that the title must be satisfactory to the buyer's attorney is a conditional acceptance, imposing as a condition
of the sale the approval of the vendee's
lawyer as distinguished from the standard
established by the law of furnishing a good
or marketable title.
[Annotated]
Contracts § 102; Specific Performance § 27
— option to purchase land — acceptance — marketable title
10. A vendee's oral acceptance of an " O p tion of Purchase," stating that the money
would be available when title examination
was completed, is unconditional, not specifying any requirement other than a good or
marketable title, where the option did not
require payment or tender oi the purchase
price until delivery of the deed and acceptance of title, and no tender was required
of the vendee, seeking specific performance,
where the vendors attempted to revoke the
offer after acceptance and refused to execute
a deed.
[Annotated]
Vendor and Purchaser § 40.5 — merchantable title — opinion of vendee's attorney
11. T h e opinion of the vendee's attorney
that title to the property is not merchantable
is not binding upon the Vendor, unless it is
so stipulated in the contract.
Specific Performance § 64 — sale of land —
marketability of title — question for
court
12. W h e r e the vendor seeks specific performance and the vendee defends on the
ground that the vendor's title is not good,
marketability becomes a question for the
court.
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BRIEFS OF COUNSEL
John Randolph Ingram, of Asheboro, for
appellant:
Plainti(T\s evidence shows a valid ofTer in
writing signed by defendants to sell their
land. ^ G S 22-2.
A written m e m o r a n d u m , though it may l>c
informal, must be sufficiently definite to
show the essential elements of a valid contract.
It must embody the terms of the
contract, names of vendor and vendee, and
a description of the land to be conveyed, at
least sufficiently definite to be aided by parol.
Smith v Joyce, 214 N C 602, 200 SE 431;
Elliott v Owen, 224 N C GR4, 94 SE2d 59.
T h e m e m o r a n d u m in issue is definite as
to (1) the intent to sell; (2) the parties—
vendee and vendors; (3) description of the
lands (Norton v Smith, 179 N C 553, 103
SE 14; Gilbert v Wright, 195 N C 165, 141
SE 577); (4) the purchase price of $15,000,
payable on delivery of deed and acceptance
of title.
After a party announces his refusal to
comply with the terms of the option, the
lender of the balance of the purchase price
and a demand for the deed arc unnecessary.
Johnson v Noles, 224 N C 512.
An option without consideration is a continuing offer. 55 Am Jur, Vendor and Purchaser § 32.
A party may testify to his own intention
and understanding when they are relevant.
Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence § 130;
Burns v Tomlinson, 147 N C 634, 61 SE 615.
Consideration for an agreement to hold
an offer open is unnecessary where the purchaser notifies the vendor of an election to
purchase prior to the attempt of the vendor
to withdraw the offer. 55 Am J u r , Vendor
and Purchaser § 3 2 ; Winders v Kenan, 161
N C 628, 632.
Miller & Beck, Adam W. Beck, Coltranc
& Gavin, and T. Worth Coltranc, all of
Asheboro, for appellees:
Plaintiff's intent with respect to payment
of the $15,000 in accordance with the alleged option or offer to sell is not relevant
to the question whether plaintiff accepted
the option and tendered the $15,000 in accordance with its terms. Stansbury, North
Carolina Evidence (2d cd) § 162.

A leading question is one that suggests the
answer desired; usually a question that may
be answered by yes or no is regarded as
leading. Stansbury, North Carolina Evid e n c e ' ( 2 d ed) § 3 1 .
Questions must not be so framed as to
assume a fact not in evidence or a fact that
is in dispute in the case. Stansbury, North
Carolina Evidence (2d ed) § 3 1 .
Want of consideration constitutes legal
excuse for nonperformance of an executory
promise. 1 Strong, North Carolina Index,
Contracts § 4.
Where the sole consideration for a contract is the mutual promise of the parties, it
is necessary that such promise be binding on
both; where it is binding only on one it
cannot constitute a sufficient consideration
for the promise of the other.
Smith v
Barnes, 236 N C 176, 72 SE2d 216.
T h e intention of the parties as expressed
in the written agreement is contioiling, and
when such agreement is explicit the court
must so declare, irrespective of what either
party thought the effect of the contract to
be. 1 Strong, North Carolina Index, Contracts § 12.
An ambiguity in a written contract is to
be inclined against the party who prepared
the writing. Jones v -Realty Co 226 N C
303,37SE2d906.
A permissive provision will not be construed as imposing an obligation. Williamson v Miller, 2 3 1 N C 722,^58 SE2d 743.
Until a proposal is accepted, there can be
no contract, as there is nothing by which the
proposer can l>e bound; unless both are
bound so that an action can be maintained
against either for breach, neither will }>e
bound. Timber Co ; v Wilson, 151 N C 154,
65 SE 932.
An option is a right acquired by contract
to accept or reject a present offer within a
limited reasonable time in the future, Trogden v Williams, 114 N C 192.
Plaintiff's evidence does not show an unconditional acceptance of the so-called option in accordance with its terms, or that
plaintiff made a tender of the purchase price
prior to the time that the offer was withdrawn by defendants.

n n^

16ALR3d

BUKKJIKAI) v I ; AKLOW

206 NC 59!'), H(> SK2d
Briefs of Counsel -(Cont'd
A c o m m i t is not made so long as, in the
contemplation of the paitics thereto, something remains to be done to establish contract relations. In negotiating a contract
the parties may impose any condition pieced-
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ent, a peiformance of which tondition is
essential hefoie the paiiies become hound by
the agreement.
1 Stioni>, N o i t h Carolina
Index, Contracts § 16; Leiner Shops v
Rosenthal, 225 N C 316, 34 S1^2d 206.

STATEMENT
Action for specific performance of an alleged contract to convey real estate.
It is alleged and admitted in the pleadings that defendants are seized in fee
simple as tenants by the entireties of a tract of land consisting of approximately
52 acres located in Black Creek Township, Randolph County, fronting approximately 500 feet on Spero Road. The property is described by metes and bounds
in paragraph III of the complaint.
Plaintiff's evidence tends to show: On or about August 15, 1961, defendants
told plaintiff that they owned the 52-acre tract of land in question, and Mrs.
Farlow said to plaintiff, "Why don't you buy it?'' Two days later he offered
defendants $15,000.00 for this property "if they wanted to sign a contract
and agreement at that time." Assenting, defendants signed the following
document, which had been prepared by plaintiff:
"Option of Purchase
"We do here-by option to John A. Burkhead, a certain parcel or tract of
land, lying & being in Black Creek Township, Randolph County and described
as follows: App. 52 acres of land with 500 ft. more or le^s fronting the Spero
Rd. The purchase 1-1,000:0*4 15,000.00, payable upon delivery of deed and
acceptance of Title.
"Option expires Oct. 15, 1961.
HIS—Lester M. Farlow
HER—Dorothy F a r l o w ; ' '
After the above memorandum was signed, plaintiff asked defendants for the
deed to the property so that he could "put it in the hands of an attorney for
a title check." When they gave him the deed, he told them it would be two
or three weeks before the title examination could be completed, and that when
it was "the money would be available for them." Plaintiff testified: "My
acceptance of this title depended on the title examination of this property."
Approximately two weeks after defendants signed the instrument set out above,
Mrs. Farlow telephoned plaintiff that she and her husband had decided not to
sell the property. Plaintiff told her that they had signedn- binding contract
which he expected them to perform. Her reply was, "We are not going to sell."
At the time of this conversation, the title examination had not been completed.
It was completed thereafter, and the title is acceptable to plaintiff.
At the close of plaintiff's evidence, the court allowed defendants' motion
for judgment of nonsuit. Plaintiff appeals.
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OPINION OF T H E C O U R T
Sharp, J.
The informal ''Option of Purchase" signed by defendants, the parties sought
to be charged in this action, embodies the terms of the offer-of sale and the
names of the vendor and vendee. The adequacy of the description of the
land to be conveyed is not in question here for defendants admit in their further
answer that on August 15, 1961, they executed an option to plaintiff to purchase the lands described in the complaint. Sec Lane v Coe, 262 NC 8, 136
SE2d 269; Gilbert v Wright, 195 NC 165, 141 SE 577; Norton v Smith, 179
NC 553, 103 SE 14. This case, therefore, involves no questions pertaining to
the statute of frauds, G. S. § 22-2.
H ] The option in suit is not under seal, and it was without consideration. It
was a mere offer to sell which defendants might have withdrawn at any time
before acceptance. "(W)ithout a valuable consideration to support it, the
agreement would be a mere nudum pactum, and might have been withdrawn
at any time. . . . But, after unconditional acceptance, there is a valuable
consideration to support the contract. . . ." Bryant Timber Co. v Wilson,
151 NC 154, 156, 65 SE 932, 933. See Thomason v Bescher, 176 N C 622,
97 SE 654, 2 ALR 626. For a resume of the rules applicable to options in North
Carolina, see Christopher, Options to Purchase Real Property in North Carolina, 44 NCL Rev 63 (1965).
[2, 3] Plaintiff's evidence, which must be taken as true in considering the
motion for nonsuit, tends to show that at the time defendants delivered the
option to plaintiff, he orally agreed to buy the property and told defendants the
money would be available as soon as the title examination had been completed.
"A written option offering to sell, at the election of the optionee, can become
binding on the owner by verbal notice to the owner . . . ." Warner v W &
O, Inc., 263 NC 37, 42, 138 SE2d 782, 786. Accord, Kovtler v Martin, 241
NC 369, 85 SE2d 314. A parol acceptance, of course, would not repel the
statute of frauds and thus could not have bound the optionee.
Plaintiff's notice of acceptance was given to defendant-optionors approximately two months before the option expired, and defendants' purported repudiation occurred about two weeks after receipt of this notice. The question
which this appeal presents is whether plaintiff unconditionally accepted the
offer contained in the option. Defendants contend that plaintiff's acceptance
was conditional in that it was made to depend upon the title examination
which had not been completed at the time defendants withdrew their offer.
I4» 5] It is uniformly held that to consummate a valid contract an acceptance A
must be unconditional and must not change, add to, or qualify the terms of
the offer. Carver v Britt, 241 NC 538, 85 SE2d 888. It is also the general
rule that the optionee's insertion in his acceptance of a condition which merely
expresses that which "would be implied in fact or in law by the offer does not
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preclude the consummation of the contract, since such a condition involves rio
qualification of the acceptor's assent to the terms of the offer." Annot., Land
Sale—Offer and Acceptance—Variance, 149 ALR 205, 211 (1914).
[6] In any contract to convey land, unless the parties agree differently, the
law implies an undertaking on the part of the vendor to convey a good or marketable tide to the purchaser. Richardson v Greensboro Warehouse & Storage
Co., 223 NC 344, 26 SE2d 897, 149 ALR 201; Leach v Johnson, 134 NC 87,
19 SR 239; Townsend v Stick, 158 F2d 142; Annot., Marketable Title, 57
ALR 1253, 1268 (1928); 55 Am Jur, Vendor & Purchaser § 149 (1946). A
marketable title is one "free from reasonable doubt in law or fact as to its
validity." Pack v Newman, 232 NC 397, 400, 61 SE2d 90, 92. It "must
be one which can be sold to a reasonable purchaser or mortgaged to a person
of reasonable prudence." 55 Am Jur, op cit supra § 149; 92 CJS Vendor &
Purchaser § 191 (1955). See Annot., 57 ALR, supra at 1282-85.
[7]
Since, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, merchantability
is implied in a contract to convey land, "the acceptance of an offer to sell
land making no specifications or limitations as to title is not made conditional
by including a provision requiring "marketable title." 1 Corbin, Contracts § 86
(2d Ed 1963). Cases supporting this proposition are collected in Annot., 149
ALR, supra at 211-213 and in 1 Williston, Contracts § 7 8 (3d Ed 1957),
wherein it is stated:
"Sometimes an acceptor from abundance of caution inserts a condition in
his acceptance which merely expresses what would be implied in fact or in
law from the offer. As such a condition involves no qualification of the
acceptor's assent to the terms of the offer, a contract is not precluded. Thus
an offer to sell land may be accepted subject to the condition that the title is
good, for unless the offer expressly specifies that die offeree must take his
chance as to the validity of the title, the meaning of the offer is that a good
title will be conveyed."
T o like effect, see illustration No. 2 to Restatement, Contracts §"-60 comment a
(1932).
[fi. 9 3 Although the law implies an obligation on the part of the vendor to
furnish a good or marketable title, it does not imply any obligation to furnish
a title that will be satisfactory to the vendee or his attorney or one that he
will be willing to accept. The fact that the tide is not satisfactory to a particular
purchaser or his attorney does not necessarily mean that the title is, in fact,
not marketable. 55 Am Jur, op cit supra § 150. Therefore, an acceptance of
an offer to sell land which provides that the title must be-satisfactory to the
buyer's attorney is a conditional acceptance; it imposes as a condition of the
sale the approval of his own lawyer as distinguished from the standard established by the law. Richardson v Greensboro Warehouse & Storage Co., supra.
Cf. Carver v Britt, supra; 1 Williston, Contracts § 77 (3d Ed 1957); Annot.,
149 ALR, supra at 208-210.
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HO] The narrow question confronting us is whether the terms of plaintiff's
acceptance—that when the title examination was completed the money would
be available—specified any requirement other than a good or marketable title.
It goes without saying that plaintiff had a right to secure a lawyer's opinion
as to the quality of the title. No prudent person would buy land without
first having the title examined by a qualified title attorney. In order to give
a title opinion, an abstractor must make a careful, and sometimes timeconsuming, search of the public records. As Parker, J. (now C. J.) said in
Carver v Britt, supra 241 NC at 541, 85 SE2d at 891, "The looking up of a tide,
the drafting and execution of a deed, the time and place of payment of the
purchase price are customary details in working out a real estate conveyance."
[11,12] l n Richardson v Greensboro Warehouse & Storage Co., supra,
plaintiff not only made his acceptance of defendant's title dependent upon the
approval of specified attorneys; he expressly stipulated that if these particular
attorneys did not approve the title his earnest money would be returned and the
transaction terminated. Plaintiff here imposed no such condition, nor did
he require that the title be ''satisfactory" to any particular individual or his
agent "before the money would be available." For a collection of the cases
discussing this latter and troublesome requirement see Annot., Land Sale—
"Satisfactory" Title, 47 ALR2d 455 (1956). All that plaintiff required in
this case was "a title check." From these words we can imply only that
plaintiff would accept the title if it were ascertained to be merchantable. Of
course, it will always be the attorney selected by the vendee who first gives
him a title opinion. Should the abstractor's opinion be adverse, unless it has
been so stipulated in the contract, his opinion is not binding upon the vendor.
In a situation where the vendor seeks specific performance and the vendee
defends on the ground that vendor's title is not good, marketability becomes
a question for the court. City of North Mankato v Carlstrom, 212 Minn
32, 2 N\V2d 130. See 92 CJS op cit supra § 191.
This case is closely analogous to Townsend v Stick, supra. There Stick
(vendee) notified Townsend that he accepted his offer to sell land at the price
quoted and offered to place the money in escrow "pending establishment of
the title to the property." Townsend resisted specific performance on the ground
that Stick had not accepted his offer unconditionally. The court held that
Stick's acceptance did not modify the offer. It said, " ( A ) 11 that was suggested
was an examination of title to determine its merchantability, and it is uniformly conceded that it is implied in a contract to convey land, unless differendy
agreed, that the vendor will give a marketable title." Id. 158 F2d at 144.
Specific performance was decreed.
[10] \Vc hold that, upon this record, plaintiff's acceptance of the offer contained in the "Option of Purchase" was unconditional. The option did not
require payment or tender of the purchase price until defendants delivered a
deed to plaintiff. The defendants having attempted to revoke the offer after
acceptance and having refused to execute a deed, no tender was required of
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plaintiff. First Citizens Bank Trust Co. v Frazelle, 226 NC 724, 40 SL2d
367.
The judgment of nonsuit is
Reversed.
Moore, J., not sitting.
Pless, J., and Rodman, E. J., took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
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to be attached to the opinion and testimony
of any exi>ert witness."
It was not error for the court to give the
above instruction. Producers' Oil Company
v. Eaton, 44 Okl. 55, 143 P. 9.
This tells the jury that the evidence of experts can be given weight only when the evidence supports the facts assumed. It is not
the duty of the jury to take for granted that
the statements contained in the hypothetical
questions are true. If the jury finds that the
facts assumed by the question are not true,
then they have a right to disregard the evidence. 22 C. J. § 823, Page 728; Colley v.
Sapp, 44 Okl. 1G, 142 P. 989, 1193.
The judgment of experts, or the opinion of
skilled witnesses, even when unanimous and
uncontroverted, are not necessarily conclusive, but may be disregarded by the jury.
22 C. J. 823, p. 729.
Both sides Introduced so-called expert testimony. The jury had a right to believe either, or reject all.
The instruction does not tell the jury that
they may take the testimony of the nonexpert
witnesses, and determine the extent of plaintiff's injury from that evidence alone.
The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed.
The Supreme Court acknowledges the aid
of Attorneys Adrian Melton, Harry Hammerly, and B. B. Barefoot in the preparation of
this opinion. These attorneys constituted an
advisory committee selected by the State Bar,
appointed by the Judicial Council, and approved by the Supreme Court. After the
analysis of law and facts was prepared by
Mr. Melton and approved by Mr. Hammerly
and Mr. Barefoot, the cause was assigned to
a justice of this court for examination and
report to the court. Thereafter, upon consideration, this opinion was adopted.

LINCOLN NAT. LIFE INS. CO. v. RIDER
ot a!.
No. 24378.

of old obligation, and validity of new one
held essential to constitute "novation/*
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of
"Novation," see Words & Phrases.]
2. Novation 0 7
Where original mortgagor was not shown
to have been consulted or to have consented
to extension agreement between holder of
mortgage and purchaser of encumbered property, no novation existed.
3. Mortgages <£=>305

Renewal or substitution of evidence of
debt secured by mortgage will not impair
lien of mortgage.
4. Mortgages <§=»306

Extension agreement entered into between holder of mortgage and purchaser of
encumbered property held not to impair lien
of mortgage, since debt was not changed, but
certain of parties involved merely changed
their position with relation thereto.
Syllabus
by the Court.
1. The requisites of a novation are a previous valid obligation, an agreement of all
the parties to a new contract, the extinguishment of the old obligation, and the validity
of the new one.
2. A mortgage secures a debt or obligation, and not the evidence of it, and no change
in the form of the evidence, or in the mode or
time of payment, can operate to discharge
the mortgage. So long as the debt secured
remains unpaid, neither the renewal nor substitution of the evidence of the debt will impair the lien of the mortgage.

Appeal from District Court, Marshall County ; Porter Newman, Judge.
Action by the Lincoln National Life Insurance Company against George E. Rider and
others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded,
with directions.
W. D. Calkins, of Oklahoma City, Jos. L.
Hull, of Tulsa, and Kelley & Grigsby, of Madill, for plaintiff in error.
Geo. E. Rider, of Madill, for defendants in
error.

BAYLESS, Justice.
The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, a corporation, hereinafter called plaintiff, instituted an action in the district court
J. Novation <2=>l
Previous valid obligation, agreement of of Marshall county, Okl., against several parall parties to new contract, extinguishment ties, among them George E. Rider. Rider is
Supreme Court of Oklahoma,
March 2G, 1935.
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the only one of said parties interested in the
appeal and will be referred to hereinafter as
defendant. The purpose of the action was to
foreclose a mortgage on certain real estate
and to quiet title as against the defendant.
The trial court decided the issues between
plaintiff and defendant In favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff brought this appeal.
The facts are these: J. H. Woodruff and
wife (hereinafter called Woodruff) mortgaged
the land in question to Exchange Trust Company, a corporation, to secure a certain debt;
the Trust Company thereupon assigned the
note and mortgage to the plaintiff; a creditor
of Woodruff levied on. Woodruff's equity in
the land and had it sold under execution; the
purchaser of this land at the execution sale
bought it subject to plaintiff's mortgage; the
purchaser at the sheriff's sale conveyed to the
defendant all of the mineral rights under forty acres of this land subject to the mortgage
indebtedness of record; the purchaser then
conveyed the land by quitclaim deed to one
Neff; and Neff then conveyed the land by warranty deed to Peiker. When the mortgage
matured plaintiff and Peiker entered into an
agreement for the extension of the time of the
payment of said note; and in said agreement
the execution, delivery, and assignment of the
note and mortgage, as aforesaid, was dul^recited, and it was agreed that the note was
unpaid, and that as a consideration for extending the time of payment thereof, Peiker
should pay the unpaid balance due on the indebtedness in periodical payments. The concluding paragraph of the agreement reads as
follows: "And the parties to this agreement
hereby consent to said extension and agTee
that said mortgage shall continue a first lien
upon said premises, and that said note and
mortgage and all their covenants and conditions shall remain in force except as herein
modified." The only evidence introduced in
the case was the various written instruments
above mentioned.
The defendant argues that the judgment of
the trial court is sustainable upon two
grounds. The first gTound that we will notice
is that of novation.
[1,2] We have defined "novation" and its
essential elements as follows: "In every novation there are four essential requisites: (1) a
previous valid obligation; (2) the agreement
of all the parties to the new contract; (3) the
extinguishment of the old contract; and (4)
the validity of the new one. A novation is a
new contractual relation. It is based upon a
new contract by all the parties interested."
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Sec Martin v. Deeper Bros. Dbr. Co., 48 Okl.
219, 149 P. 1140; Alkire v. Acuff, 134 Okl. 43,
272 P. 405; Williams v. Otis, 155 Okl. 173, 8
P.(2d) 728; and Tulsa Ice Co. v. Diley, 1570kl.
80, 10 P.(2d) 1090.
We have also said that three parties are essential to a novation agreement. Martin v.
Lceper Bros. Dbr. Co., supra; Fuller v. Stout,
GO Okl. 15, 160 P. 898, L. R. A. 1918B, 108;
Burford v. Hughes, 75 Okl. 150, 182 P. 089.
There are two parties to this agreement—the
plaintiff and Peiker. Woodruff, the original
maker, is nowhere shown to have been consulted or to have consented to the extension
agreement There was no novation for the
lack of this essential element.
Defendant's other ground may be summarized best as follows: Plaintiff, by entering
into the extension agreement with Peiker, after defendant had acquired his interest of record and without the defendant's consent, lost
the priority of lien which it formerly had had
by virtue of the mortgage given by Woodruff.
Defendant bases this contention upon several
grounds.
[3] The first ground is that the extension
agreement created a new and subsequent debt
which had the effect of paying the debt of
Woodruff. No evidence was introduced in
this case other than the written instruments
relating to the act of the various persons interested in the property as aforesaid. The
extension agreement stated in so many words
that the original note and mortgage were not
affected by the agreement except as they were
modified as to the time of payment No one
testified that the parties to the agreement had
a different intention or understanding.
The second point is: "When Peiker purchased the land subject to mortgage, and said
purchase ratified by plaintiff in error by extension agreement with Peiker, the land became the principal debtor -and Woodruff the
surety, and when time of payment of mortgage indebtedness was extended by agreement
between plaintiff in error and Peiker to which
Woodruff was not a party, Woodruff, then occupying position of surety,- w a s released and
discharged, and lien was extinguished as to
all persons holding title subject to mortgage,
except Peiker!" Defendant argues that prior
to the extension agreement Woodruff was the
principal or primary obligor on the debt, but
when Peiker assumed and agreed to pay the
debt thereafter, Peiker thereupon and thereby
became the principal obligor and Woodruff
merely the surety. Then he argues further
that the surety (Woodruff) was released from
the debt by the act of the plaintiff in extend-
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lug the time of the payment without the surety's consent. He then argues further that
because the surety (Woodruff) Is released, the
debt is released. Defendant does not argue
that Woodruff was released cither jas principal or surety, because a new or different debt
was then in existence. Defendant seeks to apply to the debt—the real object under consideration—the same life and existence with relation to Woodruff when he was only surety
that would have applied to the debt had
Woodruff remained the principal. This is not
logical or reasonable.
We said in the case of Unger v. Shull, 154
Okl. 277, 7 P.(2d) 881, 882, which is applicable
here: "A mortgage secures a debt or obligation, and not the evidence of it, and no change
in the form of the evidence, or in the mode or
time of payment, can operate to discharge the
mortgage. So long as the debt secured remains unpaid, neither the renewal nor substitution of the evidence of the debt will impair
the lien of the mortgage." See, also, First
National Bank of Altus v. Hendrick, 135 OkL
260, 275 P. 314.
We have heretofore construed the rights as
establishing the fact that the same debt remained in existence and that certain of tho
parties involved merely changed their positions with relation thereto. This being so,
both of defendant's grounds in this respect
are answered when we say that no new debt
was created, and, second, that there could be
no novation for the lack of this essential element. See discussion above with reference
to novation and the essential elements thereof.
Defendant next says that the whole transaction, including the fact that Woodruff was
not made a party to the action, evidences an
intention to release or discharge the original
debt. We have heretofore rejected that part
of his argument relating to the interpretation
of the extension agreement. In addition to
this, it appears in the record that the plaintiff also pleaded and relied upon the original
note and mortgage and no defense was made
to them separately from the extension agreement. There are a number of logical reasons,
not all indicative of an intent to release
Woodruff, why Woodruff was not made a party to the action. Among such reasons are:
First, he was not a necessary party, having
theretofore l>een divested of his title to the
land; second, by not seeking a personal judgment against him, no jury would be necessary (Vose v. U. S. Cities Corp., 152 Okl. 295, 7
l\(2d) 132); and, third, when, as is contended

in the briefs, Woodruff was a nonresident and
personal serUce could not be obtained upon
him.
We are of the opinion that the findings of
the trial court are clearly against the weight
of the evidence, and for that reason the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the
cause is remanded, with directions to take
further proceedings not inconsistent with the
views herein expressed.
McNEIIX, C. J., OSBORN, V. O. J., and
WELCH and CORN, J J., concur.

CAMDEN F I R E INS. ASS'N OF CAMDEN,
N. J., v. KOURI.
No. 24818.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
March 26, 1935.
1. Insurance ©=5163(5)
Men's suits and furnishings, comprising
relatively small portion of stock of merchandise contained in retail store, held covered by
fire policy describing insured property as
stock of merchandise consisting chiefly of dry
goods, shoes, ladies' ready-to-wear, etc., and
such other merchandise as is usually kept for
sale in dry goods stores.
2. Insurance <£=>335(2)
Insured's production of last annual in
Ventoiy taken eight months prior to fire constituted substantial compliance with fire policy requiring insured to take annual Inventory and to produce last inventory after fire,
notwithstanding fact that special inventory,
taken three months prior to fire, was destroyed.
3. Insurance <S=»335(3)
Iron safe, inventory, and book clause
of standard fire policy is substantially complied with if insured keeps and produces records enabling insurer to ascertain with reasonable certainty nature of property destroyed and amount of loss.
4. Insurance <§=>G48(0
In action on lire policy, evidence that
another Insurer paid its liability for loss occasioned in same fire held inadmissible.
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3. Vendor and Purchaser C=>I6<4)
Purchasers' addition of language "provided that no restrictions to utilization of
property exists by virtue of its proximity to
the freeway" added nothing new to earnest
money agreement which required title of
vendor to be free of encumbrances or
defects, and addition of such provision did
not constitute counteroffer.

i Wash, A pp. ;tor>
NORTHWEST PROPERTIES AGENCY,
INC., a Washington corporation, Respondents,
v.
Joseph McGHEE and Jane NIcGhee, husband
and wife, Appellants.
No. 10-40104-11.
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 2.
Nov. 18, 19G0.

4. Contracts <§=>24
For an offer and acceptance to constitute a contract, acceptance must meet and
correspond with offer in every respect.

Vendors appealed from a decree of
specific performance entered in the Superior Court, Pierce County, Wm. F.
LeVeque, J., of an earnest money receipt
and agreement pertaining to certain real
property. The Court of Appeals, Pearson,
J., held that provision "that no restrictions
to utilization of property exists by virtue
of its proximity to the freeway," added to
earnest money agreement by purchasers
prior to signing, did not make material
change in agreement's terms and did not
revoke vendor's offer to sell, and that
earnest money agreement, incorporating
future real estate contract by reference to
specific form, was sufficiently certain to
allow court to grant specific performance.
Affirmed.

1. Appeal and Error C=M95, 205
Where there was no attempt by vendors
to seek an amendment of pleadings to raise
issue of whether nominal purchasers had
duty to disclose real purchaser, to press for
fraud or breach of trust, or to make offer
of proof tenSing to show evidence of fraud
or breach of trust by an agent, such failure
foreclosed urging of such issue on appeal.
2. Principal and Agent O I 4 ( l )
Commission agreement, as simply a
term of original offer made by purchaser
and retained in counteroffer transmitted by
vendors to purchaser, was not an acknowledgment of an agency relationship between purchaser and vendors.

5. Vendor and Purchaser C=^I6(4)
When proviso added by purchaser
materially modifies quality of title vendor
has offered to furnish under terms of the
earnest money agreement, proviso constitutes rejection of vendor's offer by
counteroffer.
6. Vendor and Purchaser C= 16(4)
If condition added by purchaser's intended acceptance of vendor's offer can be
implied in vendor's original offer, added
condition does not constitute material
variance and does not make acceptance ineffective.
7. Specific Performance 0=28(2)
In absence of showing that selection of
different forms would have materially
altered vendors' performance, incorporation of future real estate contract in earnest
money agreement by giving agent authority to select one of five specifically
identified forms was permissible and made
agreement sufficiently certain to allow
court to grant specific performance.

Murray, Scott, McGavick & Graves,
Frederick R. Hok.inson, Tacoma, for appellants.
Conrad, Kane & Vandeberg, Elvin
Vandeberg, Tacoma, for respondents.

J.

PEARSON, Judge.
This is an appeal by the defendant seller
from a decree of specific performance of
an earnest money receipt and agreement
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pertaining to 14 lots in
to the City of Tacoma.
borders Interstate 5 on
Tacoma Mall properties

Barker's Addition
This real property
the east and the
on the west.

The defendants, Joseph C. McGhee and
his wife, admitted signing an earnest money
receipt and agreement in December, 1966.
They contended to the trial court, however,
that the earnest money agreement should
not be specifically enforced, for four reasons :
1. The agreement was not signed by the
purchasers by its termination date of
December 30, 1966.
2. The purchasers, prior to signing,
made a material change in the terms, thereby revoking the offer to sell.
3. The earnest money agreement, which
called for a future real estate contract, was
not certain enough for equity to enforce.
4. Part of the acceptance of the contract was oral, violating the statute of
frauds.
The operative facts show that an employee of Northwest Properties Agency,
Inc., Sherman Hale, acting for an undisclosed principal, Peter Wallerich, on
December 29, 1966 came to the home of the
defendants, Joseph McGhee and wife, ages
81 and 86 respectively, with a prepared
earnest money receipt and agreement.
(There was a dispute as to whether it was
December 29 or December 30, which the
trial court resolved in favor of December
29.)
The prepared earnest money agreement
showed the plaintiff—"Northwest Properties Agency, Inc., Trustee"—as the purchaser. In its original form, the earnest
money agreement called for a sales price
of $30,000, to be paid with $7,500 down and
the balance on a real estate contract at $500
or more per month, with interest at 6 per
cent. The form also provided that sellers
would pay a 10 per cent real estate commission. The sellers declined to sign the
earnest money agreement in that form and
after some negotiations the earnest money
agreement form was changed, so as to call
for a purchase price of $55,000, with a

$9,000 down payment. At this time the
following words were added at defendant's request, by Sherman Male: " [ C o u n t er offer good until midnight of 30 December
1966 * * *."
Hale took the earnest money agreement
as signed by the McGhees to Peter
Wallerich, the undisclosed principal, where
the following language was added: " [ p r o vided that no restrictions to the utilization
of the property exists by virtue of its
proximity to the freeway."
While there is a dispute in the testimony
as to when the changes in the earnest money
agreement were approved by the purchaser,
the trial court found that the acceptance
was made on December 30, 1966, and that
notice of acceptance was given to the
sellers on December 31, 1966. Since there
was substantial evidence to support these
findings, this court is bound thereby.
With reference to the title, the earnest
money receipt and agreement contained
the following provisions:
1. T I T L E : Title of seller is to be free
of encumbrances or defects, except:
None
Existing reservations, existing easements, building" or use restrictions
general to the district, and building or
zoning regulations or provisions shall
not be deemed encumbrances or defects.
Encumbrances to be discharged by
seller may be paid out of purchase
money at date of closing.
2.

T I T L E I N S U R A N C E : Title is to
be shown by title insurance report
furnished by the seller within 30 days
after loan approval if financing is provided for, otherwise 15 days. Seller
authorizes agent to apply for such
policy or report, showing condition
of title within the specified time. The
title policy to be issued shall contain no
exceptions other than those provided
for in said standard form plus encumbrances and defects noted in Paragraph
1 above. Delivery of such policy or
title report to closing agent shall con-
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stitutc delivery to purchaser. If title is
not so insurable as above provided and
cannot be made so insurable within one
hundred twenty days from date of title
report, earnest money shall be refunded
and all rights of purchaser terminated:
Provided that purchaser may waive
defects and elect to purchase. If title
is so insurable and purchaser fails or
refuses to complete purchase, the earnest money shall be forfeited as liquidated damages unless seller elects to
enforce this agreement or seek damages for breach thereof.

ing to the type of future real estate contract to be executed:
7. CONTRACT PURCHASER : If this
agreement is for sale on real estate cont r a c t > s c n e r a n d p u r c h a s e r agree to
execute a Real Estate Contract for the
balance of the purchase price on Real
Estate Contract Forms L-37, L-137, L 33 o r L _ 1 3 8 o f Washington Title Corn\Q9 o f p u g e t Sound
panVj or F o r m
Title Company, as selected by agent,
The terms of said form are herein incorporated bv reference,
T h e e a r n e s t mQ'ncy recejpt a n d a g r e e m e n t

The earnest money receipt and agreement
contained the following provision, pertain-

also contained the following acceptance and
commission agreement:

14. ACCEPTANCE AND C O M M I S S I O N A G R E E M E N T : December 29, 1966. We approve this sale and agree to deliver deed or
contract for deed in accordance with the terms of this agreement,
and pay
agent, a commission of $ 10% for services rendered. In the event the Earnest Money is forfeited, the
same, after deduction of expenses incurred by the agent, shall be
divided equally between the seller and agent, providing the amount
to agent does not exceed the agreed commission. I/we acknowledge receipt of a true copy of this agreement, signed by
both parties. I agree to absorb a mortgage discount to finance
this transaction, in an amount not to exceed
%
of the sale price.
Joseph McGhee (signature)
Address

Seller
Jane McGhee (signature)
Seller (Wife)

A true copy of the foregoing agreement, signed by the seller, is
hereby received on this 30 day of December, 1966/
W. W. Templin (signature)
Purchaser (Wife)

Purchaser

Plaintiff's exhibit 2, Washington Title
Insurance Company real estate contract
form L-37, was tendered to the defendants,
together with the balance of the down payment of $9,000. Defendants refused to
complete the transaction.

Plaintiff's complaint prayed for specific
performance. Defendant's answer denied
that a contract of sale had been executed
and alleged as an affirmative defense that
the transaction involved violated the
statute of frauds.
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[1] We wish to dispose of one contention which is urged on appeal by the defendants, which docs not appear to have
been seriously advocated to the trial court.
That argument was that the plaintiff,
Northwest Properties Agency, Inc., failed
in its duty of undivided loyalty, good faith,
and full disclosure to the plaintiffs. Defendant urges that an agency relationship
stemmed from this transaction between the
plaintiff and the defendant sellers and that
a duty of undivided loyalty, good faith, and
full disclosure was created. We are asked
to read into the commission agreement the
creation of an agency relationship and are
then asked to void the transaction because
of the failure of the plaintiff to disclose
the identity of the buyer. We do not accept
this argument. The plaintiffs did not proceed on the theory that they were agents of
the sellers. Defendants did not seek to
avoid this transaction by pleading agency,
fraud, or breach of trust. The closest this
issue was brought to the trial court's attention was when defendant's counsel
sought to question plaintiff about what
work he had performed in earning a real
estate commission. This question was objected to and sustained by the trial court on
the grounds that it involved an issue which
had not been pleaded. There was no attempt by defendant to seek an amendment
of the pleadings, to press for fraud or
breach of trust, nor was there an offer of
proof made, tending to show evidence of
fraud or breach of trust by an agent. Such
failure would, in our view, foreclose urging
this issue on appeal. Washington Cooperative Chick Ass'n v. Jacobs, 42 Wash.
2d 460, 256 P.2d294 (1953).
[2] In any event, we do not deem the
commission agreement as the acknowledgment of an agency relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant.
From the
manner in which the transaction was
handled, the commission agreement was
simply a term of the original offer made
by the plaintiff purchasers and was retained in the counteroffer transmitted by
the defendant sellers to the plaintiffs. (It
should be noted that the plaintiffs had

sought a listing on the property several
months before this transaction, but defendants had declined to list the property for
sale with the plaintiffs.)
We shall now consider the remaining
assignments of error. Did the addition of
the following language constitute a counteroffer by plaintiff purchasers? "[P]rovided
that no restrictions to the utilization of the
property exists by virtue of its proximity
to the freeway."
[3] The trial court concluded that this
language added nothing new to the earnest
money receipt and agreement "[S]ince the
Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement had
the same proviso in substance in Paragraph
1 and 2 thereof." We agree with this construction of the contract.
Paragraph 1 of the agreement required
title of the seller to be free of encumbrances
or defects. "Existing reservations, existing
easements, building or use restrictions
general to the district, and building or
zoning regulations * * * " were not to
be considered as encumbrances or defects.
Paragraph 2 of the agreement required
the seller to provide a title insurance policy
containing no exceptions other than those
provided in the standard form, phis those
noted in paragraph 1.
Defendant seller argues that the proviso
written in by the purchaser should be construed as adding a potential "defect" in the
title which would not have been considered
a defect in view of the provisions of paragraph 1. Thus, the seller is required by the
proviso to furnish a better title than his
original counteroffer contemplated.
To reach this construction, we would
have to say that-a use restriction by virtue
of "proximity to the freeway" would constitute "building or use restrictions general
to the district * • * "
In commencing on this proviso, the trial
court stated:
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[T]his is no more than a reiteration of
the language contained in paragraphs 1
and 2 of the earnest money receipt and
agreement. There might possibly be a
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different question raised if this lawsuit
was turned around and the plaintiff was
seeking to take advantage of that language, but in the light of the present
factual situation it appears to the Court
that nothing at all has been added to the
contract by that language, * * *
Statement of facts at 49.
[4] The general rule is that for an
offer and acceptance to constitute a contract, the acceptance must meet and correspond with the offer in every respect.
The corollary of this rule is that any
material variance between offer and acceptance precludes formation of a contract.
Bond v. Wiegardt, 36 Wash.2d 41, 216 P.
2d 196 (1950); Pearce v. Dulien Steel
Products, Inc., 14 Wash.2d 132, 127 P.2d
271 (1942).
[5] The real issue raised here is
whether the proviso added by the purchaser materially modified the quality of
title the seller offered to furnish. If it did,
then adding the proviso would constitute a
rejection of seller's offer by counteroffer.
See 16 A.L.R.3d 1424 (1967) for a collection of cases on this issue.
[6] However, if the condition added by
the intended acceptance can be implied in
the original offer, then it does not constitute
a material variance so as to make the acceptance ineffective. Pickett v. Miller, 76
N.M. 105, 412 P2d 400 (1966).
We believe that the subject matter of the
proviso, namely, "restrictions to the utilization of the property * * * by virtue
of its proximity to the freeway" should be
implied in defendant's offer to give title
"free of encumbrances or defects," and
should not be construed as "building or use
restrictions general to the district." The
latter phrase should be construed to include
those building or use restrictions placed
upon the property at the time the area was
platted or developed. This is the type of
restriction that would be "general to the
area."
In the case at bar, a portion of defendant's property had previously been sold

by defendants to the state for freeway purposes. Any restrictions that were imposed
by that sale would not be "general to the
district" but would be specific restrictions
on the property retained. We therefore
believe that the trial court was correct
in holding that such restriction would, by
implication, come within the terms of defendant's offer to give title free of encumbrances or defects.
It is well settled that an offeree's acceptance is not conditional and therefore
insufficient merely because it recites
terms or conditions that would in any
event have been implied from the original
offer, inasmuch as such an acceptance
introduces nothing new into the contract.
(Footnotes omitted.) 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 64 (1964) at 403; 16 A.L.R.3d
1429 (1967).
[7] We now turn to the contention that
the earnest money agreement was not
certain enough for equity to enforce since
it called for a future real estate contract
in which the agent was given the authority
to select from five different forms. The
forms were incorporated into the earnest
money agreement by reference as "Real
Estate Contract Forms L-37, L-137, L-38
or L-13S of Washington Title Company,
or Form 109 of Puget Sound Title Company * * * "
It is not contended that such forms did
not exist or that there were material
variances between them. Xor is there any
contention that the form chosen (Washington Title Insurance £ompany Form L-37)
contained any objectionable or contradictory provisions. (We note also that defendant had 17 years of experience in dealing
in real estate transactions and for 4 years
prior to the trial had been engaged in
developing and selling real estate.)
The argument appears to be that because
multiple forms were incorporated into
the earnest money agreement by reference,
a reasonable doubt exists as to the specific
agreement equity is asked to enforce.
Such an argument would be more
persuasive had the trial court been shown
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that the selection of different forms would
have materially altered defendant's performance. In the absence of such a showing, the only question before us is whether
or not it is permissible to incorporate a
future real estate contract into an earnest
money agreement by reference to a specific
form, or by giving an agent authority to
select one of several specifically identified
forms.
No Washington cases have been cited
which have held such a procedure is
prohibited.
In Haire v. Patterson, 63
Wash.2d 282, 3S6 P.2d 953 (1963) an earnest
money agreement which called for a future
real estate contract with no reference to a
specific form was held to be enforceable
as a cash sale. In alluding to the procedure
used here, the Supreme Court stated at 287,
288, 3S6 P.2d at 956:
It has been said that real estate contracts have become so standarized that,
when parties enter into an earnest money
agreement calling for a future contract,
they must be held to have had in mind
the provisions of a "standard" contract
of sale. We know of no "standard"
contract. However, if parties have a
particular contract form in mind, it seems
that they could evidence that fact by attaching a copy thereof to the earnest
money receipt and making it a part thereof by reference, and we are aware of
such a practice. We note the existence
of printed earnest money agreement
forms providing that the contract to
follow shall be on a particular form,
identified by number, publisher, and date
of printing. And it would not seem an
impossibility to prepare an earnest money
agreement, printed or otherwise, containing within its four corners the
material terms of the future contract of
sale.
Plaintiff's exhibit 2, which was tendered
to defendants in compliance with the earnest money agreement, is identified as
"Washington Title Insurance Company
Real Estate Contract Form L-37." Its publisher and form number are identified. It

was selected by the agent. It hears no
publishing date. It was not attached as an
exhibit to the earnest money agreement.
It contains no unusual terms or conditions,
nor do its terms contradict any provision
of the earnest money agreement.
We hold that such identification in the
earnest money agreement is sufficiently
certain that a court may grant specific
performance as the trial court did here.
We believe that this court should judicially
recognize a well-established custom of long
standing in the real estate industry.
While the better practice would be to incorporate by reference only one form and
attach such form to the earnest money
agreement, we do not find that the failure
to do so is fatal to the transaction, absent
some showing of prejudice to the party
seeking to nullify the transaction. None
having been demonstrated here, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
ARMSTRONG, C. J., and P E T R I E , J.,
concur.

1 Wash.App. 420
S T A T E of Washington, Respondent,
v.
Jo Ann B A K E R , Appellant.
No. 80-40748-1.

Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 1, Panel Two.
Dec. 8, 1909.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 21), TJ70.
Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, King County, Ward Roney, J.,
of second-degree assault and she appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Stafford, J., held
that findings that defendant had voluntarily waived her right to jury trial must be
accepted as verities in absence of assignment of error.
Affirmed.
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PANHANDLE EASTERN P I P E LINE
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation authorized to do business in the State of
Wyoming, Appellant (Defendant),
v,
Nowlin SMITH, Jr., Appellee (Plaintiff).
No. 5506.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Dec. 16, 1981.

propose an exclusive mode of acceptance
calling for the absence of any writing on
the paper other than signatures since the
letter did not explicitly demand that exact
and exclusive mode of performance.
4. Contracts c=>24
One who modifies an offer has usually
rejected the offer and made a counteroffer
and no contract exists* unless the original
offeror accepts the counteroffer.
5. Contracts c=>23

Employer appealed from a decision of
the District Court, Weston County, Paul T.
Liamos, Jr., J., which awarded damages to a
former employee for breach of contract.
The Supreme Court, Brown, J., held that:
(1) empfoyee's "grumbfing acceptance" of
employer's offer to withdraw his discharge
was effective, and (2) contract, dispute between employer and employee did not arise
under collective bargaining agreement and
therefore it was not subject to arbitration;
furthermore, employer waived any right it
might have had to arbitration, by implying
that it considered its offer to be separate
from the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement then denying that any contract
even existed and by failing to use the statutory procedure for requiring arbitration.
Affirmed.
Thomas, J., filed specially concurring
and dissenting opinion in which Rose, C. J.,
joined.
1. Contracts <s=»22(l)
An offeror has the right to demand an
exclusive mode of acceptance from offeree.
2. Contracts «=*22(1)
Mode of acceptance of an offer can be
unreasonable or difficult if the offeror
clearly expresses his intention to exclude all
other modes of acceptance and such intention must be expressed in the communication of the offer itself.
3. Master and Servant e=>47
Employer's offer to withdraw discharge, which was in letter form, did not

An offer must be accepted unconditionally; however, an acceptance is still effective if the addition only asks for something
that would be implied from the offer and is
therefore immaterial.
6. Contracts c=*22(l)
Master and Servant c=*47
Employee's "grumbling acceptance" of
employer's offer to withdraw his discharge
was effective.
7. Labor Relations <^=>436
The courts are to decide the question of
whether a grievance or dispute arises under
terms of collective bargaining agreement
and should be arbitrated, unless agreement
clearly demonstrates that the question is
reserved to the arbitrator.
8. Arbitration ^=»1.1
Arbitration is a matter of contract and
party cannot be required to submit any
dispute to arbitration which is not agreed to
submit.
9. Labor Relations c=>434.5, 436
Contract dispute between employer and
employee did not arise under collective bargaining agreement and therefore it was not
subject to arbitration; furthermore, employer waived any right it might have had
to arbitration by implying that it considered
its offer to be separate from the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement and
then denying that any contract even existed
and by failing to use the statutory procedure for requiring arbitration. W.S.1977,
§ 1-36-101 et seq.
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10. Arbitration c=>23.3
There are certain instances where a
party asserting arbitration is estopped by
his own conduct to rely on unexhausted
arbitration procedures.
11. Arbitration c=>23.3
The right to have a dispute submitted
to arbitration is a contractual right which
may be waived either expressly or implicitly.

12. Damages c=*117
Measure of damages for breach of contract is that which would place plaintiff in
same position as he would have been had
the contract been performed, less proper
deductions.
13. Master and Servant c=>41(2), 42(1)
In a suit for breach of employment
contract, damages are the amount of compensation agreed upon for the remainder of
the period involved less the amount which
employee earned or with reasonable diligence could have earned from other employment.
14. Master and Servant o=>41(6)
Damages award of $40,000 for breach
of employment contract of indefinite term
was supported by sufficient evidence.
15. Damages o=189
Existence of damages must be proved
and the amount of damages must be decided with all the certainty the case permits.
Richard L. Williams of Williams, Porter,
Day & Neville, P. C, Casper, for appellant.
Bernard Q. Phelan of Graves, Hacker &
Phelan, P. C , Cheyenne, for appellee.
Before ROSE, C. J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROONEY and BROWN, JJ.
BROWN, Justice.
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company
(Panhandle) appeals a district court judgment granting damages to its former employee Nowlin Smith, Jr., for breach of
contract. Panhandle asserts that no contract ever existed. It maintains that the

dispute which is here on appeal should have
been submitted to arbitration under the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
It also maintains that if this court decides a
contract did exist, we should nevertheless
reverse the damage award because it was
not supported by sufficient evidence.
Wfe affirm.
Panhandle fired Mr. Smith in October,
1979. Mr. Smith followed the grievance
procedure provided by a collective bargaining agreement to the third and final level
of intracompany proceedings, which was a
meeting with company officials at the division office. After that meeting, Panhandle
initially decided to uphold the decision to
fire Mr. Smith, but changed its mind after
Mr. Smith's union representative requested
that it reconsider. By letter dated December 13, 1979, the company offered to withdraw the discharge if Mr. Smith would
agree to comply with certain terms and
conditions. Mr. Smith signed the letter under the typewritten words, "Understood,
Agreed To and Accepted," added some
handwritten notations, and again signed his
name. . The union representative also
signed the letter and returned it to the
company.
Because Mr. Smith wrote on the letter,
Panhandle argues thai no contract existed,
claiming that Mr. Smith failed to use the
mode of acceptance which it prescribed. As
Panhandle conceded at oral argument, it
would have contested any words being added to the letter, e*en ones as innocuous as,
"Have a nice day." Panhandle also argues
that Mr. Smith made a counteroffer by
adding terms and conditions which showed
he was trying to modify the offer.
We think appellant's "mode of acceptance" argument was not directly raised in
the district court. Panhandle's pleadings
spoke to a counteroffer being made because
Mr. Smith added terms and conditions to
the proposed offer. The exhibits introduced at trial spoke to "modifications," and
"added terms and conditions," implying
that the content of the words mattered.
No mention was made anywhere below of
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"mode of acceptance" or "method of acceptance." Appellant cautioned this court not
to confuse the two theories of "mode of
acceptance" and "counteroffer," although
appellant tried to interweave them in its
brief. Because we want to avoid any confusion, we have decided to address both the
"mode of acceptance" argument and the
"counteroffer" argument.

terms of the communicated offer itself," its
intention to exclude all other modes of acceptance.
Crockett v. Lowther,
supra.
Panhandle was explicit only in stating that
the terms and conditions had to be agreed
to in writing.

I
[1,2] An offeror has the right to demand an exclusive mode of acceptance from
an offeree. The mode of acceptance can be
unreasonable or difficult if the offeror
clearly expresses his intention to exclude all
other modes of acceptance. This intention
must be expressed in the communicated offe r itself. Crockett v. Lowthcr, Wyo., 549
P.2d 303, 309 (1976), citing 1 Corbin, Contracts, § 88, at 373 (1963). The letter of
December 13, 1979, contained the offer to
withdraw Mr. Smith's discharge. The letter directed that both Mr. Smith and the
union had to agree in writing to the terms
of the offer, and that the signatures were a
condition precedent to the withdrawal of
the discharge. 1 It went on to reiterate that
the withdrawal of the discharge was contingent upon receipt of written acceptance by
Mr. Smith and the union.
[3] Panhandle insists that it modified
this offer by demanding of Mr. Smith during a telephone conversation that he just
sign the letter and not add anything.
Mr. Smith, however, does not remember the
conversation that way, and we must view
the evidence on appeal most favorably to
him. Madrid v. Norton, Wyo., 596 P.2d
1108 (1979). Here, Mr. Smith testified he
did not understand that any addition to the
letter would be considered a rejection of the
offer. Panhandle, therefore, did not orally
modify the written offer of December 13,
1979; it failed to "clearly express, in the
1.

" * * * The Company has, therefore, determined that Mr. Smith will be given one more
opportunity to rehabilitate himself and his
discharge shall hereby be withdrawn under
the terms and conditions listed below, which
terms and conditions must be agreed to in
writing by both Mr. Smith and the Union as a

no

The offeror is master of the offer, but we
think fairness demands that when there is a
dispute concerning mode of acceptance, the
offer itself must clearly and definitely express an exclusive mode of acceptance.
There must be no question that the offeror
would accept the prescribed mode and only
the prescribed mode. Corbin comments,
"The more unreasonable the method appears, the less likely it will be that a court
will interpret his offer as requiring it [a
specific mode of performance] and the more
clear and definite must be the expression of
his intention in words." 1 Corbin on Contracts, § 88, at 373 (1963). The only motivation we could surmise for the requirement
that no handwriting be added to the paper,
regardless of content, would be that the
offeror had an inordinate fondness for tidy
sheets of paper. The requirement strikes
us as unreasonable, and strikes out as a
prescribed mode of acceptance unless the
offeror's intention is explicitly set out. We
agree that the mode of acceptance rule
" * * * has been enforced with a rigor worthy of a better cause." Calamari & Periilo,
Contracts, § 2-22 (2d ed., 1977). We are
not eager to enforce it if there is any question about the mode of acceptance or about
the clarity with which the demand was
made. Had Panhandle seriously been proposing an exclusive mode of acceptance calling for the absence of any writing on the
paper other than signatures, the letter
should have explicitly demanded that exact
and exclusive mode of performance.
II
[4-6] The requirement that no terms or
conditions be added to change the contractcondition precedent to the withdrawal of the
discharge."
The letter then said, "The terms and conditions
are: * * * " and set out eight additional terms
and conditions, some of which will be discussed later.
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is a different matter. The law of contract
formation dictates that one who modifies
an offer has usually rejected the offer and
made a counteroffer, and that no contract
exists unless the original offeror accepts the
counteroffer. Trautwein v. Lcavcy, Wyo.,
472 P.2d 776 (1970). Panhandle contends
that Mr. Smith made a counteroffer by
adding a request on the letter to see his
personnel file and to contest any mistakes
he found there. An offer must be accepted
unconditionally; but there is, as always, an
exception to the rule. An acceptance is still
effective if the addition only asks for something that would be implied from the offer
and is therefore immaterial. 1 Corbin on
Contracts, § 86, p. 368 (1963). Kodiak Island Borough v. Large, Alaska, 622 P.2d 440
(1981); Pickett v. Miller, KM., 412 P.2d 400
(1966). A Panhandle supervisor, Mr. Smith,
and a company machinist, who was also a
union representative, all testified that all
Panhandle employees had the right to see
their personnel files. Panhandle's offer to
withdraw its discharge and eventually reinstate Mr. Smith carried with it the implication that he would be able to see his personnel record when he was once again an active employee.
Besides reserving the right to see his
personnel file, Mr. Smith wrote that his
personnel file contained mistakes, and that
he was having financial problems, apparently as a result of the company's actions.
Williston has described the kind of acceptance Mr. Smith made as one showing "an
2.

1 Williston on Contracts, § 78 (3rd ed., 1962);
1 Corbin on Contracts. § 84 (1963).

3.

In the novel Catch-22, Group Headquarters
let its men request a medical release if they
thought they were on the verge of a nervous
collapse. When Yossarian, a bombardier, asked
the doctor for a release, the doctor refused. He
told Yossarian the catch was that his recommendation for a release had to be approved by
Group, and Group never approved any of them.
The doctor later said to Yossarian that Group
couldn't let the crazy people go home, as no
one else but a crazy person would fly the
bombing missions willingly. J. Heller, Catch22, Simon and Schuster (1955, 1961).

4.

"7. Without limiting Mr. Smith's ability to
contact Company Supervisors to ask questions about these terms and conditions or

abundance of caution," and Corbin has
called it a "grumbling acceptance," which in
this case it certainly appeared to be.2 The
acceptance was unenthusiastic to be sure,
but it was an acceptance nevertheless. Mr.
Smith signed his name under the words
"Understood, Agreed To and Accepted.*'
He wrote that he agreed to the terms and
conditions. He began performance by seeking medical help and by sending in a check
to keep his insurance current. Mr. Smith
wanted to be sure that he would be able to
see his personnel file when he returned to
work. His effort to insure that right
should not block him from benefits that
Panhandle had already offered to him. His
"grumbling acceptance" should stand.
Mr. Smith found himself in his own
"Catch-22" 3 when he tried to accept Panhandle's offer contained in the letter of
December 13, 1979. The letter said that
Mr. Smith could contact Panhandle's supervisors about the terms and conditions of the
offer.4 When Mr. Smith telephoned the
company to ask about his personnel files,
Panhandle viewed his request as an indication that Mr. Smith did not want to eliminate the problems that had led to his discharge. In the same letter, Panhandle
wrote that Mr. Smith would have at least
six months to improve-his emotional state,
and indeed demanded that Mr. Smith receive counseling for that purpose. 5 When
Mr. Smith made a request which Panhandle
thought showed an improper attitude, he
other business related matters * * * the
Company expects that there will be no unusual contacts by Mr. Smith with Company
employees or Supervisors which might reasonably leave an impression of threatening,
intimidation or harrassment [sic]."
5.

"2. Within two weeks of acceptance hereof,
Mr. Smith must have contacted his choice of
a psychiatrist, psychologist, or other licensed
individual * * * capable of giving him complete treatment for his emotional disorder
and he must have established a schedule and
frequency of treatment which, in the opinion
of the Doctor, might reasonably be expected
to enable him to overcome his problem within the leave of absence period * * *."
The leave of absence period was six months.
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was apparently fired because he had failed
to spontaneously rehabilitate. We do not
dispute that Panhandle's offer to Mr. Smith
was generous. We do say that Panhandle
could not withdraw its offer just because
Mr. Smith did not and could not fulfill
Panhandle's unrealistic and contradictory
expectations.
Ill
[7,8] Panhandle contends that Mr.
Smith should not be allowed to assert his
claim for breach of contract because the
collective bargaining agreement under
which he was employed required him to
take his grievance to arbitration.
The
agreement did provide a three-step grievance procedure culminating in the fourth
stop of binding arbitration. The arbitration
clause of the collective bargaining agreement said "All grievances and disputes arising under the terms of this Agreement * * *
shall be settled in accordance with this Article." The courts are to decide the question
of whether a grievance or dispute arises
under the terms of the bargaining agreement and should be arbitrated, unless the
agreement clearly demonstrates that the
question is reserved to the arbitrator.
United Steel workers of A me rial v. Warrior
and Gulf Navigation Company, 363 U.S.
574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960).
Although this court has said that arbitration is favored, it is a matter of contract,
and a party cannot be required to submit
any dispute to arbitration wrhich he has not
agreed to submit. American National Bank
of Denver v. Cheyenne Housing
Authority,
Wyo., 562 P.2d 1017 (1977).
[9] We think that neither party here
agreed to submit this dispute to arbitration.
Mr. Smith took his original grievance about
his termination of employment through the
three-step grievance procedure, which resulted in a decision to uphold the company.
The company then chose to offer Mr. Smith
a contract independent of the grievance
proceedings. The record shows that the
company itself considered the offer of De6.

"8. Violation of any of the above terms and
conditions may, in the sole discretion of the

comber 13, 1979, to be an independent one.
The offer set up terms and conditions with
which Mr. Smith had to comply, while Panhandle tried to reserve the right to reinstate Mr. Smith's original discharge at its
sole discretion if Mr. Smith violated any of
the separate terms and conditions.6 The
dispute which arose over the offer of December 13, 1979, was not a dispute arising
under the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. Before the company made its
offer to Mr. Smith on December 13, 1979, he
would have been required to submit the
matter to binding arbitration. The arbitrator would have considered the same matters
that had been considered at the grievance
proceedings. After Panhandle made the offer to Mr. Smith, he would have been submitting a different issue to the arbitrator,
the issue of whether a new contract existed
and was breached.
Furthermore, Panhandle had the burden
of proving that the dispute should have
been arbitrated, since that burden is on the
party asserting it. If Panhandle wanted
the dispute to be arbitrated, it should have
used the procedure set out in the Uniform
Arbitration Act, § 1-36-101, et seq.f W.S.
1977, which says that the district court has
the jurisdiction to enforce an agreement
providing for arbitration. American National Bank of Denver v. Cheyenne Housing
Authority, supra at 1020. When a party
makes application to arbitrate and shows an
agreement to arbitrate, the court must order the parties to'proceed with arbitration.
If any action involving an issue subject to
arbitration is pending, the district court will
then stay the action.
[10, 11] Even had this dispute been subject to arbitration, there are certain instances where a party asserting arbitration
is estopped by his own conduct to rely on
unexhausted arbitration procedures. Vacs
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct 903, 17
L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). The right to have a
dispute submitted to arbitration is a contractual right which may be waived either
Company, result in the reinstatement of Mr.
Smith's discharge. * * * "
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expressly or implicitly. Spain v. Houston
Oilers, Tcx.Civ.App., 593 S.W.2d 74G (1979);
Barton-Dixie
Corporation
v.
Timothy
McCarthy Construction Co., 436 F.2d 405
(5th Cir.f 1971). We think Panhandle
waived any right it may have had to arbitration. Panhandle implied that it considered its offer to be separate from the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and then denied that any contract
even existed. It also failed to use the statutory procedure for requiring arbitration,
and having failed to do so, it should not be
able to raise the issue now. Therefore,
even had the dispute been one which arose
under the terms of the bargaining agreement, Panhandle waived its right to assert
arbitration.
IV
Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's
finding of damages of $40,000. We do not
agree.

would be reasonable to infer that a person
who had already worked eight years for a
company, enjoyed favorable working conditions and l>enefits, and intended to stay
until retirement, would be employed for a
longer period than the average period of
seniority. He decided that a figure of eight
years of continued employment would be
reasonable. Appellant argues that the
twelve-year seniority figure is not applicable because it is not the same as the average time an employee stayed with, the company. Be that as it may, the figure is still a
useful one because it provides the average
length of time that people who are currently employed at Panhandle have been on the
job. Mr. Smith was a member of that
group until his termination. The judge
could also give weight to Mr. Smith's testiuntil retirement. Appellant offered no objection or contradictory testimony, and we
think that the eight-year figure was reasonable in light of the evidence.

[12,13] The measure of damages for
breach of contract is that which would place
plaintiff in the same position as he would
have been had the contract been performed,
less proper deductions. Reynolds v. Tice,
Wyo., 595 P.2d 1318 (1979); and Zitterkopf
v. Roussalis, Wyo., 546 P.2d 436 (1976). In
a suit for breach of an employment contract, then, the damages are the amount of
compensation agreed upon for the remainder of the period involved less the amount
which the employee earned or with reasonable diligence could have earned from other
employment.

The trial judge also decided that Mr.
Smith's damages were $5,000 a year for the
eight years. The value of the tangible lost
fringe benefits of a stock purchase plan,
health insurance, investment credit matching stock ownership plan, group life insurance, and a qualified retirement pension
plan were mathematically ascertainable according to the testimony of one of Panhandle's own supervisors at one-half of the
hourly wage, which in Mr. Smith's case was
one-half of $8.35 an hour for a total of
approximately $12.52 an hour. That does
not take into account any monetary value
the
judge attributed to the less mathemati[14] The contract which Panhandle ofcally
ascertainable benefits of which Mr.
fered to Mr. Smith was for an indefinite
term, and impliedly called for reinstatement Smith was deprived as a result of the conof Mr. Smith's discharge only if Mr. Smith tract breach. The trial judge said:
44
* * * I don't think there is any doubt
violated any of the terms of the contract.
that Mr. Smith has a much poorer job
Mr. Smith testified that he had worked for
today than he would have with PanhanPanhandle for eight and one-half years and
dle
Eastern. He doesn't have the benehad intended to stay with Panhandle until
fits,
doesn't have as good working condiretirement at age fifty-five, which would
tions,
his work is hit and miss, and there
have been twenty-six more years. There
are
not
hours or days guaranteed. I
was also testimony showing twelve years to
don't think it a bit speculative to place a
be the average seniority at the companyvalue on those benefits over and above
The trial judge here determined that it
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anything th it Mr Smith is making today
of $5,000 a } e a r "
The fact that some of the lost benefits of
Mr Smith's job at Panhandle may be characterized as intangible does not mean that
Mr Smith should not be able to recover for
their loss It is true that one meaning of
intangible is that which cannot be defined
with precision (Webster's Third International Dictionary Unabridged, p 1173, G &
C Merriam Co 1966)
Semantics aside,
however, Mr Smith testified that he does
not get to work a forty-hour week, that he
is no longer under a union contract, that his
work is harder physically, and that it is less
comfortable because he is working outdoors
Neither appellee nor an expert witness
could place an exact dollar value on the loss
of those benefits Whether we call the loss
of those benefits tangible but not mathematically ascertainable with precision or
whether we call them intangible, they are
injuries caused by Panhandle's breach of
contract for which Mr Smith should be
recompensed
The existence of those damages here is as
tangible as the existence of pain and suffering damages in a personal injury case or the
existence of damages to character and reputation in a defamation case The United
States Supreme Court said in a tort case
that there is a clear distinction between the
measure of proof necessary to prove that
the plaintiff has sustained some damage
and the measure of proof necessary to allow
the factfinder to fix the amount of damages
Story Parchment Co \
Paterson
Parchment Paper Co , 282 U S 555, 51 S Ct
248, 75 L E d 544 (1931) Although there
was some doubt at that time whether the
same rule applied to contract cases, the
Supreme Court later said in a case in a
bankruptcy proceeding involving a lessor's
claim for damages for rejection of its lease,
citing to Story Parchment Co v Paterson
Parchment Paper Co, supra, that certainty
in the fact of damages is essential, but that
certainty as to the amount goes no further
than to require a basis for a reasoned con7

elusion
Palmer \ Connecticut
Ry <&
Lighting- Co, 311 U S 544, 61 S Ct 379, 85
LEd 336 (1941) 7
[15] The existence of damages must be
proved, the amount of damages must be
decided with all the certainty the ease permits That is what happened here The
amount of damages in this case cannot be
determined with precise mathematical exactness, but it does not have to be
" * * * Although a factfinder may not
make an award on the basis of speculation or conjecture, he need not make an
award with precise mathematical exactness It is sufficient if he determines the
amount with a reasonable degree of certainty on the basis of the evidence placed
before him, if the evidence is such as is
reasonably applicable to the nature of the
injury " (Emphasis added )
Sagebrush
Development Inc v Moehrkc, W}o , 604
P2d 198, 202 (1979)
The evidence presented at trial was reasonably applicable to the nature of Mr
Smith's injur} It went to the fact that he
does not have as good a job now as he did at
Panhandle According to Corbin
"There are many cases in which, by reason of the ordinary experience and belief
of mankind, the trial court is convinced
that substantial pecuniar} harm has been
inflicted, even though its amount in dollars is incapable of proof If the defendant had reason to foresee this kind of
harm and the difficult} of proving its
amount, tfie injured party will not be
denied a remed} in damages because of
the lack of certaint}
• • •" 5 Corbin
on Contracts, § 1020, pp 125-126 (1964)
This is one of those cases It is also one of
those cases where "substantial justice is
better than en.act injustice" Wemglass v
Gibson, 204 Pa 203, 155 A 439, 440 (1931)
Appellant argues that Mr Smith was free
to choose any other job he wanted and that
he could have found a better job than h€
did Mr Smith did have to exercise reason
able care and diligence to avoid loss or

For a recent case speaking to this iule see
American Sanitars Sales v Purchase & Prop
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lessen the resulting damage, but the question as to whether he used reasonable care
and diligence is one for the trier of fact,
within its considerable discretion.
Wyoming BancorfX)ration v. Bonham, Wyo., 563
P.2d 1382 (1977), reh. denied, Wyo., 566 P.2d
219 (1977); Asbell Bros., Inc., v. Nash-Davis
Machinery Company, Wyo., 382 P.2d 57
(1963); and Thayer v. Smith, Wyo., 380 P.2d
852 (1963). We are not prepared to disagree with the trier of fact on the question
of Mr. Smith's mitigation. Panhandle, as
the party breaching the contract, carried
the burden of proving that Mr. Smith did
not mitigate his damages. Sturgeon v. Phifer, Wyo., 390 P.2d 727 (1964); and Truck
Terminal, Inc., v. Nielsen, Wyo., 339 P.2d
413 (1959). Panhandle failed to prove or
even to introduce evidence that Mr. Smith
could have avoided some of his damages by
finding a better job than he did.
Alternatively, Panhandle asserts that Mr.
Smith did actually find a better job because
his pay was $12.50 an hour at the time of
trial. The assertion ignores the fact that
the trial judge did compare the value of Mr.
Smith's job at Panhandle with the value of
Mr. Smith's new job at the time of trial, but
that he considered more than just the hourly wages in his determination of damages.
The testimony showed that Mr. Smith's new
job did not guarantee forty hours of work a
week, that it was harder physical work, that
it was outdoors, and that there was no
collective bargaining agreement or individual contract, so that Mr. Smith's job security was greatly diminished. The trial judge
reasonably concluded that Mr. Smith had
found a job inferior to the one he had with
Panhandle. Indeed, we see no purpose for
a remand on Ihe issue of damages, because
we see no other basis on which to recompute damages that would be any more
mathematically certain or reasonable than
the method which the trial judge used. The
parties certainly cannot wait eight years so
that they can precisely determine just how
much less time Mr. Smith gets to work.
We would also still have the problem of just
how to assign a value to the less mathematically ascertainable benefits which we referred to earlier.

The rules of law on recover} of damages
for breach of contract have to be very flexible. As stated in 5 Corbin on Contracts,
§ 1002, at 33 (1964), 'Their application in
the infinite number of situations that arise
is beyond question variable and uncertain.
Even more than in the case of other rules of
law, they must be regarded merely as
guides to the court, leaving much to the
individual feeling of the court created by
the special circumstances of the particular
case." We accept the way the trial judge
applied the law to the facts of this case, and
we see no reason to upset his factual determination of the amount of damages.
The district court had jurisdiction to hear
the dispute and correctly decided that a
contract did exist and had been breached.
Its damage award was supported by sufficient evidence. We therefore affirm.
THOMAS, Justice, specially concurring
and dissenting, with whom ROSE, Chief
Justice, joins.
I agree with all that is said in the majority opinion with respect to the existence of a
contract and the right of Smith to recover
for breach of that contract. I cannot agree
with the disposition made of the issue of
Smith's damages dealt with under Part IV
of the majority opinion^and I dissent therefrom.
It is interesting to note that the majority
opinion correctly states the rule with respect to damages as follows:
44
* * • In a suit for a breach of an employment contract, then, the damages are
the amount of compensation agreed upon
for the remainder of the period involved
less the amount -which the employee
earned or with reasonable diligence could
have earned from other employment."
The rule is stated thusly in 11 Wiiliston on
Contracts, § 1358, p. 302 (3d Ed., Baker,
Voorhis & Co., Inc., 1968).
41
* * * Therefore, in an action by the
employee against the employer for a
wrongful discharge, a deduction of the
net amount of what the employee earned,
or what he might reasonably have earned
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in other employment of like nature, from
what he would have received had there
been no breach, furnishes the ordinary
measure of damages [footnote 5 omitted] "
In footnote 5 cases are cited from 23 other
jurisdictions without any contrary authority
being noted
Turning then to the facts as recited in the
majority opinion, it appears that a value
should be assigned to Smith's wages at Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company of $12 53
an hour This is based upon his hourly
wage of $8 35 plus one-half of that amount
for fringe benefits As recited in the majority opinion, Smith was earning $12 50 an
hour at the time of trial Assuming a 40hour week for 52 weeks a year, Smith
would have been paid for 2,080 hours per
year multiplied by an assumed continued
period of employment with Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company of 8 years This is a
total of 16,640 hours for which he would
have been paid at Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company $208,499 20
At $12 50 an
hour for the same period, he would have
earned $208,000 00
I recognize that he did experience a period when he was not employed, and that his
new job ma} not have resulted in a 40-hour
work week in all instances
I would remand the case to the trial court for those
value determinations, and having made the
appropriate adjustments the trial court
would then deduct his earnings at his new
job for the 8 } ear period from the $208,499 20 he would have earned at Panhandle
Eastern Pipeline Company It appears that
that amount would be substantially less
than the $40,000 00 which was awarded
The majority opinion goes astray when it
suggests that Smith selected a job that was
qualitatively less desirable than his employment with Panhandle Eastern Pipeline
Company
This qualitative
difference
might have excused Smith from accepting
that employment
He would not then be
chargeable with amounts he might have
earned in a position substantially qualitatively less desirable than the one he had
wfith Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company

030

Since he did accept the new employment
the question of qualitative difference disappears under the rule of damages, and he
must account for his actual earnings
I
would hold that when the employee actually
accepts new employment he is in effect
conceding that there is no qualitative difference in the nature of the two employments, and the only matter to be accounted
for is the actual difference in dollar value
between the new employment and the old
employment In my view, the majority in
this instance injects a classic speculative
factor into the damage formula, and that
should be avoided
I find that in Webster's Third International Dictionary, Unabridged, page 1173
(G & C Mirnam Co , Publishers, 1961), one
of the definitions of the word "intangible'*
is, "incapable of being defined or determined with certainty or precision vague,
elusive " Using this word to describe benefits lost b\ Smith, the majority concludes
that the trial court wab able to determine
"the amount of damages with a reasonable
degree of certainty " It seems to me that
the rule is antithetical to the description of
the benefits for which Smith is being compensated This is confessed by the majority
opinion in the sentence "We would also still
have the problem of just how to assign a
value to the less mathmatically ascertainable benefits which we referred to e a r l i e r "
I am satisfied that the reason there is a
problem is that Smith has been awarded
damages which are speculative In effect
the court is supporting a holding that
Smith's job>with Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company was worth $5,000 a year more
than his actual compensation or, without
supporting evidence, it is concluding that
Smith's new employment somehow is worth
$5,000 a year less than he apparently is
being paid
I would reverse and remand to the district court for a different computation of
damages, while agreeing with the majority
that the right to recover damages is
present
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$2,148 per month. The plaintiff's income
had increased also, to $1,875 per month.
The parties furnished itemized statements
of expenses. After weighing the evidence,
the court found that "there has been a
material change of circumstances" in that
the parties have both improved their incomes and that "the needs of the child have
increased." The court ruled that the defendant, who had stipulated to and agreed
to pay $150 per month for child support
nine years before, could and should pay
additional support when the child's needs
obviously and measurably had increased.
[5] The defendant contends that the
court used its own "predetermined schedule" to arrive at the $225 support figure.
There is nothing in the record, except possible gratuitous remarks of counsel, to indicate that the court relied on any such schedule. Counsel's contention is apparently
based on a chart allegedly used by the
judges of the second judicial district in aid
of child support enforcement in welfare
cases. Counsel has improperly included
these schedules in his brief as pages 6A, B,
C, and D. They were never admitted in
evidence and are not a part of the record,
and are not given any consideration by this
Court in appraising the issue of abuse of
discretion by the trial court.
Affirmed.

District Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, J., dismissed purchaser's suit, and purchaser appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) tender of earnest
money to title company which was to handle closing did not constitute tender to vendor; (2) evidence did not preponderate
against trial court's finding that purchaser
failed to tender earnest money; (3) trial
court had reasonable basis to conclude that
purchaser's acceptance by mail was not reasonable; and (4) signed earnest money
agreement, without tender of earnest money, did not form binding contract
Affirmed.
Howe, J.f concurred in the result.

1. Appeal and Error c=*847(l), 1009(4)
In equity cases, Supreme Court will
review both facts and law, but will reverse
trial court's findings only if evidence clearly
preponderates against them.
2. Equity c=>66
One seeking equity must take care to
discharge his own obligations regardless of
mere inconvenience.
3. Contracts c=>155
Contract will be construed against its
drafter.
4. Vendor arid Purchaser c=>170

PARKS ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
NEW CENTURY REALTY, INC., John
A. Riding and Cleo B. Mason,
Defendants and Respondents.

Earnest money agreement that specified title company would handle real estate
closing did not make title company escrow
agent of parties such that tender of earnest
money to title company constituted tender
to vendor as required by offer and counteroffer.
5. Specific Performance o = 121(11)

No. 17652.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 23, 1982.
Purchaser brought suit for specific performance of sale of real property. The

In purchaser's suit for specific performance, evidence did not preponderate against
trial court's finding that purchaser failed to
tender earnest money to vendor within 48
hours as required by terms of vendor's
counteroffer.
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6. Vendor and Purchaser <£=>16(1)
In case of offer to sell real property
where offer is made to other party personally, offeror is entitled to personal notice of
acceptance.
7. Vendor and Purchaser <s=»16(l)
Where
vendor's agent
personally
brought offer to vendor and counteroffer to
purchaser, and parties had not negotiated
by telephone or letter, and where counteroffer required acceptance within 48 hours,
there was reasonable basis for trial court to
conclude that acceptance by mail was not
reasonable and that timely personal or actual notice of acceptance was required.
8. Vendor and Purchaser c=>16(l)
Where vendor's counteroffer on purchaser's own form required deposit of earnest money with vendor, signed earnest
money agreement, standing alone, was insufficient to form binding contract without
tender of earnest money.

Richard D. Bradford, Provo, for plaintiff
and appellant.
Jackson Howard and John Merkling of
Howard, Lewis & Petersen, Provo, for defendants and respondents.
DURHAM, Justice:
This case is an appeal from the trial
court's dismissal of the plaintiff's suit for
specific performance of a sale of real property. The plaintiff, Parks Enterprises, Inc.,
desired to purchase approximately 84 acres
of land from New Century Realty, the defendant. On September 27, 1979, the plaintiff filled out and signed a printed form
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, which was carried to the defendant
by the plaintiff's agent, J. Fred Smith of
Tri-State Realty. Among other terms, the
plaintiffs offer provided that $5,000 in earnest money would be deposited with TriState Realty upon the parties' reaching an
agreement and that the offer would remain
1. The trial court found that the defendant intended the addition as a counteroffer, which

open for two hours. The offer also listed
four conditions to which the sale would be
subject upon acceptance of the offer. John
A. Riding, President of New Century Realty, found the primary terms of the offer
acceptable, but objected to the listed conditions. In the space below the conditions,
Riding typed'in the following:1
Seller will accept the above total price
and downpayment and other terms with
no "Subject To's" other than Seller's good
and marketable title. All release to be
$1500.00 per acre. Seller must approve
counter within 48 hours.
The counteroffer was signed "New Century
Realty, Inc. by John A. Riding, 2 p.m., 27
Sept. 1979." The following morning, Friday, September 28, the plaintiff considered
the counteroffer and decided to accept i t
Hal Parks, president of Parks Enterprises,
signed the earnest money document below
the defendant's typed counteroffer and sent
a signed copy back to the defendant with
the plaintiff's agent, Smith.
From this point, the evidence presented
at trial was in conflict. The plaintiff's
agent, J. Fred Smith, testified that he went
to the defendant's offices but found them
closed and locked all day and, for this reason, placed a signed copy of the earnest
money agreement tinder the door. He also
mailed a copy to the defendant, return receipt requested. The defendant did not receive notification of the letter until after
the expiration of the 48-hour period. The
defendant, however, introduced evidence at
trial to show that its offices were open that
day, that business was conducted as usual,
and that the plaintiff made no response to
its counteroffer within the specified time
period.
After hearing the evidence, the trial
court entered findings of fact which included findings that the defendant's typed addition to the earnest money agreement was a
counteroffer with acceptance limited to the
following 48 hours, that the plaintiff had
failed to accept within the specified period,
finding is not contested in this appeal.
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and that the recited earnest money payment of $5,000 was never tendered to the
defendant. The trial court concluded that
because of the plaintiffs failure to accept
and failure to tender the earnest money,
there was no contract which could be specifically performed. The plaintiff's cause of
action was dismissed.
[1] The plaintiff argues three points on
appeal. In its first point, the plaintiff
states that this Court should review questions of fact as well as law, asserting that
in an equity case it is the Court's duty to
examine the evidence and to overrule the
trial court's findings unless they are supported by clear and convincing evidence.
The plaintiff has misstated the standard of
review. While it is true that in equity cases
appeal may be had on the facts as well as
the law, this Court defers to the "advantaged position of the trial judge who sees
and hears the witnesses," McBride v.
McBride, Utah, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (1978), by
reversing the trial court's findings only
when the evidence clearly preponderates
against them. Bradford v. Alvey & Sons,
Utah, 621 P.2d 1240 (1980); Tanner v. £aadsgaard, Utah, 612 P.2d 345 (1980). In
these cases, both suits for specific performance of contracts for the sale of real property, this Court cited the above rule and
looked for a "reasonable basis in the evidence" to justify the trial court's findings.
Bradford at 1243; Tanner at 347. More
recently, we thoroughly reviewed and affirmed this standard of review for equity
cases in Jensen v. Brown, Utah, 639 P.2d
150 (1981). We therefore review the trial
court's findings of fact as well as its conclusions of law, but will reverse those findings
only if the evidence clearly preponderates
against them.
[2-5] In its second point, the plaintiff
contends that it properly tendered the earnest money to the defendant. It is well
recognized that one seeking equity must
take care to discharge his own obligations
regardless of mere inconvenience. Fischer
v. Johnson, Utah, 525 P.2d 45 (1974); Bradford, supra. It is also settled law that a
contract will be construed against its draft-

er.
See, e.g., Microbiological
Research
Corp. v. Muna, Utah, 625 P.2d 690 (1981);
Skousen v. Smith, 27 Utah 2d 169, 493 P.2d
1003 (1972). The plaintiff filled out an
earnest money agreement which in part
read as follows: "To: Tri State Reality [sic]
. . . In consideration of your agreement to
use your efforts to present this offer to the
Seller, I/we Parks Interprises, Inc. [sic]
hereby deposit with you as earnest money
the sum of $5,000, Five Thousand and
no/100 dollars, in the form of check to
secure and apply on the purchase of the
property . . . ." The plaintiff's provisions
were incorporated in the defendant's counteroffer except for those specifically rejected. Therefore, the $5,000 should have been
deposited immediately upon the plaintiff's
acceptance of the defendant's counteroffer.
The plaintiffs agent, J. Fred Smith, testified at trial that Tri-State Realty had never
received such a check or any earnest money
payment from the plaintiff. Smith testified that the check was made out to Backman Abstract & Title Company to hold as
escrow agent, although Smith was uncertain whether he had delivered the check to
Backman on Friday, September 28, or Monday, October 1. The check itself was not
presented as evidence, nor did the plaintiff
offer any other evidence to show when the
check was delivered. The plaintiff argues
that since the earnest money agreement
specified that the closing would be handled
by Backman Abstract & Title Company,
Backman became the escrow agent for both
parties and tender to Backman constituted
tender to the defendant. This contention is
contrary to the equity and contract principles cited above. The plaintiff asks for
specific performance, an equitable remedy,
but is unable to show compliance with the
terms which the plaintiff had chosen, i.e.,
tender of the earnest money to Tri-State
Realty, or compliance with the defendant's
counteroffer, i.e., tender within 48 hours.
The evidence does not preponderate against
the trial court's finding but, in fact, provides a reasonable basis for finding that the
plaintiff failed to tender the earnest money
payment. Therefore we will not disturb
that finding.

033

PARKS ENTERPRISES v. 4EW CENTURY REALTY

Utah

921

Cite as, Utah, 52P.2d918

[6,7] The plaintiff asserts in its third
point that its acceptance of the defendant's
counteroffer was proper, timely and created
a binding contract. The plaintiff cites
many authorities to the effect that where
an offer is silent as to the manner of acceptance, any reasonable method may be
used and that acceptance is effective upon
dispatch. We do not question these general
principles of contract formation but find
that they are not dispositive here. In the
case of an offer to sell real property where
the offer is made to the other party personally, the offeror is entitled to personal notice of acceptance. In a real property case,
Frandsen v. Gerstncr, 26 Utah 2d 180, 184,
487 P.2d 697, 700 (1971), we referred to the
rule that "generally a contract arises from
the time that the agent of the offeree communicates the acceptance of his principal to
the offeror." (Emphasis added.) A review
of the record makes it clear that the parties
were negotiating personally through the
plaintiff's agent, Smith, and that both parties were in a hurry. The plaintiff limited
the effectiveness of its original offer to a
mere two hours. Smith personally carried
the offer and counteroffer between the parties. The parties did not negotiate by telephone or letter. The defendant's counteroffer specified no particular manner of acceptance, but stated that "Seller must approve counter within 48 hours." When an
offer does not specify the manner of acceptance, the offeree may accept in any reasonable manner. Here, the plaintiff properly
sent its acceptance with its agent, Smith.
When Smith failed to communicate the acceptance to the defendant personally, the
acceptance was not yet out of the possession of the plaintiff. There was conflicting
evidence regarding whether the defendant's
office was open and the defendant denied
having received the acceptance which Smith
claimed to have put under the door. Under
these circumstances, there was a reasonable
basis for the trial court to conclude that
2.

It should be noted that although the trial
court found that the defendant had intended to
type "Buyer must approve . . . " rather than
"Seller must approve counter within 48 hours,"
that sentence should have put the plaintiff on
notice that the 48-hour limitation was of impor-

acceptance by mail was not reasonable in
this situation and that timely personal or
actual notice of acceptance was required. 2
Therefore, we will not disturb the findings
of the trial court on that question.
[8] As we have sustained the trial
court's findings of fact that there was no
timely acceptance of the defendant's counteroffer and no proper tender of the specified earnest money, we must also conclude
with the trial court that there was no contract between the parties which could be
specifically performed. Even if we had
found the mailed, late acceptance to be
reasonable and proper, the absence of a
proper tender of the earnest money would
have barred the plaintiffs action. In Fischer v. Johnson, supra, the plaintiffs sought
specific performance, alleging that they had
sufficiently tendered performance by notifying the defendants that they were ready
and willing to enter into and perform the
purchase contract as planned. The plaintiffs had some difficulty contacting the defendants and did not tender the $3,000 payment prerequisite to entering into the contract.
There is undoubtedly a basis in the evidence to justify a conclusion that" the
actions of the defendants created some
degree of difficulty or inconvenience for
the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, we cannot
see therein any basis upon which it could
reasonably be concluded that tfie plaintiffs discharged the duty which the law
imposes upon them of attempting with
reasonable diligence and good faith to do
what the agreement required -of- them.
They did not fulfill that obligation by
simply serving the notice of willingness
to go forward, and yet failing to tender
the required $3,000 payment.
525 P.2d at 47. The situation in the instant
case is comparable. The signed earnest
money agreement, standing alone, was intance to the defendant and that mailing an
acceptance on a Friday afternoon, half-way
through the 48-hour period, would not communicate with the defendant fast enough to allow
the defendant to approve it within the 48 hours.
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sufficient to form a binding contract without the required tender of earnest money.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
No costs are awarded.

there was ample support for the determination that the liens in favor of the independent contractors did not attach prior to the
mortgage and did not have priority over the
mortgage; (2) the mortgage foreclosure action was not so inextricably intertwined
with an Idaho bankruptcy case as to be
stayed by the bankruptcy case; and (3) the
order appointing a receiver did not go beyond the permissible bounds of the scope of
a receivership.

HOWE, J., concurs in the result
HALL, C.J., and STEWART and OAKS,
JJ., concur.
^w\
( O I KEY NUMBER SYSUM>

Affirmed.

1. Mechanics' Liens e=*3
Purpose of Mechanics' Lien Act is remedial in nature and seeks to provide protection to laborers and materialmen who
have added directly to value of property of
another by their materials or labor. U.C.A.
1953, 38-1-5.

CALDER BROS. COMPANY, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Ross L. ANDERSON, Signs, Inc., Dunn1
Construction Co., Jarvis Electric Co.,'
Michael Crowley, Michael Crowley dbai
Star Palace, Star Palace, Inc., et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

2. Mechanics' Liens <s=>168
Phrase "commencement to do work" as
used in mechanics' lien statute is construed
in favor of lien claimants. U.C.A.1953, 3 8 1-5.

JARVIS & SONS ELECTRIC CO., INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

3. Mechanics' Liens c=>173
Materialmen's or mechanics' liens resulting from materials furnished or labor
performed relate back to and attach as of
date of commencement of first work on
improvement or structure involved. U.C.A.
1953, 38-1-5.

Ross L. ANDERSON and Brent Weeks,
et al., Defendants.
DUNN CONSTRUCTION CO., and Royden, Inc., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Ross L. ANDERSON and Allison Anderson, Brent C. Weeks and Western
Star Palace, Inc., Defendants.
Nos. 17449, 17458 and 17459.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 24, 1982.
A mortgage foreclosure action was consolidated with two other actions brought by
independent contractors to foreclose their
mechanics' liens on the same properly. Thee
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Georgee
E. Ballif, J., entered judgment in favor off
the mortgagee. Appeals were taken. Thee
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1))

4. Mechanics' Liens <^=>173
For one contractor's lien to relate back
to commencement of work or supplying of
materials by another contractor, both contractors' projects' must have been performed in connection with what is essentially single project performed under common
plan prosecuted with reasonable promptness
and without material abandonment; ordinary maintenance or cleanup work does not
serve as basis for "tacking" so as to fix
earlier lien date for labor and materials
supplied. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5.
5. Mortgages c=> 151(3)
Liens of contractors could not be
"tacked" onto earlier date so as to have
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Pat I. P R A V O R N E , Appellant,

v.
V/ayne M c L E O D and Louise McLeod,

Respondents.
No. 4603.
Supremo Court of Nevada.
July 10, 1003.

Purchaser's action for specific performance of vendors' contract to sell realty.
T h e 8th Judicial District Court, ClarkCounty, John Mowbray, J., entered judgment for the vendors and the purchaser appealed. The Supreme Court, Badt, C. J.,
held that the purchaser's signing and returning of the agreement which had been
drafted by the vendors and forwarded to
the purchaser constituted an unconditional
acceptance of the vendors' offer, and that
a request seeking insertion of a provision
for gradual release of portions of the realty
from the note and deed of trust as stated
portions of the indebtedness were paid was
only a request for an additional benefit and
not an essential term or condition of acceptance.

George E. Fianklin, Jr , Las Vegas, for
appellant.
Springmeyer, Thompson & Dixon, Reno,
for respondents.
BADT, Chief Justice.
The question here involved for determination is whether the instrument herein
referred to- as a contract of purchase and
sale was a completed contract, or whether
it was merely an offer made by the McLeods
to Pravorne tc enter into a contract, which
offer was rejected by Pravorne and a
counteroffer made by him, which in turn
was not accepted by the McLeods.
Under similar circumstances the law was
very simply stated in Hargrave v. Heard
Inv. Co., 56 Ariz. 77, 105 P.2d 520, 521, as
follows:

1. Vendor and Purchaser OI6(4)
Purchaser's signing and returning of
agreement for sale of realty constituted an
unconditional acceptance of vendors' offer,
and request attached to agreement seeking
insertion of a provision for gradual release
of portions of the realt\ from the note and
deed of trust as stated portions of the
indebtedness were paid was not an essential
term or condition of acceptance.

"It is the law that when A offers B to
enter into a contract on certain terms, and
B declines to accept those terms but offers
a counter-proposition, the original offer
loses its effect, and is thereafter only open
to acceptance by B when renewed by A.
On the other hand, if A makes an offer
which is unconditionally accepted by B, the
fact that B, after such acceptance, proposes a modification of the original contract, which is declined by A, does not affect
the validity of the original contract. If
then, in the present case, the original contract of purchase and sale, upon its delivery
to and acceptance by plaintiff, was a completed and binding contract between defendant and the insurance company, the fact
that the latter desired to have certain
terms added to those of the contract in the
escrow directions to plaintiff does not affect the validity of the contract."

2. Vendor and Purchaser C==>23
Notwithstanding lack of their signatures on the agreement itself, vendors were
bound by terms of the agreement which
they had drafted and sent to purchaser
where a signed covering letter accompanying the agreement contained both the offer
and the vendors' unconditional promise to
sign, demonstrating the vendors' assent
thereto.

Neither party contests such general recital of the applicable well-established law.
Pravorne, in his complaint for specific performance, asserts that there was such completed contract. McLeod insists that his
offer to enter into the contract of purchase
and sale was not unconditionally accepted
by Pravorne but that Pravorne rejected
the same and made a counteroffer, which
McLeod refused to accept. The case ther

Reversed and remanded.
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turns upon the construction of the written
instruments and correspondence involved
and the actions of the parties thereunder.
The facts arc as follows:
The parties had been negotiating with
respect to a proposed purchase of real property by Pravornc from McLeod. Pravornc
had the Nevada Title Insurance Company
prepare escrow instructions. They were
mailed to McLeod but were unsatisfactory
to him, so he had his attorney draft a complete new contract entitled "Agreement for
Sale of Realty," which in turn contained
escrow instructions. McLeod then mailed
this agreement to Pravorne's real estate
broker, with a better addressed to the broker
and signed by McLeod, reading as follows:
"Dear Mr. Bell:
"Upon reviewing your Escrow Instructions which were prepared by Nevada Title
Insurance-Company, I took them to my attorney, Mead Dixon, for his approval.
"Obviously, we decided to prepare our
own Agreement of Sale and I am sending
it for the examination and approval of your
buyer. There is no change in any of the
conditions of our telephone agreement,
but merely that the conditions are set forth
more clearly.
"I am sending two copies of this Agreement to Nevada Title Insurance Company,
If the Agreement is acceptable to your
buyer, please have him sign and return two
copies as soon as possible. We will then
sign one and return it to Nevada Title Company immediately.
"If these papers arc in order and acceptable to your buyer, we are going to be
very anxious to close this matter as soon
as possible.
"Sincerely yours,
"Wayne McLeod
"cc: Nevada Title Insurance Company
"118 South Fourth Street
"Las Vegas, Nevada
" A T T E N T I O N : Evelyn Wilson"
Two unsigned copies of the agreement
were enclosed. The agreement was between McLeod and his wife, as sellers, and

Pravornc as purchaser, and provided that
the sellers agreed to sell and the purchaser
to buy the described real estate for the purchase price of §70,50(1.00, payable $1,000.00
"on the signing of this contract, by cash
or check to the order of Nevada Title Insurance Company, * * * $19,445.00 by
cash or check to the order of Nevada Title
Insurance Company * * * on or before
closing," and ' $50,055.00 "by promissory
note of the Purchaser payable to the order
of the Sellers in four (4) equal annual
instalments of principal, plus interest at 6%
per annum, such instalments to be payable
on or before May 1 of each year commencing with May.l, 1963, secured by first deed
of trust on the above described property. ,,
The contract provided further for the apportionment of taxes and special assessments; that the closing should take place
at the office of Nevada Title Insurance
Company at Las Vegas, and that closing
should be effected (a) by depositing such
instruments or funds with the title insurance company as might be necessary to
effect the closing, (b) that the deed be the
usual grant, bargain, and sale deed, (c) that
the note and deed of trust be in usual form,
(d) that the sellers would furnish a policy
of title insurance subject to certain specified
exceptions, (c) the division and charging
of fees and expenses according to the usual
practice of the title insurance company.
The contract then provided certain conditions as to brokerage commissions, the resulting situation if the sellers should be
unable to convey good merchantable title,
that appropriate instructions should be
signed by cither party upon demand of
the other and that in the event of conflict
between the provisions of the agreement
and the provisions of any escrow instructions, the provisions of the agreement
should prevail.
Pravornc signed the contract of purchase
and sale in duplicate and delivered the
copies to the title insurance company. The
title insurance company mailed the signed
agreement to McLeod, but stapled to the
agreement were three sheets of paper. For
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a rejection of it, a mere inquiry as to
whether one proposing a contract will alter
or modify its terms, made before acceptance
or rejection does not amount to a rejection.
* * * »>>

Here McLcod had the contract drawn by
his own attorney and he himself mailed it
to Pravorne, stating that he would sign it.
The conclusion is clear that he expressed
his unconditional assent thereto.

For additional authorities see 1 Williston,
Contracts § 79, and cases cited therein.

Concluding as wc do that the request for
amendment was merely for an additional
benefit if the request should be approved
and was not a rejection of the offer, the
judgment must be reversed and a judgment
of specific performance entered, and it is
so ordered.

[1] We are of the opinion that when appellant signed and returned the agreement
he made an unconditional acceptance which
was not made to depend upon McLcod's
assent to the proposed amendment, which
was simply a request for an additional benefit which was not an essential term or condition of his acceptance.
[2] The fact that Mr. and Mrs. McLcod
did not sign the original contract before
forwarding the same is not material. Respondent conceded in oral argument that the
>igned covering letter above quoted in full
was the offer. The question that arises
from such situation is whether or not the
seller consented to be bound by the written
contract even though he did not sign it.
Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Garrett,
10 Cir., 70 F.2d 969, 974; Reno Electrical
Works v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
43 Ncv. 191, 194, 183 P. 386, 387; Geary
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 366 111.
625, 10 N.E.2d 350; Bartlett v. Rogers, 103
Cal.App.2d 250, 229 P.2d 434, 437; 1 Corbin, Contracts § 31, at 85.

The appeal is also from the court's denial
of Pravorne's "Motion to set Aside Order
for Summary Judgment or to Grant a Xew
Trial." XRCP 59. Respondents argue
that a motion for new trial does not lie
under the circumstances. In view of the
foregoing however, it is not necessary to
discuss this subject.
Judgment reversed with costs, and remanded with instructions for entrv of iuds:ment not inconsistent with the foregoingopinion.
McXAMEE, J., and GABRIELLI, District Judge, concur.
T H O M P S O N , J., being disqualified, the
Governor commissioned Honorable J O H N
E.< GABRIELLI of the Second Judicial
District to sit in his place.
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where the offeree has agreed in advance that such silence he so construed 13
or where there was some duty resting upon him to that effect.14 The solicitation of the offer by the offeree may, in the light of the relations of the parties
or other surrounding circumstances, justify the offeror in regarding the offeree's
silence after receiving the offer as an acceptance. 15 It is said, however,
that circumstances which will impose a contractual obligation by mere silence
are exceptional in their character and of rare occurrence; and no legal liability
can arise out of the mere silence of the party sought to be affected, unless he
is subject to a duty to reply which is neglected, to the harm of the other party. 16
An agreement inferred from silence must rest on the principle of estoppel,
and a change of position, in reliance on such silence, resulting in substantial
injury, is an essential element of the estoppel.17
While there is authority that silence amounts to assent where the offer states
that acceptance will be assumed m case there is no reply,18 there is also authority that even under such circumstances silence is not necessarily a legal
acceptance which forms a contract. 19
There is a legal acceptance where silence is accompanied by acts of the offeree, such as exercise of dominion over things offered to him, which warrant
an inference of assent.20
§ 48. Acceptance by mail.
While an offer may ordinarily be accepted by mail, such an acceptance
must be unqualified, plain, and free from ambiguity, to constitute a contract. 1
Whether certain correspondence between the parties showed that the plaintiff
had unconditionally accepted the defendant's offer has been held to be a question for the court. 2
13. Bowlcy v Fuller, 121 Mc 22, 115 A 466,
24 ALR 964.
14. Colc-Mclntvre-Norneet Co. v Hollowav,
141 Term 679, 214 SW 817, 7 ALR 1603,
holding that the delay of a jobber in notifying a customer of the rejection of an order
Liken bv the jobber's traveling salesman
amounts to an acceptance of it.
15. Truscon Steel Co. v Cooke (CA10 Okla)
90 F2d 905.
17 Tex Lc Rev 209.
16. Chastian v Baxter, 139 Kan 331. 31 P
2d 2 1 ; Lcchlcr v Montana L. Ins. Co. 48 N D
644, 186 NW 271, 23 ALR 1193; Roval Ins.
Co. v Beatty, 119 Pa 6, 12 A 607; Colc-McIntvrc-NorP.cet Co. v Hollow-ay, 141 Tcnn
679, 214 SW 817, 7 ALR 1683.
There can be an acceptance by silence only
where the circumstances arc such that a duty
to speak arises. A duty to speak can arise
only when an offeror has a right to demand
some action by the offeree. Suittcr v Thompson, 225 O r 614, 350 P2d 267.
In Bowley v Fuller, 121 Mc 22, 115 A
466, 24 ALR 964, it was held that the mere
failure of the owner of hay stored in another's barn, to answer the latter's letter
naming a price for storage, docs not create a
contract to pay the price named.
17. Lctrcs v Washington Co-op. Chick Asso.

8 Wash 2d 61. I l l P2d 5 9 k Shakman v
United Slates Credit Svstem Co. 92 Wis 366,
66 NW 520.
18. Wood & B Co. v D. E. Hcv.it Lumber
Co. 89 W Va 254, 109 SE 242, 19 ALR
467.
19. Bowlev v Fuller, 121 Mc 22, 115 A
466, 24 ALR 9 6 k Trover v Fox, 162 Wash
537, 290 P 733, 77 ALR 1132.
The recipient of an o.Tcr is under no
duty to speak, his silence may not be translated into an accep*arce where it is not misleading, merely because the ofTer purports
to attach that effect to it. Albrecht Chemical
Co. v Anderson Trading Corp. 293 NY 437,
84 NE2d 625.
20. Russell v Texas Co. (CA9 Mont s . 238
F i d 636. cert den 354 US 938, 1 L ed 2d
1537, 77 S Ct 1400: Gorham v Peerless Life
Ins. Co. 368 Mich 335, 118 NW2d 306; WadsWorth v New York Life Ins. Co. 349 Mich
240, 04 NW2d 513.
Restatement, CONTRACTS § 72.

1. Watts v Thcmas Carter & Sons, Inc. 207
App Div 656, 202 NYS 852.
Practice

Aids.—Proof

of mailing of letter.

7 A M J U R PROOF OF FACTS 417,

MAILINC,

Proof 1.
2. M. P. Berglas Mfg. Co. v Paddleford, 201
App Div 611, 194 NYS 756.
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W i t h respect to acceptance by mail, the courts have 1 -n confronted by
the rather difficult question whether the contract is complc 1 when the letter
of acceptance is mailed or when it is received by the offeror, There is no doubt
t h a t the implication t h a t a complete, final, a n d absolute) binding contract
ay in some cases
is formed as soon as the acccr v ancc of an offer is posted
lead to inconvenience a n d h a i d s h i p . At t h e same time, i has been pointed
out t h a t an offeror, if he chooses, m a y always make the fo. ation of the cont r a c t which he proposes dependent u p o n t h e actual commv i cation to himself
of the acceptance a n d that if no answer to his offer is rc< ived by him a n d
t h e m a t t e r is of importance to him, he can m a k e inquiri< of the person to
w h o m his offer was addressed. It has been suggested, moreover, t h a t if the
offeror is not to be b o u n d by t h e acceptance until it is received by him, t h e
p a r t y accepting the offer o u g h t not to be b o u n d w h e n his acceptance is received, because he docs not know of t h e meeting of t h e minds, for t h e offer
may have been w i t h d r a w n before his acceptance was rccciwd. U p o n balancing convenience and inconvenience, t h e courts have deem< 1 it more consistent wTith the acts and declarations of t h e parties to consider the contract complete a n d absolutely binding on t h e transmission of t h e ac ccptance t h r o u g h
the post, as the m e d i u m of c o m m u n i c a t i o n which t h e parti :s themselves contemplate, instead of postponing its completion until t h e acceptance has been
received by t h e offeror.
By treating the post office as the agency of both
parties, t h e courts have m a n a g e d to harmonize the legal notion t h a t it is necessary t h a t t h e minds of t h e parties meet with t h e equally well-established principle t h a t a determination to accept is ineffectual if it is not communicated
either actually or by legal implication. 3 Accordingly, where acceptance by mail
is authorized, the contract is completed at t h e m o m e n t the acceptor deposits
in the post office the letter of acceptance directed to the offeror's proper a d dress a n d with the postage prepaid, provided he docs so within the proper
time a n d before receiving any intimation of the revocation of the offer. 4 It
follows that, in such a case, it is immaterial whether t h e letter of acceptance
actually reaches the offeror. 5 T h e r e arc, however, instances where the mailing
of an acceptance is unauthorized a n d docs not form a contract. 6
3 . Burton v United States, 202 US 344, 50
L ed 1057, 26 S Ct 688: Patrick v Bowman,
149 US 411, 37 L cd 790, 13 S Ct 811, 866;
Tayloc v Merchants' F. Ins. Co. 9 How (US)
390, 13 L ed 187: Cohen v First Nat. Bank,
22 Ariz 394, 198 P 122, 15 ALR 701;
Kcmpncr v Cohn, 47 Ark 519, 1 SW 869;
Updike v People, 92 Colo 125. 18 P2d 472;
New v Gcnnania F. Ins. Co. 171 Ind 33, 85
NE 703; Lucas v Western U. Tclcg. Co. 131
Iowa 669, 109 NW 191; Gipps Brewing Co.
v Dc France, 91 Iowa 108, 58 NW 1087;
Wheat v Cross, 31 Md 99; Eggcr v Neshitt,
122 Mo 667, 27 SW 385; Wester v Casein Co.
206 NY 506, 100 NE 488; Macticr v Frith,
6 Wend (NY) 103.
Adams v Lindscll. 1 Barn & Aid 681, 106
Eng Reprint 250: Brogdcn v Metropolitan R.
Co. (Eng) LR 2 App Cas 66G; Household F.
& Carriage Acci. Ins. Co. v Grant (Eng) LR
4 E x c h Div216 ( C A ) .
Williston, Contracts 3d ed §§ 81, 83, 85.
Restatement, CONTRACTS § 67.

This rule is known as the "deposited acceptance rule" and also as the "rule in

Adams v Lindscll [1 Barn" & Aid. 681, 106
Ens. Reprint 2 5 0 ] / ' Morrison v Thoclkc (Fla
App) 155 So 2d 889.
4. Shuhert Theatrical Co. v Rath (CA2)
271 F 827, 20 ALR 846 (holding that the
mailing of a letter exercising an open option
to employ another's services for a specified
time, properly stamped and addressed, closes
the contract); Morrison v Thoeike (Fla App)
155 So 2d 889; Consolidated Sales Co. v
Bank of Hampton Roads, 193 Va 307, 68
SE2d 652.
5. Cohen v First Nat. "Bank, 22 Ariz 394,
198 P 122, 15 ALR 701; Egger v Nesbitt, 122
Mo 667, 27 SW 385: Anderson v Stewart,
149 Neb 660, 32 NW2d 140, 3 ALR2d 250;
Scottish-American Mortg. Co. v Davis, 96
Tex 501, 74 SW 17; Consolidated Sales Co.
v Bank of Hampton Roads, 193 Va 307, 68
SE2d 652; Weaver v Burr, 31 W Va 736, 8
SE 743.
Household F & Carriage Acci. Ins. Co. v
Grant (Eng) LR 4 Lxch Div 216 ( C A ) .
In holding that an option was accepted
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Where acceptance by mail is authorized, as the contract is completed when
the acceptance is duly mailed, the ofTcr cannot thereafter be revoked even
though the revocation is mailed before, if it does not reach the acceptor
until after, the mailing of the acceptance. The ofTer cannot be withdrawn
unless the withdrawal reaches the party to whom it is addressed before his
letter of reply announcing the acceptance has been mailed.7 While there is
some authority apparently to the contrary, most of these cases seem distinguishable. Some arc explainable under express provisions of a statute relating
to effective time of revocations. Others are based on the theory, contrary
to the prevailing rule, that acceptance does not become effective until receipt
thereof by the offeror. In jurisdictions where this view prevails, it would seem
that the general rule above stated will not be applied, and the revocation
may be effective at least if communicated to the offeree before receipt by the
offeror of the letter of acceptance, although the revocation was not received
by the offeree until after the mailing of his acceptance. 8
It would seem that regardless of the manner in which an offer is communicated, acceptance by letter is sufficient if the letter is actually delivered to
the offeror within the time the offer remains open. But of course a letter
which is written and remains in the writer's hands or under his control is not
an acceptance. 9 Similarly, where the offeree promptly delivers a letter of acceptance to his agent with directions to mail it, but the agent neglects to mail
it within the time specified in the offer, no contract is formed.10
§ 49. — Authorization.
Acceptance by mail may, of course, be expressly authorized, and it would
appear to be impliedly authorized when the circumstances are such that it
must have been within the contemplation of the parties that the mails would
be used in making the answer. It is said that where the circumstances are
such that it must have been within the contemplation of the parties that,
according to the ordinary usages of mankind, the mails might be used as a
means of communicating the acceptance of an offer, the acceptance is complete as soon as it is posted.11 It has also been said that the rule should be
by the mailing of a letter, the court in Shubcrt Theatrical Co. v Rath (CA2) 271 F
827, 20 ALR 816, observed that "the law is
settled that, if a letter accepting an offer is
made in the manner either expressly or impliedly indicated by the party making the
ofTcr, it makes no difference whatever that
the letter is never received because of some
mistake of the post-office authorities, or
through accident in transmission, or because
in some way it becomrs lost," citing numerous
authorities in support of the proposition.
6. § 50, infra.
7. Patrick v Bowman, 149 US 411, 37 L cd
790, 13 S Ct 811, 866; TayJoc v Merchants'
F. Ins. Co. 9 How (US) 390. 13 L ed 187;
Kempncr v Cohn, 4 7 Ark 519, 1 SW 869.;
Wheat v Cross, 31 Md 99; Anderson v Stewart,
149 Neb 660, 32 NW2d 140, 3 ALR2d
250.
Stevenson v McLean (Ens) LR 5 QB Div
316.
Annotation:
125 ALR 900.
8. Stahl v Locb, Cooncy & Locb, Inc. 209

III App 245 (abstract) (on theory that acceptance docs not become effective uivil receipt by offeror); M'Cullo<h v Eagle Ins. Co.
18 Mass (1 Pick) 278 (same); Waiters v Lincoln, 29 SD 98, 135 NW 712 (statute).
Annotation:
125 ALR 991.
9. Morrison v Thoclkc (Ha App) 155 So 2d
839; Ritchie v Rawlings, 106 Kan 118, 186
P 1033; Logan v WaddV ' M o App) 238
SW 516; Mactier v Frith, 6 Wend <XY) 103:
Watson v Orccon Mohnc Plow Co. 112 Or
414, 227 P 278.
10. Maclay v Harvey, 90 111 525.
1 1 . Shubcrt Theatrical Co. v Rath (CA2)
271 F 827, 20 ALR 846; Lucas v Western U.
Teles. Co. 131 Iowa 669. 109 XW 191; Blake
v Hamburg-Bremen J \ Ins. Co. 67 Tex 160,
2 SW 3 6 8 /
Household F & Carriage Acci Ins. Co. v
Grant (Eng) LR 4 Exch Div 216 ( C A ) .
Williston, Contracts 3d ed §S 81, 83, 85.
Authority to send an acceptance by mail so
as to create a binding contract upon posting
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should notify the offeror if he docs not intend
to accept.
An offeree who does any act inconsistent
with the offeror's ownership of offered property is bound in accordance with the offered
terms unless they arc manifestly unreasonble.
But if the act is wrongful as against the offeror
it is an acceptance only if ratified by him.
Restatement, CONTRACTS 2d § 69.

p 387, n 17—
An agreement based on estoppel, when inferred from silence, must include a change of
position and reliance on the silence and an
obligation or duty to speak out. Bivans Corp. v
Community Nat. Bank, 15 Mich App 178, 166
NW2d 270.
p 3 8 7 , n 19—
,
Sec also Sorg v Fred Weisz 8c. Associates, 14
Cal App 3d 78, 91 Cal Rptr 918, holding that
silence or inaction by an offeree did not constitute acceptance of a landowner's written offer
to grant, for a certain daily compensation, a
license to store waste and rubbish which the
offeree without authority had previously abandoned on the land, even though the offer
slaved. \ha\ continued use oV \he tand COT "S\OTing" the waste would constitute acceptance and
even though the offeree failed to remove the
rubbish within what was found to be a reasonable time, where there were no prior dealings,
communication, or any other relationship between the landowner and the offeree from
which the former could reasonably have concluded that the offeree intended to accept the
obligation contained in the offer.
p 387, n 20—First Nat. Bank v Marietta Mfg.
Co. 151 W Va 636, 153 SK2d 172.
§ 48. A c c e p t a n c e by mail
Practice aids: Acceptance by Correspondence.
1 VVilliston on Contracts 3d ed § 8 1 .
When an Acceptance Is Mailed. 1 Williston
on Contracts 3d ed § 85.
Restatements:
As to time when rejection or counter-offer
terminates power of acceptance, according to
Restatement. Contracts 2d, see § 39, supra.
An acceptance sent by mail or otherwise
from a distance is not operative when dispatched, unless it is properly addressed and
such other precautions taken as are ordinarily
observed to insure safe transmission of similar
messages. Restatements, CONTRACTS 2d § 66.
p 388, n 4—E. M. Boerke, Inc. v Williams. 28
Wis 2d 627, 137 NW2d 489.
Where a letter confirming exercise of option
to purchase was mailed within the period of
option, it constituted a valid acceptance of the
offer under the terms of the option, even
though the letter was received after the period
had expired. Re Crossman's Estate, 231 Cal
App 2d 370. 4 1 Cal Rptr 800.
The well-established rule is that in the absence of any limitation or provision to the

contrary in the offer, the acceptance of an offer
is complete and the contract becomes binding
upon those parties when the offeree deposits
the acceptance in the post box. Reserve Ins.
Co. v Duckett. 249 Mel 108. 238 A2d 536.
p 389, n 9—Darling v Nincteen-Eighty Corp.
— Iowa —, 176 NW2d 765 (offeree's mailing papers to his own agent did not constitute acceptance).
Additional case authorities for section:
Where a written acceptance of an offer is
deposited in the mail one day and received by
the offeror two days later, telephoned revocation of the offer on the intervening day was
ineffective, the agreement becoming binding
upon mailing of the acceptance. Kennedv v
Erie Ins. Exchange.. 64 Pa D & C2d 227,' 35
Lch Co LJ 70.
§ 49. —Authorization
Practice aids: An Acceptance Must Be Properly Stamped and Addressed. I Williston on
Contracts 3d ed § 84.
Ihc of Mail or Telegraph Must be Authorized if Contract is to be Completed by
Sending Acceptance. I Williston on Contracts 3d ed § 83.
Restatement:
As to what constitutes receipt of revocation,
rejection, or acceptance of offer under Restatement, Contracts 2d, see § 44, supra.
§51.

—EfTect of r i g h t t o withdraw, o r
w i t h d r a w a l of, l e t t e r f r o m mail
Practice aids: Withdrawal of Acceptance From
Channel of Communication. 1 Williston on
Contracts 3d ed § 86.
§ 5 3 . A c c e p t a n c e by t e l e p h o n e
Practice aids:
Acceptance by Telephone or Teletype. 1
Williston on Contracts 3d ed § 82A.
Restatement:
Acceptance given by telephone or other medium of substantially instantaneous two-way
communication is governed by the principles
applicable to acceptances where the parties are
in the presence of each other. Restatement,
CONTRACTS 2d § 64.

p 392, n 14—Sims v United Bridge & Iron
(OldaH02 P 2 d 9 l l .
p 392, n 15—Pierce-v Folcv Bros., Inc. 283
Minn 360, 16S NW2d 346.
§ 5 4 . A c c e p t a n c e by t e l e g r a p h — o f t e l e g r a p h i c offer
Practice aids: Acceptance by Telegraph. 1
Williston on Contracts 3d ed § 82.
Restatement:
As to time when rejection or counter-offer
terminates power of acceptance, according to
Restatement, Contracts 2d, see § 39, supra.
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demand that he comply with his ofTcr, asking time to consider, and by a subsequent oiler of a compromise which is rejected.17
3. QUALIFIED OR CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE

§ G2. Generally; necessity that acceptance comply with ofTcr.
The rule is fundamental that an acceptance must comply with the terms of
the offer18—that is, in order to form a contract, the ofTcr and acceptance must
express assent to one and the same thing, 19 and there must be no substantial or
material 20 variance between them. 1 An ofTcr imposes n o obligations until accepted according to its terms, 2 without qualification or departure. 3 So too, in
order that a binding and enforceable contract may arise out of the doing of
an act in consequence of an ofTer, the act must be done in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the offer.*
17. Page v Shainwald, 169 NY 246, 62 NE
356.

Anderson v Stewart, 149 Neb 660, 32 NW
2d 140, 3 ALR 250; McConc v Ecclcs, 42
Ncv 451, 181 P 134; Richardson v Greens18. Baird v Pratt (CA8) 148 F 825; Gram
boro Warehouse & Storage Co. 223 NC 344,
v Mutual Life Ins. Co. 300 NY 375, 91 NE2d
26 SE2d 897, 149 ALR 2 0 1 ; Kvalc v Keane,
307.
39 N D 560, 168 NW 74, 9 ALR 972; St.
Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v Nix, 101 Okla
21 U of Cincinnati L Rev 68.
197, 224 P 982; Northwestern Agencies v
An acceptance must be coextensive with the
offer. Podany v Erickson, 235 Minn 36, 49 Flynn, 138 O r 101, 5 P2d 530; Southern
Bridge Co. v Askew, 119 SC 19, 111 SE
NW2d 193.
790: Canton Cotton Mills v Bowman OverAn acceptance must be as specific as the all Co. 149 Tenn 18, 257 SW 398; Hancock
ofTcr. Valashinas v Koniuto, 283 App Div v Fletcher, 113 W Va 624, 169 SE 457.
13, 125 NYS2d 554, a d d 308 NY 233, 124 .
Jordan v Norton, 4 Mces & W 155, 150
NE2d 300.
En£ Reprint 1382.
19. Phoenix Tron & Steel Co. v WilkofT Co. Annotation:
3 ALR2d 257, § 1.
(CA6) 253 F 165. 1 ALR 1497; Allen v
Bissingcr & Co. 62 Utah 226, 219 P 539, 31
Williston, Contracts 3d ed § 73.
ALR 376 (holding that the acceptance of
Restatement, CONTRACTS § 59.
an offer to furnish a copy of the official report of a hearing before the Interstate Com2. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v Columbus
merce Commission by affirming interest in Rolling Mill Co. 119 US 149, 30 L ed 376,
"your official report of the different changes
7 S Ct 168; Tillcy v Cook County, 103 US
in the handling of freight"' and the ordering
155, 26 L ed 374; First Nat. Bank v Hall,
of a copy of the same constituted a contract
101 US 43, 25 L cd-822.
for the copied stenographic report of the tesT h e acceptance must be in the exact terms
timony taken at the hearing).
of the offer. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v Curtis
There must be a meeting of the minds of
Electrical Co. 153 Tex 118, 264 SW2d 700.
the parties upon identical terms. Allis-ChalT h e acceptance must be in exact accordmcrs Mfg. Co. v Curtis Electrical Co. 153 ance with the offer. Wusslcr v Peterson (Mo)
Tex 118, 264 SW2d 700.
270 SW2d 12. „
20. Immaterial or minor differences or vari3 . Northeastern Constr. Co. v Winston- •
ances between the offer and acceptance will
Salem (CA4) 83 F2d 57, 104 ALR 1142;
not prevent tkc formation of a contract. § 65, Polhamus v Roberts, 50 N M 236, 175 P2d
infra.
196, 170 ALR 991.
1. Isclin v United States, 271 US 136, 70
A difference as to the form of a contract
L ed 872, 46 S Ct 458; Beer v Mackin, 145 Is just as effective "to prevent entering into
US 629, 36 L ed 812, 12 S Ct 977: Ship- a contract as one as to substance. Phoenix
man v District of Columbia, 119 US 140, Iron & Steel Co. v WilkofT Co. (CA6) 253
F 165, 1 ALR 1497.
30 L ed 337, 7 S Ct 134; Phoenix Iron &
Steel Co. v WilkofT Co. (CA6) 253 F 165, 1
An offer to take a certain sum in cash
ALR 1497; Koehlc v Tiller (Fla) 42 So 2d
for land is not accepted, so as to bind the
363; Quinn v Daly, 300 III 273, 133 NE
parties, by a contract which leaves the buyer
290; Brach v Mattcson, 298 III 387, 131
at liberty to withdraw by forfeiting a deNE 804; Shaw v Ingram-Day Lumber Co. posit of one-quarter of that sum or to pay
152 Ky 329, 153 SW 431; Thomas v Ledger,
the remainder within 60 days. Stilt v Huidc274 Mich 16, 263 NW 783; United Cigar
kopcr, 17 Wall (US) 384. 21 L ed 644.
Stores Co. v llollister, 185 Minn 534, 242
NW 3; Williams v Emerson-Brantingham
4. Scott v People's Monthly Co. 209 Iowa
Implement Co. (Mo App) 198 SW 425; 503, 228 N W 263, 67 A L R 413.
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The acceptance, to be effective, must be unequivocal and unconditional, 5
and it may not introduce additional terms and condition^.6 If a condition is
affixed to the acceptance by the party to whom the offer is made, or any
modification of or change in the offer is made or requested, there is a rejection
of the offer7 which put:; an end to the negotiation, unless the party who made
the original offer renews it or assents to the modification suggested.8 The effect
of an acceptance containing conditions not found in the offer is to make a
counterproposal, upon which the parties have not yet agreed, but which is open
for acceptance or rejection.9 A qualified acceptance is simply a counteroffer,10
and this is true by statute in some states. 11 It is also a general rule that where
an offer is made to a particular person, a reply which attempts to substitute
or add another as a party to the proposed contract, -for direct performance of
or participation in the fulfilment of the obligation involved or a material part
thereof, is tantamount to a counteroffer and in effect a rejection of the offer.12
Annotation:

White, 117 111 118, 7 NE 525: Cedar Rapids
Lumber Co. v Fisher. 129 Iowa 332, 104
NW 595: Thomas v Ledger, 274 Mich 16, 263
In order to make performance of a thing
NW 783; State ex rel. Johnson v Blair, 331
proposed sufficient as an acceptance of the
Mo 1072, 174 SW2d 051; Jones v Great Northproposal, the performance must be made in
ern R. Co. 68 Mont 231, 217 P 673, 37 ALR
accordance with the terms of the proposal
754: Anderson v Stewart, 149 Neb 660, 32
as to amount, as to quality, as to fitness for
NW2d 140, 3 ALR2d 250: McConc v Ecclcs,
the purpose intended, and as to the time
42 Ncv 451, 181 P 134: Barrow S. S. Co. v
of delivery. Barber-Green Co. v M. F. Dol- Mexican C. R. Co. 134 NY 15, 31 NE 261;
lard, Jr., Inc. 239 App Div 655, 269 NYS Mactier v Frith. 6 Wend (NY) 103: Ruckcr
2 H , a i T d 267 NY 545, 196 N E 571.
v Sanders, 182 N C 507. 109 SE "57: Horean
The purchaser of goods from a corpora- v Russell, 24 ND 490. 140 NW 99: Sossation is not entitled to his percentage in a pro- mon v Littleiohn, 241 SC 478. 129 SE2d 124:
Crews v Sullivan, 133 Va 478. 113 SE 865:
posed profit-sharing scheme devised by the
Weaver v Burr. 31 W Va 736, 8 SE 713:
corporation, where he did not comply with
Todorovich v Kinnickinnic Mut. Loan cc
the condition upon which the offer of a right
Bide. Asso. 238 Wis 39, 298 NW 226, 135
to a participation in the profits was rested,
ALR 818.
namely, that he would for the following year
deal exclusively with such corporation. D.
Williston, Contracts 3d ed £ 77.
R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v Corn Products Rcf.
Restatement, CONTRACTS £$ 6 ' \ 72.
Co. 236 US 165, 59 L cd 520, 35 S Ct 398.
8. As to acceptance of conditions by the of• 5. Wusslcr v Peterson ( M o ) 270 SW2d 12; feror, see § 66, infra.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v Curtis Electrical
Co. 153 Tex 118, 264 SW2d 700.
9. Bvford v Gates Bros. Lumber Co. 216
Ark 400, 225 SW2d 929: Richardson y
Williston, Contracts 3d cd § 72.
Greensboro Warehouse £ Storage Co. 233
6. Podany v Erickson, 235 Minn 36, 49 NW N C 344, 26 SE2d 89,7, 149 ALR 201.
2d 193.
5 Ark L Rev 218.
25 U of Cincinnati L Rev 68.
A reply to an ofTor, thourh purporting to
One accepting an offer has no right to im- accept it, which zdds qualifications or repose additional terms or to introduce new and quires performance of conditions, h not an
substantially different conditions not found in acceptance but a counteroffer.
Poihamus v
the offer. Richardson v Greensboro WareRoberts, 50 NM 236, 175 P2d 196, 170 ALR
house & Storage Co. 223 N C 344, 26 SE2d
991.
897, 149 ALR 201.
10. Hall v Mutual Life Ins. Co. 282 App
7. Ban- v Lapslcy, 1 Wheat ( U S ) 151, 4 Div 203, 122 NYS2d 239, afTd 306 NY 9U9,
119 NE2d 598.
L ed 58: Phoenix Iron & Steel Co. v WilkofT
Co. (CA6) 253 F 165, 1 ALR 1497; Baird
21 U of Cincinnati L Rev 68.
v Pratt (CA8) 148 F 825; Montgomery
A qualified acceptance amounts to a reGaslight Co. v Montgomery, 87 Ala 245,
jection and constitutes a counteroffer. Po6 So 113; Smith v School Dist. 187 Ark dany v Erickson, 235 Minn 36, 49 NW2d
405, 59 S\V2d 1022: Four Oil Co. v United
193.
Oil Producers, 145 Cal 623, 79 P 366 (holding that an acceptance of an offer to sell
Foster, 179 Okla 393, 65 P2d
1 1 . Fry
crude oil of 15° gravity, with the added
1224.
stipulation that it must be of that gravity
12. Bank of Buchanan Countv v Continental
at 60° Fahrenheit, is not sufficient to
constitute a binding contract); Corcoran v Nat. Bank (CA8 Mo) 277 F 385; Wilson v
87 ALR2d 661, § 7 (prize

contests).
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The offeree, having once rejected the offer by a conditional acceptance, cannot afterward revive it by tendering an unconditional acceptance of it.13
One who has submitted a countcrproposition cannot without the assent of the
other party withdraw or abandon it, and then accept the original offer.14
In order to give the rejected offer any new vitality, there must be a renewal
of it, or renewed assent to it, by the party who made it,16 which may be inferred, for example, from the fact that the parties conducted business under
the conditional acceptance. 10
§ G3. Differences regarding place of performance, payment, or delivery.
The general rule is that an acceptance which specifies a different place of
performance from that stated or implied in the offer will not consummate a
contract. 17 Accordingly, it may be said generally that an acceptance which
specifies a different place for payment of the purchase price or of delivery
from that stated in the offer or implied as a matter of law is not such an
unequivocal and unconditional acceptance as to create a binding contract. 13
This rule is subject to the limitation that where an unqualified acceptance
is made, it will not be neutralized or destroyed by a mere suggestion or request, not intended as a condition of the acceptance, that payment or delivery
be made at a place other than the place specified in the offer or implied as a
matter of law.19 Similarly, it has been held that where an offer specifies no
Windolph, 103 NJ Eq 275, 143 A 316; Polhamus v. Roberts, 50 NM 236, 175 P2d 196,
170 ALR 991; Frick & Lindsav Co. v Johnstown & S. R. Co. 271 Pa 536, 115 A 837;
Dorsey v Strand, 21 Wash 2d 217, 150 P2d
702.
Annotation:

170 ALR 996.

13. Isclin v United States, 271 US 136,
70 L ed 872, 46 S Ct 458; Minneapolis &
St. L. R. Co. v Columbus Rolling Mill Co.
119 US 149, 30 L ed 376, 7 S Ct 163; Tilley
v Cook County (Tillcv v Chicago) 103 US
155, 26 L ed 374; Baird v Pratt (CA8)
148 F 825; Montgomery Gaslight Co. v
Montgomery, 87 Ala 245, 6 So 113: Roleson v Blount, 143 Ark 307, 220 SW 3 1 ;
Four Oil Co. v United Oil Producers, 145
Cal 623, 79 P 366; Shaw v Ingram-Day Lumber Co. 152 Ky 329, 153 SW 4 3 1 ; Spraguc v
Hosie, 155 Mich 30, 118 NW 497; Lewis v
Johnson. 123 Minn 409, 143 NW 1127; State
ex rcl. Johnson v Blair, 351 Mo 1072, 174
S\V2d 851; McCone v Ecclcs, 42 Ncv 451,
181 P 134; Rucker v Sanders, 182 N C 607,
109 SE 857; C. R. Shaw Wholesale Co. v
Hackharth, 102 Or 80, 201 P 1066; Sossamon v Littlcjohn, 241 SC 478, 129 SE2d
124; Canton Cotton Mills v Bowman Overall
Co. 149 Tcnn 18, 257 SW 398; Mcascll v
Baruch, 152 Va 460, 147 SE 203; Crewi T
Sullivan, 133 Va 478, 113 SE 865.
An offer by one who has secured an option for the purchase of real property, which
departs from the terms of the option as to
the time of payment of the purchase price,
amounts to a rejection of the option, and such
option may not be revived by a subsequent
unconditional acceptance. Beaumont v Pricto,
249 US 554, 63 L cd 770, 39 S Ct 383.

14. Bokcrn v Loud (Mo App)
1049.
16 Tex L Rev 260.

108 SW2d

15. Thomas v Ledger, 274 Mich 16, 263
NW 783; Lewis v Johnson, 123 Minn 409,
143 NW 1127; Bokcrn v Loud (Mo App)
108 SW2d 1049; Todorovich v Kinnickinnic
Mut. Loan & Bid*. Asso. 238 Wis 39, 298
NW 226, 135 ALR 818.
16 Tex L Rev 260.
16. McKell v Chesapeake & O. R. Co.
(CA6) 175 F 321, writ of cert den 220 US
613, 55 L ed 609, 31 S Ct 717; Hampton v
Lee, 49 Idaho 16, .235 P 1023; Rucker v
Sanders, 182 NC 607] 109 SE 857.
17. McCutchan v Iowa State Bank, 232
Iowa 550, 5 NW2d 813 (place of payment
and dclivcrv); De Jongc v* Hunt, 103 Mich
94, 61 NW 341 (place of payment); Frirk &
L. Co. v Johnstown & S. R. Co. 271 Pa
536, 115 A 837 1 place of delivery).
Annotation:
3 ALR2d 257, 258, §§ 1, 2.
18. Sawyer v Brossart, 67 Iowa 673, 25 NW
876 (place of payment); Egger v Nesbitt, 122
Mo 667, 27 SW 335 (place of payment);
Anderson v Stewart, 149 Neb 660, 32 NW2d
140, 3 ALR2d 660 (place of payment and delivery); Hall v Jones, 164 NC 199, 80 SE
228 (place of payment and delivery).
Annotation:
3 ALR2d 257, § 2.
An acceptance of an offer to sell or to buy
personal property, stipulating a different place
for delivery than the place expressly stated
in the offer, does not create a binding contract. See SALT.S (1st ed § 51 S u p p ) .
19. Chournos v Evona Inv. Co. 97 Utah.v
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place for closing the transaction, the fact that the offeree accompanies his
acceptance with a suggestion as to a place of closing will not constitute such a
variance from the offer as to make the acceptance incfTcctivc.20 Of course, if
the ofTeror assents to the offeree's acceptance changing the place of payment
or delivery, a contract will result. 1
§ 64. Stipulation as to terms or conditions which wrouIcl be implied.
It is well settled that an offeree's acceptance is not conditional and therefore insufficient merely because it recites terms or conditions that would in
any event have been implied from the original offer,2 inasmuch as such an
acceptance introduces nothing new into the contract. 3 Accordingly, since an
offer to sell implies that the title is marketable, an acceptance calling for a
marketable title docs not introduce a new condition which prevents the formation of the contract. 4 Moreover, although the offeree expressly qualifies his
acceptance by making it a condition thereof that he is to have a right to which
he would by law have been entitled if his acceptance had been absolute in
terms, there being no reference to such right in the offer, it seems that the
acceptance is in reality absolute, does not vary from the offer, and operates to
form a contract. 6 There is some authority, however, to the effect that an acceptance of an offer which makes no mention of a certain right of the offeree,
which he would have as a matter of law if the offer should be accepted absolutely, conditional on the offeror's agreeing that he should have such right, is
a qualified acceptance and such as to prevent the formation of a contract unless
the offeror thereafter in some way agrees thereto. 6
§ 65. Collateral or immaterial matters; inquiries, requests, suggestions, or
directions.
It must not be infened, from the rule that an acceptance must be unconditional, that the mere mention in a letter of acceptance of matters upon
which the acceptance of the proposition does not depend prevents the contract
from being completed.7 There is authority to the effect that although an ac335, 93 P2d 450, rch den 97 Utah 316, 94
P2d 470; Turner v McCormick, 56 W Va
161, 49 SE 28; Curtis Land & Loan Co. v
Interior Land Co. 137 Wis 341, 113 N\V 353.
Annotation:
3 ALR2d 258, § 3.
2 0 . Winslow v Moore (Sup) 17 NY Week
Dig 429.
1. L. & E. Wcrtheimer, Inc. v Wchlc-IIartford Co. 126 Conn 30, 9 A2d 279, 125 ALR
985; Ely v Joslin, 111 Kan 630, 203 P 628.
Annotation:
3 ALR2d 261, § 3.
2. Curtis Land & Loan Co. v Interior Land
Co. 137 Wis 341, 118 NW 853.
Hussey v Ilornc-Payne, LR 8 Ch Div
(En K ) 670 ( C A ) , afTd LR 4 App Cas 311.
Annotation:
1 ALR 1503.
5 Ark L Rev 218.
Williston, Contracts 3d ed § 78.
3. Morse v Tillotson 5: W. Co. (CA2) 253
F 340, 1 ALR 1485; Bvford v Gates Bros.
Lumber Co. 216 Ark 400, 225 SV/2d 929.
4. Morse v Tillotson & W. Co. (CA2) 253

F 340, 1 ALR 1485, holding that a provisior
in an acceptance of an application for loan:
on vessels to make the advance when th(
lender's attorney ad\ises him that the title i:
Rood does not introduce a new term which
prevents the formation of a contract enforce
able arainst the borrower, although the ab
stract u never furnished or the title passcc
upon.
5. Sec Phoenix Iron & Steel Co. v Wilkof
Co. (CA6) 253 F 1G5, 1 ALR 1197, in which
it was said that it was unnecessary to dccid<
this poinL
6. Phoenix Iron & Steel Co. v WilkofT Co.
supra, in which it was said that the partie
did net aqrec as to the form of the contrac
in that the offeror intended the contract t<
be in the form of the offer, whereas the of
fcrcc intended the contract to embrace a tern
expressly giving the offeree the riqht to whicl
he would have been entitled without such ex
press provision.
7. Townscnd v Stick (CA4 NC) 158 F2<
142; Radford v Practical Premium Co. 12.
Ark 199, 188 SW 562; Moore v Picrson, (
Iowa 279; Johnson v Federal Union Surer
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crpt.inrc which introduces a new term as part of the proposed contract is
insufficient, the mere addition to the acceptance of a collateral or immaterial
requisition not warranted by the terms of the offer does not prevent the contract from being completed.8 Thus, immaterial or minor differences or variances between the oflcr and acceptance will not prevent the formation of a
contract. 9 Although a request for a change or modification of a proposed contract made before an acceptance thereof amounts to a rejection of it, a mere
inquiry as to whether one proposing a contract will alter or modify its terms,
made before acceptance or rejection, does not amount to a rejection; and if
the offer is not withdrawn, it may be accepted within a reasonable time. 10
Requested or suggested modifications of an offer will not preclude the formation of a contract where it clearly appears that the offer is positively accepted regardless of whether the requests are granted. 11 Where the acceptance of an offer is initially unconditional, the fact that it is accompanied with
a direction or request looking to the carrying out of its provisions, but which
does not limit or restrict the contract, does not render it ineffectual or give
it the character of a counteroffer.12 This rule has been held to apply to a
request for information as to the manner of remitting the price,13 to a request
to a proposed seller of real estate to fix the date for closing the transaction, 14
to a buyer's suggestion for a time and place of closing made in accepting an
offer which specified no time for closing, and to a mere suggestion or request
that pavment or delivery be made at a place other than that specified in the
offer.15 '•
Co. 187 Mich 454, 153 NW 788; Foster v
West Pub. Co. 77 Okla 114, 186 P 1083;
Dc Moss v Bervllium Corp. 358 Pa 470, 58
A2d 70; Weaver v Burr, 31 W Va 736, 8 SE
7-13.
Williston, Contracts 3d cd § 79.
The requirement, by one who has contracted to purchase real estate from a corporation, of further resolutions on its part for
the completion of the transfer does not show
a refusal to accept the oflcr of sale. Western
Timber Co. v Kalama River Lumber Co. 42
Wash 620, 85 P 338.
8. Foster v West Pub. Co. 77 Okla 114,
186 P 1083.
Re Abcraman Iron Works (Eng) LR 4 Ch
532.
9. Richardson v Greensboro Warehouse &.
Storage Co. 223 NC 344. 26 SE2d 897, 149
ALR 201, holding that where a contract consisting of an ofTcr and acceptance is in several
writings, the court will not be astute to detect immaterial differences in the phrasing
of the ofTcr and acceptance which might defeat the contract, but will try to give to each
writing a reasonable interpretation under
which substantial justice may be reached according to the intent of the parties.
An ofTer and its acceptance must receive
a reasonable construction, and the proposer is
bound by its acceptance in that sense; immaterial variances between the ofTer and its
acceptance will be disregarded.
Fanners'
Produce Co. v McAlcster Storage & Com.
Co. 48 Okla 488, 150 P 483.

Merely describing the basis of calculating
the price of sugar in acceptance of an order
a little differently from what it was in the
order docs not prevent the contract from
becoming binding if there is no diflcrcnce in
meaning. A. B. Small Co. v American Sugar
Rcf. Co. 267 US 233, 69 L cd 589, 45 S Ct
295.
10. Foster v West Pub. Co. 77 Okla 114, 186
P 1033; Turner v McCormick, 56 W Va 161,
49 SE 28.
Stevenson v McLean (Eng) LR 5 QB Div
346.
Restatement, CONTRACTS § 62.

1 1 . Podany v Erickson, 235 Minn 36, 49
N\V2d 193; Turner v McCormick, 56 W Va
161, 49 SE 28.
21 U of Cincinnati L Pvev 68.
12. Valashinas v Koniuto, 283 App Div
13, 125 NYS2d 554, afld 308 NY 233, 124
NE2d 300.
Acceptance of an option and subsequent
performance are. duTcrrm matters; and where
the acceptance is unconditional, suggestions
or demands as to performance, not qualifying
or rendering the acceptance conditional upon
compliance with such demands, will not invalidate such acceptance. Horgan v Russell,
24 ND 490, 1 4 0 N W 9 9 .
13. Clark v Dales (NY) 20 Barb 42.
14. Baker v Packard, 112 App Div 543, 98
NYS 804, afTd 189 NY 524, 82 NE 1124.
15. § 63, supra.
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§ 66. Consent by offeror to conditions, qualifications, or changes.
Where an offeree docs not accept the offer as made b u t makes a qualified
or conditional acceptance, t h e r e is no contract unless the offeror consents to
the qualification or condition tendered by the offeree. 10
Undoubtedly, an
ofTcree has the right to m a k e his acceptance depend upon any fact he might
name, including the a p p r o v a l of the offer by his attorney; and if the offeror
assents to the condition or to any qualification or difference between the offer
and acceptance he is b o u n d by it. 17 This applies to differences between the
offer and acceptance as to t h e place of p a y m e n t or delivery. 18
An express assent to new terms a n d conditions attached to the acceptance
of an offer is not necessary in order to m a k e such terms and conditions a
part of the contract. A n y l a n g u a g e or conduct on the part of the original
offeror showing his assent to the new terms and conditions will be sufficient. 19
Where an original offeror, after receiving an alleged acceptance of his offer
containing additional or changed conditions or terms, corresponds with the
offeree concerning the s h i p m e n t or delivery of the subject m a t t e r of the agreement, this has been held to show his assent to the additional conditions or
terms. 2 0 O n the other h a n d , it has been held that mere silence on the part of
the offeror will not constitute an acceptance by him of added or altered conditions or terms a t t a c h e d to the offeree's acceptance of the original offer, in
the absence of an agreement t h a t silence shall have such effect, where there
is no duty on the p a r t of the original offeror to reject such conditions or terms. 1
U n d e r some circumstances, however, even silence on the part of the original
offeror m a y constitute an acceptance of the conditions or terms attached to
the offeree's " a c c e p t a n c e " of the original offer. 2 Where the original offeror,
16. Greenwich Bank v Oppenhcim, 133 App
Div 536. 118 NYS 297; Todorovich v Kinnickinnic Mut. Loan & Bldg. Asso. 233 Wis
39, 298 NW 226, 135 ALR 818.
Annotation:
135 ALR 822.
17. Roto-Lith. Ltd. v F. P. Bartlctt & Co.
(CA1 Mass) 297 F2d 497 (in which
a
buyer was held hound bv a disclaimer of warranty in the seller's acknowledgment of the
order, where the buyer accented the goods
with knowledge of the condition specified in
the acknowledgment): Wilhclm v Wood, 151
App Div 42, 135 NYS 930.
Annotation:
135 ALR 822.
A contract is consummated by a telegram
to a vendor containing the proposed tf-rms
of the contract, to which the vendor replies
accepting the terms, but adding, "if you will
give us time to fill," which in turn is accepted by the vendee in a letter treating the
telegram as an acceptance of the offer, inclosing shipping instructions, adding a desire
to have the shipment made at once, if possible, and asking for a confirmation on the letter. Farmers' Produce Co. v McAlester Storage & Com. Co. 48 Okla 488, 150 P 483.
18. § 63, supra
19. Roto-Lith. Ltd. v F. P. Bartlett & Co.
(CA1 Mass) 297 F2d 497 (acceptance of
goods by buyer with knowledge of a disclaimer
of warranty in seller's acknowledgment of ord e r ) ; American Lumber & Mfg. Co. v Atlantic

Mill & Lumber Co. (CA3 Pa) 290 F 632:
McKr-11 v Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (CA6
Ohio) 171 F 3 2 \ afTd 186 F 39. cert den
220 US 613. 5r> L ed 609. 31 S Ct 717: Earle
v Anscll. 157 Mass 29 k 32 NE 16S: Russell
v Falls Mfg. Co. 106 Wis 329, 82 NW 134.
Annotation:
135 ALR C22.
H i e words "forward papers, draft attached.**
in a buver's telegram accepting the seller's
counteroffer for sale of whisky, does not so
qualify the acceptance as to deprive it of the
positive and unequivocal character necessary
to consummate a contract, it appearing from
previous telegrams that the procedure suggested thereby had been tacitly assented to
bv the narties. L. & E. Wcrthcimer, Inc. v
Wehle-IIartford Co. .126 Conn 30, 9 A2d
279, 125 ALR Stt5.
20. Wilson v White. 161 Cnl 453. 119 P
895; Riverside Coal Co v Elman Coal Co.
1 H Conn 492. 159 A 2"0: Russell v Falls
Mfg. Co. 106 Wis 329, 82 NW 134.
1. Columbia Malting Co v Clausen-Flanagan Corp. (CA2 NY) 3 F2d 547: Cincinnati
Equipment Co. v Big Muddv River Consol.
Coal Co. 15.3 Ky 247, 164 SW 794; Blaisdell
Filtration Co v M. L. Bavard & Co. 311
Pa 6, 166 A 234: Todorovich v Kinnickinnic
Mut. Loan & Bldg. Asso. 238 Wis 39, 298 NW
226, 135 ALR 818.
Annotation:
135 ALR 822.
2. Lamis v Des Moines Elevator Jt Grain
405
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after receiving an alleged acceptance containing additional or altered conditions or terms, performs his part of the agreement or the new or altered conditions or terms in whole or in part, he thereby manifests his acceptance
thereof,3 except where the ofTcrce had no notice or knowledge of such conduct. 4
E. FORMAL REQUISITES

§ G7. Generally; necessity of writing.
A contract need not be in writing unless a statute requires it.6 Conversely,
an oral or parol contract is unenforceable where a statute requires it to be
in writing. 6 The principal statute making such a requirement is the statute
of frauds, which applies only to the contracts specified therein. 7 Also, where
the parties indicate a definite intention not to be bound until a written agreement has been made, such an agreement is prerequisite to the formation of a
contract. 8 But no principle of law makes it necessary that a new contract upon
the same subject between the same persons shall be reduced to writing simply
because the old contract was written. 9
Except for some contracts, such as insurance contracts, the form of which
may be closely regulated by statute, 10 the form in which a written contract is
drawn is immaterial, as long as it is legible.11 Thus, where a contract which
need not be in writing is reduced to writing, it is not necessary that it should
be expressed in a particular form.12 For instance, although a receipt is, as
Co. 210 Iowa 1069, 229 NW 756: Wheeler
v Klaholt, 178 Mass 141, 59 N E 756.
Annotation:
3 35 ALR 824.

der certain statutes, see 1 Am J u r 2d, A C KNOWLEDGMENTS §§ 4 ct seq.

8. §§26 ct seq., supra.
3. McKcll v Chesapeake & O . R. Co. (CA6 9. Teal v Bilby, 123 US 572, 31 L ed 263,
Ohio) 175 F 321, affd 186 F 39, cert c!cn
220 US 613, 55 L cd 609, 31 S Ct 717; 8 S Ct 239.
Gallagher v Equitable Gaslight Co. 141 Cal 10. Sec INSURANCE (Rev ed § 187).
699, 75 P 329; Johnson v M. J. O'Ncil, Inc.
As to the right of a state to prescribe, by
182 Minn 232, 234 NW 16; Fry v Foster, 179 statute, standard form* of policies, sec INSUROkla 398, 65 P2d 1224.
ANCE (Rev cd § 5 9 ) . "
Annotation:
135 ALR 826-832.
11. While a contract may be printed, typeAs to application of this principle in the written, or written in ink or pencil, an indecase of sales of personal property, sec SALES
cipherable scrawl docs not constitute a con(1st cd § 5 1 ) .
tract. Where the parties undertake to put
their agreement in writing and express its cru4. T h e performance by the original offeror
cial terms by characters or symbols so illegible
of all the conditions attached by the offeree that the court cannot determine the signifito his acceptance of the offer is insufficient
cation of that which is on the paper, no conto indicate the offeror's acceptance thereof
tract in writing has been made. Arr.rblou
where the offeree had no knowledge or notice v New York, N. II. & H. R. Co. 225 Mass
of such conduct. Todorovich v Kinnickinnic
235, 114 N E 2 9 7 .
Mut. Loan & Bldg. Asso. 238 Wis 39, 298
NW 226, 135 ALR 818. Annotation: 135
Practice
Aids.—Forms
of contracts. 3 AM
ALR 827.
J U R LEGAL FORMS 3 : 9 7 1 - 3 : 9 7 8 .
— Advertising contracts. 1 A M J U R LECAL
5. Sullivan v Bryant, 40 Okla 80, 136 P
FOUMS 1:424-1:539.
412; Fish v Capuell, 18 R I 667, 29 A 840.
12. Generally, contracts need not take a prePractice Aids.—Instruction
as to determin- scribed form, but are spelled out of the phrasing content of oral contracts. 6 A M J U R P L ing adopted by the parties. Edison Electric
& PR FORMS 6:663.
Illuminating Co. v Thacher, 229 NY 172, 128
NE 124.
6. Schaal v Race (Fla App) 135 So 2d
Any memorandum in writing, regardless of
252.
its form and whether payable in money or in
7. See STATUTE OF FRAUDS (1st cd § § 4 ct
specific property, whereby a debt based on a
scq.).
consideration is acknowledged by one as owAs to the necessity of acknowledgment un- ing to another to whom the memorandum is
406
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F.Male of Maguirc. 204 Kan G8(>. 4GO P2d 358,
mod 20G Kan i, 4 7f> KM 6T8.
p 397, n 18—Riverside Fence Co. v Novak, 273
Cal App 2d G5C), 78 Cal Rptr 53(3.
An option holder may recover damages for
breach of an option contract without a lender
of the purchase price agreed upon in the oplion contract. Fullington v M. Pcnn Phillips Co.
238 Or 321, 395 P2d 124, 12 ALRSd 1121.
Additional case authorities for section:
Where provisions of an option contract prescribe the particular manner in which the option is to be exercised, they must be strictly
followed, but where the contract merely suggests and does not require a particular manner
of communicating exercise of the option, another means of communication is not precluded. Palto Alto Town 8c Country Village,
Inc. v BBTC Co., 11 Cal 3d 494, 1 13 Cal Rptr
705, 521 P2d 1097.
An option falls within the term "proposal,"
as used in the statute relating to the mode of
communicating acceptance of a "proposal."
Palto Alto Town & Country Village, Inc. v
HBTC Co., 11 Cal 3d 494, 113 Caf Rptr 705,
521 P2d 1097.
An optionee will be excused from strict compliance with the terms of an option agreement
where the failure to comply is not due to wilful
or gross negligence on his part but is rather
the result of an honest and justifiable mistake;
equity will also excuse strict compliance where
such is prevented by some act of the oplionor
such as waiver or misleading representations or
conduct. Cattle Feeders, Inc. v Jordan (Tex Civ
App) 549 S\V2d 29.
A telegram addressed to the owners of stock
in a co-operative apartment which stated "I
wish to exercise the option to buy apartment
please advise" clearly apprised the owners of a
binding intent to exercise the option to purchase and was therefore a valid exercise of the
option; the import of the telegram was clear
and unambiguous and no special form or
words were necessary to constitute proper written notice under the agreement. Cohen v Nonoo (1979) 101 Misc 2d 1037, 422 NYS2d 574.

letter by optionee's attorney declaring intention
to purchase property in accordance with previously executed option agreement was fully effective and timely where option agreement required notice no later than September l and
where letter exercising option was received bv
optionor on August 29, even though no tender
of purchase price was made at that time nor
any specific provision of option agreement expressly set forth particular time for payment,
particularly where exact purchase price was
indefinite and dependent upon settling of past
and future accounts between parties to option
agreement. Loose v Brubachcr, 2 I 9 Kan 727,
549 P 2 d 9 9 i .
The depositing of a written notice of the
exercise of an x>ption to purchase realty on
October 2 1 . the date stipulated in the option
contract as being the last date for giving notice
to exercise the option, was untimely, in the
absence of any provision in the option agreement, where the notice was received by the
owner of the property two days after die expiration date of the option; the option agreement
provided that failure to give timely noticewithin the option period would terminate the
option. Salinen v Frankson (Minn) 245 N\V2d
839, 87 ALR3d 800.

§ 6 1 . — T i m e o f e x e r c i s e ; delay
Practice aids: Timeliness of notice of exercise
of option to purchase realty, 87 ALR3d 805.
Option to purchase real property as affected by optionor's receipt of offer lor, or
sale of. larger tract which includes the optioned parcel. 34 AUR4th 1217.
p 397, n 20—
Annotation: Validity of option to purchasereal ty as affected by indefiniteness of term
provided for exercise. 31 ALR3d 522.
p 398, n 11—Steele v Northup, 259 Iowa 443,
143N\V2d 302.
Additional case authorities for section:
Although time is of essence in option agreements, notice to optionor in form of written
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§ 6 2 . Generally; n e c e s s i t y that a c c e p tance c o m p l y with offer
Practice aids: Acts constituting rejection of
contract offer. 27 AM Jt R PROOF OF FACTS 2d

605.
Qualified or Conditional Acceptances Are
Counter-Offcrs and Reject Original Oiler. 1
Williston on Contracts 3d ed § 77.
If Offer Prescribes Place, Time, or Manner
of Acceptance, Its Terms Must Be Complied
With. 1 Williston on Contracts 3d ed § 76.
Acceptance Must Comply With Terms of
Offer. 1 Williston on Contracts 3d ed § 73.
Acceptance Must Be Unequivocal. 1 Williston on Contracts 3d ed § 72.
Gedid, A Background to Variance Problems Under >bc Uniform Commercial Code:
Toward a Contextual Approach. 22 Duq LR
595, Spring, 19S4.
Restatement:
As to acceptance bv silence or exercise oi
dominion, according to Restatement, Contract?
2d, see § 4 7^ supra".
An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated by the non-occurrence of any condition
of acceptance under the terms of the offer.
Restatement, CONTRACTS 2d § 36(2).
A counter-offer is an offer made by an offeree to hts^oCfcror relating to the same matter
as the original offer and proposing a substituted bargain differing from that proposed by
the original offer.
An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated by his making of a counter-offer, unless
the offeror has manifested a contrary intention
or unless the counter-offer manifests a contrary
intention of the offeree. Restatement, CONTRACTS 2d § 39.
{17 Am Jur 2d Supp
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Where notification is essential to acceptance
by promise, the oileror is not hound by an
acceptance in equivocal terms unless he reasonably understands it as an acceptance. Restate-

and defendant was not liable for fee. Fleming v
Parkview Colonial Manor Invest Co 31 *M
App 3d 6. 333 NF.1M 587.
In an action bv an attempting purchaser of
ment, CONTRACTS 2d § 57.
real estate in which the purchaser alleged
breach of contract and misrepresentation bv
An acceptance must comply with the i e q u i p the seller and sought specific performance and
ments of the oiler as to the promise to be
money damages, the trial court properly dismade or the performance to be rendered. Remissed the breach of contract causes of action
statement, CONTRACTS 2d § 58.
where the seller did not effectuate a binding
A reply to an oflcr which purports lo accept
acceptance of the purchaser's offer in that the
it but is conditional on the offeror's assent to
seller imposed the conditions that the purterms additional to or different from those
chaser accept the property "as is—where is,"
offered is not an acceptance but is a counterthat the purchaser prepare an offer in contract
offer. Restatement, CONTRACTS 2d § 59.
form that would be subject to the approval of
p 400, n 19—
the seller's "legal authorities," and that the
One of the essential elements for the formapurchaser resolve the contingencies in its offer
tion of a contract is a manifestation of assent
by a certain date or else forfeit the deposit.
by the parlies to the terms thereof. It is essenChain Locations of America, Inc. v T.I.M.E.tial that those parties assent to the same thing
DC, Inc. (1981, 3d Dept) 81 App Div 2d 993.
in the same sense and that their minds meet on
440 NVS2d 69.
the essential terms and conditions. T h e UniFurther negotiations were contemplated reform Commercial Code has not made any
garding method of financing purchase, and no
change in the basic law. Kuclid Engineering
contract was created, where defendant made
Corp. v Illinois Power Co. 79 111 App 2d 145. offer to buy "if the arrangements can be
223 NE2d 409.
made," lo which plaintiff responded favorably,
but reserved "issues that we should settle"
p 400, n 1—
concerning finances. Blakev v McMurrav (1965.
The rule peculiar to offers to the effect that a
3d Dept) 110 App Div 2d 998. 488 NYS2d
conditional acceptance is in itself a rejection of
286.
the oflcr is not applicable to an option contract
that is supported by a consideration and fixes a
§ 6 3 . Differences r e g a r d i n g p l a c e of p e r lime limit for election. Humble Oil & Refining
formance, payment, o r delivery
Co. v Westsidc Invest. Corp. (Tex) 428 S\V2d
92.
Additional case authorities for section:
No contract existed where defendant ofiered
p 4 0 1 , n 9—
via telegram to purchase machinery at stated
Where a supplemental agreement covering
price "FOB, our tri:.k, vour plant, loaded" and
extra work at a slated price was signed by ihe
plaintiff responded via telegram which purcontractor under protest and with notification
ported to accept at same stated price but on an
of the other party that claim would be filed for
"as is, where is" basis. Koehring Co. v Gloitems not covered by agreement, the contracwacki (1977) 77 Wis 2d 497, 253 NW2d 64.
tor's act constituted a counteroffer adding newterms and conditions to the original offer. Slate
Highway Dept. v Wright Contracting Co. 107
§ 6 4 . S t i p u l a t i o n as t o t e r m s o r c o n d i Ga App 758, 131 SK2d 808, 1 ALR3d 1260.
tions which would be implied
Additional case authorities for section:
Terms of acceptance of oflcr lo purchase all
the issued and outstanding capital slock of
corporation were not additional proposals constituting a rejection and counteroffer but were
an integral part of the offer and acceptance
where the attachment and signed offer, when
considered together, constituted a written
memorandum sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. Kagel v First
Commonwealth Co. (DC Cal) 409 F Supp
1396, afl'd (CA9 Cal) 534 F2d 194 (applying
California law).
In action for damages arising out of alleged
breach of contract to pay fee to plaintiff for
obtaining financing, condition attached to letter
of commitment to make loan that operating
company could not be sold without lender's
approval was counter-offer, rather than acceptance, and, in absence of any action by defendant corporation evidencing agreement lo condition, there was no acceptance of counter-offer

p 403, n 5—
An optionee's insertion in his acceptance of a
condition which merely expresses that winch
would be implied in fact or in law by the offer
does not preclude the consummation of the
contract, since such a condition involves no
qualification of the acceptor's assent to the
terms of the offei. Burkhcad v Farlow, 266 NC
595, 146 SK2d 802. 16 ALR3d 1416.
§ 6 5 . Collateral or immaterial matters;
inquiries, requests, suggestions, or
directions
Practice aids: Added Terms Requested as Favor Do Not Invalidate Acceptance. 1 Williston on Contracts 3d ed § 79.
Conditions Which Do Not Qualify Offer
Do Not Impair Acceptance. 1 Williston on
Contracts 3d ed § 78.
Restatement:
An acceptance which requests a change or
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addition U> the irnns of tlic oJfci is no! thcjcby
invalidated unless the acceptance is made to
depend on an assent to the changed or added
terms. Restatement. CONTRACTS 2d § 0 1 .

Ops 2d ) 12, 92 Ohio L Abb 225, 198 NE2d 82
(realtor).

Additional case authorities for section:
The anticipated fi\c-year lease of a restaurant
p 404, n 8—Wallerius v Hare, 200 Kan 578, with an option to renew never came into exis438 T2d 05.
tence where the parties involved intended to
enter a written lease but never reached any
p 4 0 4 , n 11 —
complete agreement as to the precise rental to
A mere injury as to whether one proposing a
be paid. Bruhl v White (La App) 346 So 2d
contract will alter or modify its terms docs noi
734.
amount to a rejection. Javbc Constr. Co. v
An alleged oral employment agreement
Beco, Inc. 3 Conn Cir 400, 210 A2d 208.
wherein plaintiff was to receive a 10^o commisp 404, n 12—
sion for each construction contract he obtained
for defendant is, hot unenforceable under the
Where the terms of settlement agreement
Statute of Frauds (General Obligations Law,
were fully undersiood by both parties, a re§ 5-701) since the employment agreement was
quest lhat checks be made payable in a certain
one of an indefinite hiring, terminable at will,
manner did not have the effect of destroying
and hence not within the statute, since it might
the agreement that the parties had entered
into. Aetna Ins. Co. v Sanchez ( l e x Civ App) be performed within one year. Zinn v Bernic
Constr., Inc. (1979) 99 Misc 2d 510, 410
391 SW2d 184.
NYS2d 725.
§ 6 6 . C o n s e n t by o f f e r o r t o c o n d i t i o n s ,
qualifications, o r c h a n g e s
p 405, n 19—V'Soke v Barwick (CA2 NY) 404
F2d 495, cert den 394 US 9 2 1 , 22 L Ed 2d
454, 89 S C t 1197.
p 405, n I —
Execution by the offeree of a supplemental
contract under notification to the offeror that
an additional claim would be filed for items not
covered therein constituted a counteroffer, and
the original offeror's subsequent execution of
the contract did not amount to acceptance of
the counteroffer in absence of notification to
the original offeree as to acceptance or not of
the counteroffer. State Highwjv Dept. v Wright
Contracting Co. 107 Ga App 758, 131 SF.2d
808. 1 ALR3d 1200.

§ 70. Signature
Practice aids: Testimonium—General form. 5
AM JUR LEGAL FORMS 2d, Contracts § 08:16.

Restatement:
As to effect of contracts under seal, generallv, according to Restatement, Contracts 2d,
see 08 Am Jur 2d, Seals § 1 1 .
Where a grantee or promisee accepts a
sealed document which purports to contain a
return promise by him, he makes the return
promise. But if he does not sign or seal the
document his promise is not under seal, and
whether it is binding depends on the rules
governing unsealed contracts. Restatement,
CONTRACTS 2d § 107.

T h e promisee of a promise under seal is not
precluded from enforcing it as a sealed contract because he has not signed or sealed the
document, unless his doing so was a condition
of the delivery, whether or not the document
contains a promise by him. Restatement, CON-

Additional case authorities for section:
A letter sent by the seller of a condominium
in response to a counteroffer by a prospective
buyer did not constitute an acceptance of the
TRACTS 2d § 109.
buyer's counterotlcr. where the letter did not
acknowledge a precision dealing with the buyp 408, n 12—Nelkin v Marvin Hime Sc Co. 228
er's proposal that the parlies split the brokerCal App 2d 744, 39 Cal Rptr 701.
age fee which proposal the buver had made a
Western Bank v Morrill, 245 O r 47, 420 P2d
condition of his counteroffer. Mintzberg v Go1 19 (release).
lesianeh (1980. Fla App 03) 390 So 2d 759.
Additional case authorities for section:
A directors advertising agreement constitut§ 67. Generally; necessity of writing
ing the contract between a customer and the
Practice Aids: General contract form. 5 AM
telephone company for classified advertising
Jt'R LKGAL FORMS 2d 08.14.
was enforceable, notwithstanding that the
Number of copies. 5 AM Jt'R LEGAL FORMS
agreement was never signed by the customer;
2d. Contracts $68:129.
the telephone company was justified in believing the customer*had accepted the terms and
Restatement:
conditions of the written agreement, where the
As to effect of contracts under seal, genercustomer did not notify the company of any
ally, according to Restatement. Contracts 2d,
proposed changes, and paid the monthly sersee 08 Am Jur 2d. Seals § 11.
vice charge. Richard A. Berjian, D.O., Inc. v
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. (1978) 54 Ohio St 2d 147,
p 407, n 20—
8 Ohio Ops 3d 149, 375 NE2d 410.
The fact that a contract was drawn by a
person not entitled to practice law docs not
Where neither the dealer nor his authorized
affect its legalitv as between the parties to it.
agent has signed an automobile sales contract
Frank v Moore 1 Ohio App 2d 90, 30 Ohio
containing the words " T h e order is not valid
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stitution of a principal for an agent is not the substitution of a new creditor.6
Furthermore, in many jurisdictions it has also been held that a novation
may be accomplished by the substitution of a new party to a contract, whereby
the rights and liabilities of an original party are extinguished.6
§ 1 6 . Consent of parties.
It is a well-settled principle that an essential element of every novation
is a new contract to which all the parties concerned must agree, 7 and in the
absence of such agreement or consent a novation cannot be affected.8 In most
jurisdictions assent to the terms of a novation need not be shown by express
words, but may be implied from the facts.and circumstances attending the
transaction and conduct of the parties thereafter.9
295 P 268, 74 ALR 1021; Kirkup v Anaconda
Amusement Co. 59 Mont 469, 197 P 1005, 17
ALR 441; M. K. Goctz Brewing Co. v Wain,
LEGAL F O R M S , NOVATION, Form 10:116.
92 Neb 614, 139 NW 230; Heaton v Angier,
5. Hobson v Davidson, 8 Mart (La) 422.
7 N H 397; Griggs v Day, 136 NY 152, 32
NE 612, motion for reh den 137 NY 542, 32
6. Law v San Francisco Gas & E. Co. 168 NE 1001; Grant-Holub Co. v Goodman, 23
Cal 112, 142 P 52; Fletcher American Co. v Ohio App 540, 156 NE 151; Fuller v Stout,
Culbertson, 215 Ky 695, 286 SW 984; Detroit
66 Okla 15, 166 P 898; Montgomery v Hall,
Postage Stamp Service Co. v Schermack, 179
229 O r 428, 366 P2d 909; Collyer v Moulton,
Mich 266, 146 NW 144; Peters v Poro, 96
9 R I 90: Chastain v Cooper & Reed, 152 T e x
Vt 95, 117 A 244, 25 ALR 615.
322, 257 SW2d 422; Arlington Towers Land
A novation is effected where the defendant
Corp. v McFarland, 203 Va 387, 124 SE2d
agrees with the plaintiffs, who own three
212; Lutz v Williams, 79 W V a 609, 91 SE
buildings,, tq supply all three buildings with
460; T . W. Stevenson Co. v Peterson, 163 Wis
steam, and subsequently the plaintiff sells two
258, 157 NW 750.
of the buildings', t|ie defendant consenting to
Annotation:
61 ALR2d 755, 769, $ 4; 124
an assignment of the contract and agreeing
ALR 1498.
to supply the purchaser. Law v San Francisco Gas & E. Co. 168 Cal 112, 142 P 52.
In order for a novation to be legally effecA novation is effected in case a wholesaler,
tive, it must occur before the expiration of
upon receiving notice from a retailer that he
the original agreement to which it pertains,
has sold his business and that the purchaser
and all parties to the original agreement, as
will assume the obligations of the retailer
well as all substituted parties, must assent
to the wholesaler, takes from the purchaser
thereto. Frederick C. Smith Clinic v Laand credits upon the account notes which exstrapes, 111 Ohio App 42, 13 Ohio Ops 2d
tend the time of payment, and provide for ex- 411, 170 NE2d 497.
change and collection fees and security for
8. Western Machinery-Co. v Northwestern
other indebtedness which may arise between
Improv. Co. (CA9 Wash) 254 F2d 4 5 3 :
the parties, although the wholesaler subseAlaska Creamery Products, Inc. v Wells
quently notifies the retailer that he will be
(Alaska) 373 P2d 505; Garthofner v Edreleased only in case the notes are paid.
T. W. Stevenson Co. v Peterson, 163 Wis monds, 74 Cal App 2d 15, 167 P2d 789; Exchange Lumber & Mfg. Co. v Thomas, 71
258, 157 NW 750.
Idaho 391, 233 P2d 406; Eitzen's Estate v
7. Western Machinery Co. v Northwestern
Lauman, 231 Iowa> 1169, 3 NW2d 546;
Improv. Co. (CA9 Wash) 254 F2d 453: City
Andres v Morgan, 62 Ohio St 236, 56 NE
Nat. Bank v Fuller (CAB) 52 F2d 870, 79 875; Poc v Dixon, 60 Ohio St 124, 54 NE
ALR 71; Perry v Gallagher, 17 Ala App 114, 86; Montgomery v Hall, 229 O r 428, 366 P
82 So 562; Alaska Creamery Products, Inc.
2d 909; Arlington Towers Land Corp. v
v Wells (Alaska) 373 P2d 505: Colley v
McFarland, 203 Va 387, 124 SE2d 212.
Chowchilla Nat. Bank, 200 Cal 760, 255 P
9. United States use of fackson Ready-Mix
188, 52 ALR 569; Forrest v Royal Ins. Co.
Concrete v Hyde Constr. Co. ( D C Okla) 236
88 Cal App 88, 262 P 820: Smith v Missouri
F Supp 770; Eitzen's Estate v Lauman, 231
State L. Ins. Co. 45 Ga App 383, 165 SE
168: Cox v Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. 180 Iowa 1169, 3 NW2d 546; Philadelphia & R.
Coal & I. Co. v Willinger, 137 Md 46, 111
Ind 495, 103 N E 337; Eitzen's Estate v LauA 132, 12 ALR 1542; Clark v General Cleanman, 231 Iowa 1169, 3 NW2d 546; Barnes v
Hckla F. Ins. Co. 56 Minn 38, 57 NW 314; ing Co. 345 Mass 62, 185 NE2d 749; Detroit
Hi Franco v Steinbaum (Mo App) 177 SW Postage Stamp Serv. Co. v Schermack, 179
Mich 266, 146 NW 144; Fuller v Stout, 66
2d 697; Tannhauser v Shea, 88 Mont 562,
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Under the civil law of Rome, novation took place only when the contracting parties expressly disclosed that their object in making the new contract
was to extinguish the old one. 10 A similar view has been taken in some
jurisdictions in the civil-law tradition and has been incorporated into some
of the modern codes.11 Thus, it has been held that a delegation by which
the debtor gives to the creditor a new debtor, who obligates himself to such
creditor, does not operate as a novation, unless the creditor has expressly
declared that he intends to discharge the original debtor, upon application
of the maxim of the civil law "delegatus debitor est odiosus in lege." 12 Some
of the Louisiana cases, however, appear to modify the strictness of this rule
slightly in holding that the release either must be expressly declared, or must
so clearly result from the record of the facts and circumstances attending the
transaction that no doubt can exist as to the intentions of the parties in regard
to it.13
§ 17. —Debtors.
In order to constitute a contract of novation by the substitution of a new
debtor, the latter must participate in and consent to the arrangement and
thereby assume the discharge of the obligation to the creditor. 14 Without
such consent by the new debtor, the creditor can have no action against
him, since there is, in such case, no privity between them. 15 Moreover, the
original debtor should also be consulted and must consent to the agreement. 16
Okla 15, 166 P 898; Klinkoosten v Mundt, 36
SD 595, 156 NW 85; Peters v Poro, 96 Vt
95, 117 A 244, 25 ALR 615; Barnes v Crockett, 111 Va 240, 68 SE 983; T. W. Stevenson
Co. v Peterson, 163 Wis 258, 157 NW 750.
As to assent of creditors to novation, see
§ 18, infra.
As to assent of debtors to novation, see 5 17,
infra.
As to presumptions in actions involving
novations, generally, see § 32, infra.
As to sufficiency of proof of novation, generally, see § 33, infra.

Miss 200, 56 So 2d 496; W. Crawford Smith,
Inc. v Watkins (Mo App) 425 SW2d 276;
Kirkup v Anaconda Amusement Co. 59 Mont
469, 197 P 1005, 17 ALR 4 4 1 ; M. K. Goetz
Brewing Co. v Wain, 92 Neb 614, 139 NW
230; Collyer v Moulton, 9 R I 90; Peters v
Poro, 96 Vt 95, 117 A 244, 25 ALR 615.

10. Hayes v Claterbaugh (La App) 140 So
2d 737; Peters v Poro, 96 Vt 95, 117 A 244,
25 ALR 615; Drown v Forrest, 63 Vt 557,
22 A 612.

16. Blank v Michael, 208 Iowa 402,
NW 12; Bonnemer v Negrete, 16 La 474;
coln Nat. L. Ins. Co. v Rider, 171 Okla
42 P2d 842; Lutz v Williams, 79 W Va
91 SE 460.
Annotation:
124 ALR 1498, 1500.

11. Bonncmer v Negrete, 16 La 474; Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. v Endom, 51 La Ann
1263, 26 So 90.
12. Sucker State Drill Co. v Loewer, 114 La
403, 38 So 399.
Where a new firm succeeds to the business
of one that has been dissolved, and assumes
the debts of the old firm and transfers them
to its books, and the creditor makes frequent demands on both firms, it is not sufficient to show a release of the old firm. Carriere v Labiche, 14 La Ann 208.
13. Berges v Daverede (La) 23 So 891;
Rachel v Rachel, 11 La Ann 687; Short v
New Orleans, 4 La Ann 281.
14. Bonnemer v Negrete, 16 La 474; Greenwood Leflore Hospital Com v Turner, 213
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LEGAL FORMS,

NOVATION, Forms 10:105 et scq.
15. M. K. Goetz Brewing Co. v Wain, 92
Neb 614, 139 NW 230.
226
Lin262,
609,

While the consent of the original debtor to
the assumption of his debt by a third person
doubtless is essential to a novation, ordinarily
the necessity of such consent is not stressed,
since there is a presumption of his consent to
such act for his benefit, although he may be
said to have a right of disclaimer. F. I. Somcrs & Sons, Inc. v Le Clerc, 110 Vt 408, 8
A2d 663, 124 ALR 1494.
In F. I. Somcrs & Sons, Inc. v Le Clerc, supra, it was held that if necessary to effect a
novation, the consent of a mother to her
daughter's assumption of the mother's debt
to a storekeeper might be presumed from the
relationship between the original debtor ana
the new debtor, their living together, the
mother's inability to pay, and the long period
[58 Am Jur 2d]
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however, that express notice of withdrawal must be given. It is sufficient to
constitute a withdrawal thai knowledge of acts by the offeror inconsistent with
(lie continuance of the oiler is brought home to the offeree,63 as where the
offeror sells the property to a third person. 64
§ 2 1 . —Rejection of offer.
The rejection of an offer to purchase or sell real estate terminates the offer,
and subsequent acceptance of the offer is ineffectual unless it has been
renewed or the offerer assents to such subsequent acceptance. 65 As in the case
of contracts generally,66 an acceptance which differs from the offer or imposes
conditions not contained therein is a rejection of the offer, >and a subsequent
unconditional acceptance before the offer is expressly withdrawn is ineffectual.57 It seems that the same would be true as to a demand for a modification
of the terms of the offer without indicating any intention to accept, although a
mere inquiry as to whether the person making the offer would modify it does
not amount to a rejection of the offer.58
§ 22. Communication by mail.
As in the case of contracts generally, 59 a binding contract for the sale of land
may be made by a letter mailed from the buyer or seller making an offer, and
the acceptance by letter by the party to whom it is made. 60 An offer sent
through the mail must be communicated to the offeree and is not completed
upon posting, but upon its receipt by the offeree.61 For the purpose of
consummating the contract, however, where the offer is made by mail or
otherwise contemplates and authorizes an acceptance by mail, the acceptance
dates from the time the letter of acceptance is duly mailed, without regard to
the time of its receipt or whether it is in fact received.62 In such cases, the
53. Hoover Motor Express Co. v Clements
Paper Co. 193 Tenn 6. 241 SW2d 851; Weaver
v Burr, 31 W Va 736, 8 SF 743; Frank v
Suatford-Handcock, 13 Wyo 37, 77 P 134.
54. Coleman v Appleganh, G8 Md 2 1 , 11 A
284; William Weisman Reahv Co. v Cohen, 157
Minn 161. 195 NW 898; Frank v StratfordHandcock. 13 Wyo 37, 77 P 134.
In this connection, see Am l^w Inst Restatement, CONTRACTS, Vol. 1 § 42.

55. Lewis v Johnson. 123 Minn 409, 143 NW
1127 (holding thai an ofFer in writing for the
sale of land by a prospective vendor, being
rejected by the prospective \endee, cannot
thereafter be accepted by the vendee unless the
vendor's assent thereto is in writing); Fgger v
Nesbit. 122 Mo 667, 27 SW 385.
A vendee's express and unconditional repudiation of a contract for the purchase of really
has been held not withdrawn by the vendee's
subsequent offer to take the property, conditioned upon the clearance of an easement to
which the sale was subject under the terms of
the contract. Freedman v St. Matthias Parish,
37 Cal 2d 16, 230 P2d 629, 31 ALR2d 1.
Generally, as to revocation of offer by rejection, see 17 A m j u r 2d, CONTRACTS § 39.

56. See 17 A m j u r 2d, CONTRACTS § 62.

57. Fgger v Nesbit, 122 Mo 667. 27 SW 385;
Weaver v Burr, 31 W Va 736, 8 S t 743.
A Hat sum mentioned in an offer of purchase, in reply to which the offeree submits a
counterproposal based on monthly payments
without specifying the toTal amount, cannot be
taken as representing the total purchase price
under the counterproposal, since, by submitting the counterproposal, the offeree rejects in
toto the terms of the original offer. Todorovich
v Kinnickinnic Mut. Loan &: Bldg. Ass'n. 238
Wis 39. 298 NW 22£, 135-ALR 818.
58. Turner
SF 28.

McCormick. 56 W Va 161, 49

59. See 17 A m j u r 2d, CONTRACTS § 48.

60. Moore v Pierson. 6 Iowa 279; Gates v
Dudgeon. 173 NY 426. 66 NE 116; Curtis
Land & Loan Co. v Interior Land Co. 137 Wis
341, 118 N W 8 5 3 .
61. Caldwell v Cline, 109 W Va 553, 156 SE
55, 72 ALR 1211.
62. Patrick v Bowman, 149 US 411, 37 L Ed
790, 13 S Ct 811; Kempncr v Cohn. 47 Ark

196

055

77 A m j u r 2 d

VLNDOR AND PURCHASER

§23

courts, upon balancing conveniences and inconveniences, have deemed it
more consistent with the purpose and intention of the pan ties to consider the
contract complete and absolutely binding on the transmission of the acceptance through the post as the medium of communication which the parties
themselves contemplate, instead of postponing its completion until the acceptance has been received by the offeror. By treating the post office as the agency
of both parties, the courts have managed to harmonize the legal notion that it
is necessary that the minds of the parties meet with the equally well-established principle that the determination to accept is ineffectual if not communicated either actually or by legal implication. 63 Therefore, a letter withdrawing
the offer is ineffectual for that purpose although mailed before the letter of
acceptance, if it was not received until after the letter of acceptance was
mailed.*4
Whether a contract is consummated b \ the posting of a letter accepting an
offer is dependent upon whether acceptance b\ mail was authonzed When an
offer to sell is made to the other party personally, the proposer is ordinarily
entitled to personal notice that his offer has been accepted In the absence of
proof of any agreement on his part that notice of acceptance might be sent to
him by mail, or that notice so sent has been actual!) receded bv him within
the lime limited, there has been no notice of such acceptance; unless the
acceptance of the offer has been communicated to the person making it, it is
of no avail.65 In such a case a letter of acceptance, although mailed to the
person by whom the offer was made, remains until delivered to the addressee
subject UD the control of the sender, and he may recall his acceptance at an\
time before actual delivery of the letter. 66
In cases where acceptance by mail is authorized, it must appear that the
letter of acceptance was actually placed in the post office, and directed to the
proper place of the person making the offer 67 If a lettei containing an offer to
sell requires that acceptance be made within a certain time, such requirement
must be complied with,68 and if no time is fixed, the acceptance must be within
a reasonable time, but in determining whethei the acceptance was within a
reasonable time, a difference is made between an offer to sell land and one to
sell personalty of a character whose value may be subject to violent fluctuations, and a longer time may be taken in the former ca^c t.han m the latter 6 3
The fact that in the letter of acceptance a mistake is made in referring to the
date of the letter containing the offer is immaterial, if it clearlv appears that
the one containing the offer was the one referred to 70
D CONSIDLRAiION. MUTUALITY

§ 23. Generally.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, an agreement for the sale of
519, 1 SW 869, Scottish-American Mortg Coi \
irr,
Davis, 96 Tex 504, 74 SW 17, Weaver v Burr.
31 W Va 736.8 SL 743
63. See

66. Scottish-American Moiu* Co \ Davis, 96
Tex 504. 74 SW 17*
67. Weaver \ Burr, 31 W Va 736, 8 SL 74 3

17 Am Jur 2d. CONTRACTS § 48

. .
64. Patrick v Bowman. 149 US 4 1 1. 37 L Ld
Ld
790, 13 S Ct 811; Kempner v Cohn. 47 Ark
"*k
519. 1 SW869
65. Weaver \ Burr, 31 W Va 736, 8 SL 743

68. Cair v Duval 39 US 77 10 L Ld 361.
Athc v Bartholemeu, 69 Wis 43. 33 N\S 110
69. K empner v Cohn, 47 Ark 519. 1 SW 869
(delay of 5 days held not unieasonable)
70. Moore v Pierson, (> Iowa 279
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An employer may offer a promise of employment at specified
wages in such a manner as to empower the offere 3 to accept
either by actually beginning work or by promising to go to
work.64 Beginning work in response to the offer would nearly
always justify the inference of a promise to complete it. Actual shipment of part of the goods ordered, if in accordance
with an instalment order or with custom or course of dealing,
may justify the inference of a promise that the balance will be
shipped.^5 If the order is for shipment in one lot, shipment of
less may operate as an acceptance and a breach at the same
time,aG but it may also be no more than a return offer to sell the
part shipped or a performance in accordance with an urgent request and for the accommodation of the buyer.57
Ordinarily, one who makes an offer to sell property for a price
contemplates a bilateral contract and expects a notice of acceptance. This is true even though the offer is in the form of an irrevocable option to buy. Nevertheless, in such a case the offeree can accept by making a tender of the price without other
notice. If the offeror accepts the tender, the resulting payment
may constitute full performance by the buyer and the resulting contract is unilateral. If the offeror rejects the tender, he
is guilty of a breach of contract for which the buyer can maintain
suit for damages or specific performance.58
§ 78- Acceptance by Post
As has already been stated, an offeror can specify any mode of
acceptance that he pleases. By his offer he creates the power of
acceptance; and he can limit it as he desires. Without regard to
the mode in which he communicates his offer, he can require acceptance by telegraph, telephone, or letter; and he can require
that it shall be received instead of merely started. 61 But in order
to limit the power of acceptance, he must either communicate
the limitation to the offeree before the* latter accepts, or else
make his offer in such manner and terms that the offeree has
reason to luiow that his power is so limited.
Where the parties are negotiating at a distance from each
other, the most common method of making an offer is by sending it by mail; and more often than not the offeror has specified
no particular mode of acceptance. ..In such a case, it is now the
prevailing rule that the offeree has power to accept and close
the contract by mailing a letter, ot acceptance,, properly -stamped
and addressed,62 within a reasonable.time. The.contractis re62. N.J.—Potts v. Whitehead, 20 N.
J.Eq. 55 (1SG9).
Restatement, Contracts, § C7, reads:
"An acceptance sent oy mail or
otherwise from a distance is not
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operative when despatched, unless
It is properly addressed and any
other precaution taken which is ordinarily observed to insure safe
transmission of similar messages."*
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garded as made a t the time and place that the letter of acceptance
is put into the possession of the post office department. 63
Various reasons have been given for so holding; and for a
long time some learned theorists and judges denied that such
was the rule and even that the courts had power to make it the
rule. The objections have now mostly died away; and no one
doubts that the courts can make such a rule, because they have in
fact made it. In as much as the rule seems to be causing no great
dissatisfaction, it may now be supposed that the courts are not
likely to unmake it.
The reason that is most often given for the rule is that the
offeror, by sending his offer by mail, has made the post his
agent to receive and carry the acceptance. Sometimes it is said
that the post is the common agent of both parties.04 It requires
only slight consideration to perceive that this reasoning is defective. The term "agent" is generally used to refer only to
some human person with power to act on his principal's behalf.
The "post" is not a person, although there are many persons in the
postal service; and it is by no act of any such person that the
making of the contract is consummated. A letter box on the
corner is neither a person nor an agent; and \ e t the acceptance
is effective when the letter of acceptance is dropped into that
box.65 It is the offeree himself (or some person authorized by
him) who drops the letter in the box. It is he who has the power
and who exercises it by his action. The "box" has no power and
does no act. It is true that a postman may thereafter remove the
letter from the box; but the contract has already been made and
the removal has no legal operation. All this is equally true in
case the letter is mailed by dropping it through the proper slit
inside of a post office building.
Sometimes it is said that the mailing of the^letter of acceptance makes the contract for the reason that by the act of mailing the offeree puts the letter irrevocably out of his own possession and control. The present post office regulations provide,
however, that the sender of a letter can regal 1 it. He can stop
delivery by telegraphing ahead and can cause the return of the
letter to himself. This is discussed in a later section.
A better explanation of the existing rule seems to be that in
such cases the mailing of a letter has long been a customary and
expected way of accepting the offer. It is ordinary business
usage. More than this, however, is needed to explain why the
letter is operative on mailing rather than on receipt by the offeror. Even though it is business usage to send an offer by mail,
it creates no power of acceptance until it is received. Indeed,
G4. Eng.—It was so argued In
Household Fire & C. Ace. Ins Co. v.
Grant, 4 Ex.D. 21G (1ST9).
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most notices sent by mail are not operative unless actually received.
The additional reasons for holding that a different rule applies
to an acceptance and that it is operative on mailing may be suggested as follows: When an offer is by mail and the acceptance
also is by mail, the contract must date either from the mailing of
the acceptance or from its receipt. In either case, one of the parties will be bound by the contract without being actually aware
of that fact If we hold the offeror bound on the mailing of
13IO acceptance, he may change his position in ignorance of the
acceptance; even though he waits a reasonable time before acting, he may still remain unaware that he is bound by contract
because the letter of acceptance is delayed, or is actually lost
or destroyed, in the mails. Therefore this rule is going to cause
loss and inconvenience to the offeror in some cases. But if we
adopt the alternative rule that the letter of acceptance is not
operative until receipt, it is the offeree who is subjected to the
danger of loss and inconvenience. He can not know that his letter has been received and that he is bound by contract until a
new communication is received by him. His letter of acceptance may never have been received and so no letter of notification is sent to him; or it may have been received, and the
letter of notification may be delayed or entirely lost in the mails.
One of the parties must c a n y the risk of loss and inconvenience.06
We need a definite and uniform rule as to this. We can choose
either rule; but we must choose one. We can put the risk on
either party; but we must not leave it in doubt. The party not
carrying the risk can then act promptly and with confidence in
reliance on the contract; the party carrying the risk can insure
against it if he so desires. The business community could no
doubt adjust itself to either rule; but the rulSsthrowing the risk
on the offeror has the merit of closing the deal more quickly and
enabling performance more promptly. It must be remembered
that in the vast majority of cases the acceptance is neither lost
nor delayed; and promptness of action is of importance in all
of them. Also it is the offeror who has invited the acceptance.67
A third possibility has been suggested, but little considered.
This is that the mailing of the acceptance shall consummate a
conditional contract, one that at once becomes irrevocable by
either party but that is conditional upon ^actual receipt of the
letter within a reasonable time by the offeror. To this rule, also,
the business community could no doubt adjust itself; but it has
no such advantages in the allocation of risk as to justify advocating its adoption at the present time.08
If the offer has not itself been sent by mail, the theory that the
post is the common agent of the parties breaks down. Also,
there is so much the less reason for holding that the offeror has
126
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authorized an acceptance by mail.00 As in all other cases, he
may have expressly authorized such an acceptance. In some
well-reasoned cases, it has been held that the power to accept by
mailing a letter may rest upon facts other than an express or
implied authorization. Even though the offer was not made by
mail and there was no authorization, the existing circumstances
may be such as to make it reasonable for the offeree to accept
by mail and to give the offeror reason to know that the acceptance will be so made. Such may be usage and business practice.
In such case, the acceptance is operative on mailing.70
The fact that an offer is sent by wire is not itself evidence of an
authorization to accept by mail—indeed it tends to show that a
more speedy form of acceptance is desired. Yet the nature of
the proposed contract, the time of the expected performance,
the absence of price fluctuation, and other factors may be sufficient to warrant a decision that an acceptance by mail is operative on mailing.71
An offeror can always so word his offer and so limit the power
of acceptance as to make the receipt of the acceptance necessary
to the creation of a contract Indeed, if he merely says ''Notice
of your acceptance must be given within 30 days," this may be
held to mean that the notice must be received within that time.
It would be different if he says, "Please reply by return of post."
The latter specifies a mode of communication but does not make
receipt necessary. Where an already completed contract contained a provision creating an option to be exercised by the giving
of notice within a stated time, it has been held that it is not
enough that the notice was mailed within that time.72 Here, the
question is one of interpretation of language. Probably, when
parties use the word "notice/' they usually mean a communication received.
So, also, where in an already completed contract, a power of
revocation or termination by notice is reserved, the notice is not
operative until actually received.73
If the circumstances are such that the acceptance is operative
at starting it by mail or telegraph, the fact that it is delayed on
the way 7 * or even that it is lost and never received "t5 does not
affect the validity of the contract already made. This presup69.
Scottish American Mortg. Co. v.
Davis, 74 S.W. 17, 9G Tex. G04, 97
Am.St.Rep. 932 (1903), held t h a t acceptance by mail w a s not authorized since the offer was not by mail,
and t h a t a mailed acceptance could
therefore be recalled.

Household F i r e & C. Ace. Ins. Co. v.
Grant, 4 Ex.D. 21G (1S79), offor put
in the hands of offeree's soliciting
agent.
Restatement, C o n t a c t s , §§ G4, GO.
7 L

Eng.—Ilenthorn v. F r a s e r [1S92]
2 Ch. 27, offer delivered In p e r s o n ;

70#
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Ok!.—Fanners' Produce Co. v.
McAlester Storage & Com. Co., 150
P. 4S3, 48 Okl. 4SS, L R.A.191GA,
1297 (1915).
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poses that such loss or delay is not caused by the fault of the
offeree. Of course, in these cases there is likely to be injury or
inconvenience; but it is the risk of this that someone has to
carry; that one is the offeror unless he has so made his offer as to
prevent i t
§ 79. Acceptance by Telephone
In a few cases the courts have dealt with the making of a
contract by telephone. Restatement, Contracts, § 65, states,
"Acceptance given by telephone is governed by the principles
applicable to oral acceptance where the parties are in the presence of each other". There is no comment; and no illustrations
are given. The question before the courts has been as to the
place at which the contract should be regarded as having been
made. This has been held to be the place at which the offeree
speaks the words of acceptance into the telephone transmitter. 76
When an acceptance is made orally in the presence of the offeror, there is no appreciable lapse of time between the act of
speaking and the hearing of the sounds. Nevertheless, if the
offeree knows or has reason to know that the offeror does not
actually hear or understand his words of acceptance, a contract
is not consummated. Undoubtedly the same is true in the case of
an acceptance by telephone; and under some circumstances the
offeree has more reason to doubt the effectiveness of his communication by telephone than in the case of an acceptance face
to face.
§ 80. Withdrawal of a Letter of Acceptance from the Mails
The postal regulations have for a long period made it possible
for the sender of a letter to intercept it and prevent its delivery
to the addressee. This has caused some doubt to be expressed
as to whether an acceptance can ever be operative upon the mere
mailing of the letter, since the delivery to the post office has not
put it entirely beyond the sender's control.
It is believed that no such doubt should exist. The question
should not turn upon the total loss of power to control, but rather
upon the reasonableness of regarding this as a proper method of
accepting an offer. First, if the offeror expressly says that acceptance may be by the mailing of a letter, the offeree certainly
has power to accept as thus authorized. The withdrawal of the
letter, with the consent of the post office, would not make the
acceptance inoperative, although it might prevent the offeror
from ever knowing that his offer had been accepted. Secondly,
if the offeror specifies that acceptance must be made by a communication received by him, or by some mode other than the
76. Bank of Yolo v. Sperry Flour
Co., 74 P. 855, 141 Cal. 314 (1903).
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cable by consideration, or a seal, and which is therefore a contract,
is hereafter considered. Even a revocable offer, however, may be made
not only to the public generally, but it may be made to a specified
person or his assigns, and in such a case an assignee of the offeree, being
within the terms of the offer, may accept it. Moreover, if after an
offer is made to one person only, performance is tendered by another,
though the offeror may refuse the tendered performance, yet if he
does receive performance knowing that it is not tendeied by or on
behalf of the offeree, he will be bound. The tender of the performance
is, in effect, a new offer, and receipt of the performance an acceptance
of this new offer.78 Even if performance is received by the offeror under
the supposition that it was rendered by the offeree, the offeror on learning the truth must surrender the performance if this is possible (or if
the performance consisted of property which he has resold, he must
pay over the proceeds of the resale) or he will in effect have accepted
a counter-offer. If, however, before notice of the facts such a situation
has arisen that neither the performance nor any equivalent received
for it can be returned the offeror is certainly not liable on an}' theory
of contract and probably not liable quasi contractually,79 for the conduct of the seller in failing to disclose his identity is wanting in the
good faith which the law generally requires of one who seeks to base
a claim on a benefit received without request.
§ 81. Acceptance in contracts by correspondence may be completed
by mailing an acceptance. so
Frequently contracts are made between parties at a distance and
it is of vital importance to determine at what moment the contract is
complete. If the mailing of an acceptance completes the contract,
what happens thereafter, whether the death of either party, the receipt of a revocation or rejection, or a telegraphic recalling of the
acceptance, though occurring before the receipt of the acceptance,
will be of no avail; whereas, if a contract is not completed until the
acceptance has been received, in all the situations supposed no contract
will arise. It was early decided that the contract was complete upon
the mailing of the acceptance. 81 The reason influencing the court was
evidently that at the time of mailing acceptance there had been an
overt manifestation of assent to the proposal. The court failed to
consider that since the proposed contract was bilateral, as is almost
invariably any contract made b}r mail, the so-called acceptance must
73

Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, supra, n. 77; Thomas Mfg. Co. v. Prather, 65 Aik. 27, 44 S. W J

218.
79

Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, supra, n. 77; Boulton v. Jones, Shpra, n. 77.
Rest., Contracts, § 64.
81
Adams t>. LindseU, 1 B. <fc Aid. 681.
80

0G2

90

SELECTIONS FROM WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS

§ 81

also have become effective as a promise to the offeror in order to create a contract. The result thus early reached, however, has definitely
established the law in England 82 and in the United States 83 and in
Canada. It is, therefore, immaterial that the acceptance never reaches
its destination.84 No distinction seems to have been taken in the cases
between unilateral and bilateral contracts; yet a distinction in theory
exists between transferring the ownership of property and conveying
an idea. If an offer for a unilateral contract calls for the performance
of an act by the offeree and that act can be performed by dispatching
something through the mail, on well-recognized principles of the law
of sales, title will pass and the act of the offeree will be complete as
soon as the thing requested is sent. It has been settled since an early
day that where goods are ordered from a distance, the delivery of
them to a carrier, in accordance with the express or implied terms of
the offer, transfers title to the buyer; that is, a unilateral contract is
completed in which the performance by the offeree is the transfer of
title at the moment of shipment, and the promise of the offeror to pay
the price becomes a binding obligation at that time. If goods are
ordered to be sent by mail there can be no doubt that the same principle
applies and that a unilateral contract is complete when the goods are
mailed. If instead of goods the offeree is requested to send money,
the result is the same. As soon as the mono}' is sent it becomes the
property of the offeror, and he is bound to perform his promise for
which the money was the consideration. So if the offer requested the
sending of a formal document by mail, title to the document would
pass as soon as mailed.83
In an offer to make an informal bilateral contract, however, the
offeror requests a promise and not an act, and our law does not regard
the mere delivery of an unsealed informal writing, such as a letter,
as of itself creating an obligation. Accordingly in bilateral contracts
made by correspondence, the question is, when has the offeree made
the promise requested in the offer? It may be forcibly argued thatmaking a promise is something which necessarily requires communica" D u n l o p v. Higgins, 1 H. L. C. 3S1; Household Fire Ins. Co. r. Grant, 4 Ex. D. 21G;
Hcnthorn v. Eraser, [1S92] 2 Ch. 27.
" T a y l o e v. Merchants' F. Ins. Co , 9 How. 390, 13 L. Ed. 187; Ferner v. Storer, 03 la.
4S4, 1 9 X . W. 2SS, 50 Am. Rep. 752; Shaw r. Ingram-Day Lum. Co., 152 Ky. 329, 153 S. W.
431, L. R. A. 1915D 145; Wheat v. Cross, 31 Md. 99; Mactier v. Frith, 0 Wend. (X. Y.) 103,
21 Am. Dec. 2G2; Trevor v. Wood, 30 N. Y. 307, 93 Am. Dec. 511; Scottish American
Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 90 Tex. 50-1, 74 S. W. 17, 97 Am. St. Rep. 932. Ace, Rest., Contracts,
§§64, 67. Cf. McCulloch v. Ragle Ins. Co., 1 Pick. (Mass.) 278. Whether tins case would
now be followed in Massachusetts may be doubted. See Brauer v. Shaw, 108 Mass. 198,
46 N. E. 617, 60 Am. St. Rep. 3S7.
•« Rest., Contracts, § 64.
85
Tayloe v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., supra, n. 83.
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tion, and that sending a letter wliich never arrives is no more making
a promise to the person addressed than talking into a telephone when
there is no connection with the person addressed; and the rule that a
bilateral contract is completed by mailing acceptance has been ably
criticized, and contention made that actual communication should be
required. But it is in accordance with all analogies in the formation
of contracts that some outward indication of assent and of promises
should be regarded by the law as essential rather than the actual communication which is necessary for mental assent. If the law is open
to criticism for taking the moment of mailing a letter as important,
it is because that outward act is not so certain an outward indication
that a promise has been made as a receipt of the letter by the offeror
would be, and the law should select such an outward act as normally
and ordinarily connotes the actual making of a promise by communication. In any event, the law is so well settled as to make discussion
academic.
§ 82. Acceptance by telegraph may be complete by dispatching a
message; by telephone, on receipt of message.
By analogy to the law governing contracts by mail, it is held that
a contract by telegraph may be completed b\- delivering a telegraphic
dispatch of acceptance for transmission at the receiving office of the
telegraph company.&G The same analogy has been suggested in the
case of contracts by telephone.87 The analogy between the telegraph
and mail is by no means perfect, and the telephone presents still greater
differences from the mail. In the United States, neither the telegraph
nor the telephone has been operated by the government, except during
war. In neither case is anything tangible sent by the offeree and received b}r the offeror. In the use of the telegraph the risks of error are
also vastly greater than in the case of mail. Nevertheless if the assumption is sound that the offeror has impliedly assented'to the starting of a telegram on its way, as the only necessary manifestation of
acceptance, the result of the cases is unquestionably right. The
difficult}' is because of the probability that such an assumption is
based on a legal fiction. So far as the telegraph is concerned, however,
the law is doubtless settled; but a contract by telephone presents quite
as great an analogy to a contract made where the parties are orally
addressing one another in each other's presence. It has not been sugM

Rest., Contracts, §§6i, G7. Minnesota Oil Co. v. Collier Lead Co., 4 Dill. 431; B a n k of Yo4o v. Sperry Flour Co., 141 Cal. 314, 74 P . 855, 65 L. It. A. 90; Butler v. Foley, 211
Mich. C6S, 179 N. W. 34; Trevor v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 307, 93 Am. Doc. 511; Coivan v. O'Conner, 20 Q. B. D. 640.
87
Bunk of Yolo v. Sperry Flour Co., supra, n. SO; Carow Towing Co. v. The ' ' E d McWUliams," 46 Dora. L. R. 506.

064

BISHOP & RONNOW, P.C.
WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiffs
P.O. Box 279
36 North 300 West
Cedar City, UT
84720
Telephone:

586-9483

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

CLIFFORD G. CRANE, and
BONNIE CRANE , husband and
wife,
Plaintiffs,

COMPLAINT

)
)

)

vs .
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.,
a Utah Limited Partnership;
HEART MARKETING AND
DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah
Corporation, in its capacity
as general partner of
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.;
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., a Utah
Corporation; and DIXIE TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. #5~ - 21 I

)

Come now Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, who complain
of Defendants and for cause of action allege as follows:
PRELIMINARY ALLEGATIONS
1.

TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., is a Utah Limited Partner-

ship .
2.

HEART MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., is a Utah

Corporation serving as general partner of TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE,
LTD.

0G5

o n l
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3.

LEISURE SPORTS, INC., is a Utah Corporation.

4.

DIXIE TITLE COMPANY is a Utah Corporation.

5.

Plaintiffs own a twenty-five percent (25%) interest

as limited partners in TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a Utah
Limited Partnership.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
6.

In or about the month of November 1984, Plaintiffs

entered into a certain "Agreement for Sale of LTD. Partnership
Interest1' in which Plaintiffs1 appear as Sellers and TIMBERBROOK
VILLAGE, LTD., appears as Buyer.

A copy of the "Agreement for

Sale of LTD. Partnership Interest" is attached, marked as
Exhibit "A", and is incorporated by this reference.
7.

Among other things, Defendant TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.,

agreed to convey all of Unit 201, Building 1 of Timberbrook
Condominiums to Plaintiffs, subject to an existing construction
loan, which loan was to be released from the condominium upon
completion of the sales of units in Phase I.
8.

All contingencies recited in the Agreement for Sale

of LTD. Partnership Interest have occurred, and Plaintiffs
have performed all conditions required of them to be performed.
9.

Defendant TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., has failed and

refused to convey to Plaintiffs the real property to which
they are entitled.

Plaintiffs are entitled to specific

performance on the part of Defendant TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.,
and its general partner, HEART MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.
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10.

In the event that Defendants TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE,

LTD., and HEART MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., do not
convey the condominium to Plaintiffs as required by the
agreement, Plaintiffs will suffer damages in the amount of
$150,000.00.
11.

Any defense raised to this First Cause of Action by

TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., and/or HEART MARKETING AND
DEVELOPMENT, INC., will be raised in bad faith and Plaintiffs
will be entitled to the award of reasonable attorney fees
under the provision of UCA 78-27-56 (1953, as amended).
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against
Defendants TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., and HEART MARKETING
AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., its general partner, requiring specific
performance of the "Agreement for Sale of LTD. Partnership
Interest11 by said Defendants and requiring conveyance of the
real property described above to Plaintiffs, or, in the
event that specific performance is not deemed appropriate
or is not made by Defendants TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., and
HEART MARKETING AND DEVELOPING, INC., that Plaintiffs be
awarded judgment against said Defendants, jointly and
severally, in the amount of $150,000.00, and Plaintiffs
further pray that they be awarded reasonable attorney fees,
pursuant to UCA 78-27-56 (1953, as amended), their costs of
court, and such other and further relief as the Court deems
appropriate.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
12.

In or about the month of November of 1984, Plaintiffs

as Sellers and Defendant LEISURE SPORTS, INC., as Buyer,
entered into a certain "Agreement for Sale of LTD. Partnership
Interest11.

A copy of said is attached, marked as Exhibit

fl ff

B ,

and is incorporated by this reference.
13.

All contigencies recited in said Agreement have

occurred, and Plaintiffs have performed all conditions
required of them to be performed.
14.

Defendant LEISURE SPORTS, INC., has failed and

refused to pay to Plaintiffs the sum of $175,000.00 required
to be paid to Plaintiffs by the terms of the "Agreement for
Sale of LTD. Partnership Interest11.
15.

Defendant LEISURE SPORTS, INC., is indebted to

Plaintiffs in the amount of $175,000.00, or, alternatively,
its failure to pay said amount to Plaintiffs has damaged
Plaintiffs in the amount of $175,000.00.
16.

Any defense raised to this cause of action by

LEISURE SPORTS, INC., will be raised in bad faith and
Plaintiffs are entitled to the award of reasonable attorney
fees pursuant to UCA 78-27-56 (1953, as amended), in the
event that LEISURE SPORTS, INC., files any defense to this
cause of action.
17.

Plaintiffs are entitled to interest at the legal

rate prior to judgment, and to interest at the judgment rate
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from and after any judgment rendered in favor of Plaintiffs
and against Defendant LEISURE SPORTS, INC.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against LEISURE
SPORTS, INC., in the amount of $175,000.00, for reasonable
attorney fees if any defense is asserted in bad faith, for
interest at the legal rate prior to judgment, for Plaintiffs1
costs of court, for interest after judgment at the judgment
rate, and for such other and further relief as the Court
deems appropriate.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
18.

Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations set forth

in their First and Second Causes of Action, above, as
though fully stated herein.
19.

Defendant DIXIE TITLE COMPANY holds in escrow the

Agreements for Sale of LTD. Partnership Interest stated
above, the documents necessary to consummate said Agreements,
and the sum of $175,000.00 owed to Plaintiffs.

Said documents

and monies are held for the use and benefit of the other
parties to this action.
20.

Plaintiffs have demanded that Defendant DIXIE TITLE

COMPANY "close" the transactions referred to above, and
disburse monies and documents in accordance with the Agreements
stated.

See letter from Dean A. Mixon, attorney for Plaintiffs,

dated 18 February 1985 to DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, (Exhibit "C")
and copy of telegram to DIXIE TITLE COMPANY (ExhibitM D n ) .
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21.

Despite Plaintiffs demands, DIXIE TITLE COMPANY has

refused to deliver to Plaintiffs the documents and monies
to which Plaintiffs are entitled.
22.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an order of this Court

requiring DIXIE TITLE COMPANY to close the transactions
referred to above, and to deliver to Plaintiffs the documents
and monies to which Plaintiffs are entitled, together with
interest upon said monies.

In the event of failure of

DIXIE TITLE COMPANY to deliver said monies and documents,
Plaintiffs will be damaged in the amount of $325,000.00.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against DIXIE
TITLE COMPANY requiring said Defendant to deliver to Plaintiffs
all documents held in escrow for Plaintiffs benefit, together
with $175,000.00, plus interest, held by DIXIE TITLE COMPANY,
and in the event that DIXIE TITLE COMPANY fails to deliver
said documents and money, plus interest, to Plaintiffs, that
Plaintiffs have judgment against DIXIE TITLE COMPANY in the
amount of $325,000.00, together with interest before and
after judgment at the applicable rate, and together with
reasonable attorney fees pursuant to UCA 78-27-56 (1953,
as amended), if DIXIE TITLE COMPANY asserts in bad faith
any defense to this cause of action.

Further, Plaintiffs

pray for an award of their costs of court and for such other
and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.
DATED:
gtf June 1985.
'^
^

nr_n

WILLARD R. B I S H O P J
Attorney for Plaintiffs

7
Plaintiffs' address:
12671 Overbrooke Drive
Santa Ana, CA 92705
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AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF LTD. PARTNERSHIP INTEREST

Agreement
between

made

this

Timberbrook

(hereinafter

day

Village,

"Buyer")

and

of

Ltd.,

a

Clifford

1984, by

#

Utah

G.

Limited

Crane

and

and

Partnership,
Bonnie

Crane,

(hereinafter "Seller").
RECITALS
1.

Seller is the owner of a^5% interest in Timberbrook Village

Ltd. a Utah Limited Paitnership.
2.

The

agreement

parties hereto

wherein

Seller

desire

shall

to

set

purchase

forth

the

the

terms

limited

of an

partnership

interest on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.
NOW

THEREFORE, in consideration

of the mutual

covenants

made

herein, the parties agree as follows:
1.

Buyer

Building

)

agrees
of

to

assign

Timberbrook

and

convey

Condominiums,

all
at

of

closing

Seller's right, title and interest on the assignment
hereto

at

existing

Exhibit

"A".

construction

Said

Conveyance

loan which

loan

shall

shall

be

Unit

be

«=3. / Q
all

of

form attached
subject

released

to

iron

an
the

condominium upon completion of the sales of Units in Phase 1.
2.

This agreement and closing hereon shall be contingent upon

closing of that certain loan between Seller and Nebraska Saving and
Loan Association.
3.
Company,

R20/13

Closing
Inc.,

shall
(Escrow

occur

through

Agent),

205

the
East

072

cilices

of

Tabernacle,

()08

Dixie
St.

Title

George,

EXHIBIT

Utah.

The assignment

(Exhibit "A11} shall be deposited with Escrow

Agent to be delivered to Buyer upon closing.
Agreement made the date first mentioned above.

SELLER

^I^PO^AJ^JL^
Cliffl^Jd G. Crane
I Bonnie Crane
BUYER
LEISURE SPORTS, INC.

By &0^\

(IM^AA

B^pryvC^iurch,

President

lupsell J > G a n i d n
(airman of t h e Board of
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EXHIBIT "AM

ASSIGNMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST

Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane

(Seller) hereby assigns and

conveys to Leisure Sports Inc. a 5% interest as a limited partner,
in Timberbrook Village Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership.
Seller warrants as follows:
1.

That the interest conveyed

is free and clear of all liens,

encumbrances or claims against Seller's title;
2.

That Seller has the full power to convey said interest;

3.

Seller hereby authorizes and directs the General Partner of

Timberbrook Village, Ltd. to show the change in interest as of the
date

of

closing,

and

Seller

hereby

authorizes

the

Escrow

Agent,

Dixie Title Company to notify the General Partner in writing of the
date of closing.
DATED this

day of NO^&gj^Lr,—1Q?>4\

"^(?c^<.

^

SELLER

CliEfoAAAG.

iH (JJAA»v^
Crane

J7 ,ry\

Udj2*zLX^

Bonnie Crane
STATE OF UTAH,

)

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

: ss.
)

On the

day of November, 1984, personally appeared
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before

nm

me Clifford

G. Crane

and

Bonnie

Crane, the

Sellers

in

the

above

entitled Assignment, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed
this instrument for the purposes therein set forth*

My Commission Expires:

Notary Public
Residing In:

075
Oil

Callfornid

State of

C o u n t y of

Orange

On t h i s t h e

S5.

^

t h

d a y of
:•::•:;•::•:•/:

S'ebnMi^v
M A p. V

19

, before me,

:DT— :

U

the u n d e r s i g n e d N o t a r y P u b l i c , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d

•:-:-: ci.irroRD n.
OFFICIAL SEAL

'

^

^

^ • 6 ^ - ;
J v ;. i - V ^ ^ V
v > d * ^

MARYH. HEEDT
NOTARY P'JOitC CALIFORNIA
PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN
OttANGF COUNTY

M> C o m m i i s i o o

O p i r e s Mar. 3 1 . K ' r f i

CHAMC

A JJ !: .

;<o;i;in:

CPA::F:

«::'::,:

p e r s o n a l l y k n o w n to me
.K>. p r o v e d to me on the basis of s a t i s f a c t o r y e v i d e n c e
to be the p e r s o n ' s ) w h o s e namc(s)

._

s u b s c r i b e d to the

° -

w i t h i n i n s t r u m e n t , and a c k n o w l e d g e d that

h'.v

W I T N E S S my h a n d a n d o f f i c i a l seal.

Notary's Signature

OTh-

e x e c u t e d it.

AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF LTD. PARTNERSHIP INTEREST

Agreement
between

made

Leisure

this

day

Sports,

of

Inc.

, 1984 , by

and

"Buyer")

and

(hereinafter

Clifford G. Crane/and Bonnie Crane J (hereinafter "Seller").
j

RECITALS
1.

Seller

is

the

owner

of

a

20%

interest

in

Timberbrook

Village Ltd. a Utah Limited Partnership.
2.

The

agreement

parties hereto

wherein

Seller

desire

shall

to

set

purchase

forth
the

the

terms

limited

of an

partnership

interest on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration

of the mutual

covenants made

herein, the parties agree as follows:
1.
defined,
Dollars
2.
Seller's

Buyer
the

hereby

agrees

to

sum of One liundred

pay,

at

closing

Seventy-Five

as

Thousand

hereinafter
and

no/100

($175,000).
Seller

agrees

to

assign

and

convey

at

closing

right, title and interest on the assignment

all

of

form attached

hereto at Exhibit "A".
3-

This agreement and closing hereon shall ,be contingent upon

closing of that certain loan between Seller and Nebraska Saving and
Loan Association.
4.

Closing

shall occur

through

the

offices

of

Dixie

Title

Company, Inc., (Escrow Agent), 205 East Tabernacle, St. George,
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Utah.

The assignment

(Exhibit

M

A") shall be deposited with Escrow

Agent to be delivered to Buyer upon closing.
Agreement made the date first mentioned above.

SELLER
Cliif

jM d^OA^K^
G. Crane

Bonnie Crane
BUYER
LEISURE SPORTS, INC.
By

fcSOA^)

.sell J>Gallian
fiairman of the Board of
D i r e c t o r s and S e c r e t a r y
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-2-

State of

Ca 1 i i

OT

fi i a

Pr.mrr-

19 _ _ , b e f o r e m o ,

ss

C o u n t y of
the u n d o r s i q n n d N o t a r > P u b l i c , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d
;

^ A [ K H HEEDT
P M \ : » v_ crpn.L \u

**'': f ' M i ' F O !

n

<\

f'PA!.'"

AN^

r

MNIE

PAMr

^ •'• — •'

p e r s o n a l l y Knov.n to m e
1

'" proxed to m e on ihr» b a s i s of s a t i s f a c t o r y e v i d e n c e

to be the p p ' s o n ( s ) w h o s n namo(s)
w i t h i n i n s t r u m e n t , a n d a c k n o w l e d g e d that

My t<vr>rrv

:in

11^-_
.

_ s u b s c r i b e d to t h ^
^

__ e x e c u t e d it

W ! i N F S S r ly h a n d a n d offic lal s^ai

07!)
Notary's Signature

-:-^>--^^

'i:

EXHIBIT "A"

ASSIGNMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST

Clifford G. Crane (and Bonnie Crane/ (Seller) hereby assigns an"d
conveys to Leisure Sports Inc. a 20% interest as a limited partner,
in Timberbrook Village Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership.
Seller warrants as follows:
1.

That the interest conveyed is free and clear of all liens,

encumbrances or claims against Seller's title;
2.

That Seller has the full power to convey said interest;

3.

Seller hereby authorizes and directs the General Partner of

Timberbrook Village, Ltd. to show the change in interest as of the
date

of

closing,

and

Seller

hereby

authorizes

the

Escrow

Agent,

Dixie Title Company to notify the General Partner in writing of the
date of closing.
DATED this

day of Nuvdnibui, 1904. ^ k o W < *

13

(

Wt_^

SELLER

CliffdJ^dl GTTrane

A/ft/v^.

^?t^V

Bonnie Crane
STATE OF UTAH,

)

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

: ss.
)

On the

day of November, 1984, personally appeared before

-T-

0,80

n* ^

me

Clifford

Crane

and

Bonnie

Crane,

the

Sellers

in

the

above

entitled Assignment, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed
this instrument for the purposes therein set forth.

My Commission Expires:

Notary Public
Residing In:
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State of

Cal i i orn i a
0 r \ i n Co

Feb r u a r y

^ 3 th
O n this the

19

' day of

55.

MARY l\.

, before me,

HEIlIvr*****

County of
the u n d e r s i g n e d rJotary Public, p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d

— * CLIFFORD

VARY H HEtDT

G.

CHAIJ*?: AMI) ROMIHE

•."i p e r s o n a l l y k n o w n to me
•[•/• p r o v e d to m e on tho basis of s a t i s f a c t o r y e v i d e n c e
to be the person(s) w h o s e name(s)

rl r o

w i t h i n i n s t r u m e n t , and a c k n o w l e d g e d that
My Co mm.'

CRANE

W I T N E S S m y h a n d and o f f i c i a l seal.

Notary's Signature

_ . s u b s c r i b e d to the

1/hev
(\ O • ;

.executed it.

WEINFELD 6 MIXON
A tAW CORPORATION

6 0 1 NORTH PARKCtNTER DRIVE, SUITE 2 0 3
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA

TELEPHONE

©2705

<7I<4) B 4 I - 6 6 4 8

February 18,1985

Mr. Doug Westbrook
Dixie Title Company
205 E. Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
RE:

CLIFFORD CRANE ESCROW

Dear Mr. Westbrook:
As I believe you know, our office represents Clifford
G. and Bonnie Crane. Enclosed please find the following
two original documents:
1. "Agreement For Sale of Limited Partnership Interest"
to which my clients and Timberbrook Village Limited are parties;
2. "Agreement For Sale of Limited Partnership Interest"
to which my clients and Leisure Sports Incorporated are parties.
Enclosed please find, further, a copy of a document
entitled "Substitution of Guarantee" dated November 20, 1984,
between Nebraska Savings & Loan Association and Russell J.
Gallian. You may proceed to close the transaction referred
to in Mr. Gallian's February 11, 1985, letter to me, copy
enclosed, as soon as you have received from Nebraska Savings
& Loan Association their written affirmation o*f the validity
of the "Substitution of Guarantor" document along with their
warranty that Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane have no
obligations whatsoever to Nebraska Savings & Loan Association,
either jointly or severally, either actual or contingent.
There are three conditions to closing from our side:
1. Your mailing to me by registered mail, the original
of the above-referenced affirmation and warranty by Nebraska
Savings & Loan Association;
2. Your mailing to me by certified mail, a fully executed
Warranty Deed to Unit 210, Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums ;
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EXHIBIT

CE1MFELD 8 MIXON
A LAW

Mr. DOLV Westbrook
February 18, 1985
Page two

CORPORATION

3. Your disbursing by wire transfer, the sum of $175,000
into my client's account at Home Savings of American,
179 N. Tustin, Orange, California 92667, Account No. 125-900624-3
If the above-referenced closing does not occur by Friday,
March 8, 1985, you are instructed to return all documents
to me and to terminate the escrow. If you have any question
or comment, please do not hesitate to call.
Very truly yours,
WEINFELD & MIXON
y

^<

-7 / ( / /

BY: i~

c-v

DEAN A. MIXON
DAM/mw
Enclosure
cc:

Mr. Clifford Crane
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4-053195S066002 P3/07/85 ICS IPMRNCZ CSP SNAB
1 7145416648 MGM TORN SANTA ANA CA 03-07 g857P EST

WEINFELD A^-'D MIXON
601 NORTH PARK CFNTER
SANTA ANA CA 92705

THIS

IS A CONFIRMATION

«203

COPY OF THE FOLLOWING

MESSAGE!

714541664P TDRN SANTA ANA CA 26 03-07 0657P EST
FON 8016P8J638
MR DOUG WESTBROOK, DIXIE TITLE CO RPT DLY HGM COPY MESSAGE
P05 EAST TABERNACLE
ST GEORGE UT B4770
THF MARCH 8 CLOSING REQUIREMENT REFERRED TO IN MY LETTER OF FEBRUARY
18, 1985, IS WAIVED. THE ESCROW IS IRREVOCABLE. YOU ARE TO CLOSE AT
ONCE.
WEINFELD AND MIXON
601 NORTH PARK CENTER «2P!3
SANTA ANA CA 92705
P0I58 EST
MGMCOMP

085
Olii
EXHIBIT
"D"

S2P5 MILL ST
RFNO NV H95M2 06AM

1-R15921A067 03/08/85 ICS IPMROCG RNO SNAA
009^6
DH TDRN
3/8

WEINFELD AND MIXON
601 NORTH PARK CENTER
SANTA ANA CA 92705

«203

YOUR MESSAGE 4-053195S066 2057
DATED 3/8
TO DOUG WESTBRDOK OF ST GEORGE UT
WAS DELIVERED BY TELEPHONE AT 8|41AM PST
ON 3/6
AND ACCEPTED BY D L.
THANK

YOU FOR USING OUR SERVICE,

WESTERN UNION
5205 MILL ST
RENO NV 89502
15t27 EST
MGMCOMP
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GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL
RUSSELL J. GALLIAN
Attorney for Defendant Heart Marketing and Development, Inc.,
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET
P.O. BOX 1339
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 8 4770
(801) 628-1682
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE
CRANE, Husband and wife,
ANSWER
Plaintiffs,
vs,
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a Utah
Limited Partnership; HEART
MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah Corporation, in its
capacity as general partner of
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.;
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., a Utah
Corporation; and DIXIE TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,

Civil No. SS- <£ $ /

Defendants.
COMES NOW the Defendant Heart Marketing and Development, Inc.,
by and through its attorney, Russell J. Gallian, and hereby answers
Plaintifffs Complaint on file herein as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff's Complaint

fails to state a cause of action upon

which relief may be granted.
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SECOND DEFENSE
Defendant admits and denies as follows:
1.

Admits Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.

2.

Defendant denies Paragraph 8.

3.

Defendant

refused

to

convey

admits
to

so

much

Plaintiffs

of

Paragraph

9

that

real

property,

but

it

has

denies

the

remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 9.
4.

Defendant denies Paragraphs 10 and 11.

5.

Defendant

Heart

Marketing

and

Development,

Inc.,

is

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of Paragraphs 12 through 22, so denies the same.
THIRD DEFENSE
6.

Defendant incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 5, and makes

the same a part hereof by reference.
7.

Defendant Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., has not

consummated the deal with Plaintiffs inasmuch as Plaintiffs changed
the

terms

of

the

counteroffer

by

Development,

Inc.,

Plaintiffs

before

deal

such

that

Plaintiffs.
thereafter
the

the

new

Defendant
withdrew

Plaintiffs

terms
Heart

its

accepted

constituted
Marketing

original

and

offer

Defendants1

a

to

original

offer.
8.

Defendant

Heart

Marketing

thereafter advised Dixie Title Company

and

Development,

Inc.,

that their offer had been

withdrawn and not to accept Plaintiffs' acceptance of the offer.
9.

Defendant gave notice to Plaintiff that it was withdrawing

the offer, which notice was given before Plaintiffs accepted the

n««

(V)1

offer.
WHEREFORE, Defendant

Heart

Marketing

and

Development,

Inc.,

prays the Court as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein be dismissed and

they take nothing;
2.
recover

That
its

Defendant

costs

and

Heart

Marketing

disbursements

and

incurred

Development,
herein,

Inc.,

including

reasonable attorney's fees;
4.

That Defendant Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., be

granted such other and further relief as may appear just and proper
in the circumstances.
DATED this Z V

day of July, 1985.
GMtfTlAtf, DRAKE & WESTFALL

Russell J. Gallian

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was mailed, postage prepaid this

^

o "- day of July, 1985,

to Counsel for Plaintiff, to wit;
Willard R. Bishop, Esq.
P. 0. Box 279
36 North 300 West
Cedar City, Utah 84720 h
//

ecretary
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GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL
RUSSELL J. GALLIAN
Attorney for Defendant Timberbrook Village, Ltd.,
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET
P.O. BOX 1339
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 8 4770
(801) 628-1682

I

^

r
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE
CRANE, Husband and wife,
ANSWER
Plaintiffs,
vs,
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a Utah
Limited Partnership; HEART
MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah Corporation, in its
capacity as general partner of
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.;
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., a Utah
Corporation; and DIXIE TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,

Civil No.

Defendants.
COMES
through

NOW

its

the

Defendant

attorney,

Russell

Timberbrook
J.

Village,

Gallian,

and

Ltd.,
hereby

by

and

answers

Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff's Complaint

fails to state a cause of action upon

which relief may be granted.
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SECOND DEFENSE
Defendant admits and denies as follows:
1.

Admits Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.

2.

Defendant denies Paragraph 8.

3.

Defendant

refused

to

convey

admits
to

so

much

Plaintiffs

of

Paragraph

9

that

real

property,

but

it

has

denies

the

remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 9.

or

4.

Defendant denies Paragraphs 10 and 11.

5.

Defendant Timberbrook Village, Ltd*, is without knowledge

information

sufficient

to

form

a belief

as

to

the

truth

of

Paragraphs 12 through 22, so denies the same.
THIRD DEFENSE
6.

Defendant incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 5, and makes

the same a part hereof by reference.
7.

Defendant Timberbrook Village, Ltd., has not consummated

the deal with Plaintiffs inasmuch as Plaintiffs changed the terms of
the deal

such

Plaintiffs.
withdrew

that

the

Defendant

its original

new

terms

Timberbrook
offer

to

constituted
Village,

Plaintiffs

a counteroffer
Ltd.,

before

the

by

thereafter
Plaintiffs

accepted Defendants' original offer.
8.

Defendant

Timberbrook

Village, Ltd., thereafter

advised

Dixie Title Company that it was withdrawing its offer to Plaintiffs
and not to accept Plaintiffs' acceptance of the offer.
9.

Defendant gave notice to Plaintiff that it was withdrawing

the offer, which notice was given before Plaintiffs accepted

the

offer.
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WHEREFORE, Defendant Timberbrook Village, Ltd., prays the Court
as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein be dismissed and

they take nothing;
2.
costs

That
and

Defendant

disbursements

Timberbrook
incurred

Village,
herein,

Ltd.,

including

recover

its

reasonable

attorney's fees;
4.
other

and

That Defendant Timberbrook Village, Ltd., , be granted such
further

relief

as may

appear

just

and

proper

in

the

circumstances.
DATED this

}^J

day of July, 1985.
GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was mailed, postage prepaid this

X>J ~

day of July, 1985,

to Counsel for Plaintiff, to wit;
Willard R. Bishop, Esq.
P. 0. Box 279
36 North 300 West
Cedar City, Utah 84720 '

^Secretary
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GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL
RUSSELL J. GALLIAN
Attorney for Defendant Dixie Title Company
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET
P.O. BOX 1339
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770
(801) 628-1682
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE
CRANE, Husband and wife,
ANSWER
Plaintiffs,
vs.
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a Utah
Limited Partnership; HEART
MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah Corporation, in its
capacity as general partner of
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.;
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., a Utah
Corporation; and DIXIE TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,

Civil No.

Defendants.
COMES NOW the Defendant Dixie Title Company, by and through its
attorney,

Russell

J.

Gallian,

and

hereby

answers

Plaintifffs

Complaint on file herein as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon
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relief may be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Defendant admits and denies as follows:
1.

Admits Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

2.

Defendant is without knowledge or information

sufficient

to form a belief as to the truths of Paragraphs 5 through 17, so
denies the same.
3.

Defendant

admits

and

denies

as

set

forth

above

in

reference to Paragraph 18.
4.

Defendant admits Paragraphs 19 and 20.

5.

Defendant admits Paragraph 21 inasmuch as the terms of the

escrow have not been made, and Dixie Title Company has no authority
to close escrow.
6.

Defendant

Dixie

Title

Company

is without

knowledge

or

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of Paragraph
22, so denies the same.

Dixie Title Company further states that it

is a neutral escrow agent and is willing to follow the terms of the
escrow agreement when all the conditions prior to closing of escrow
are fulfilled.
THIRD DEFENSE
7.

Defendant incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 6, and makes

the same a part hereof by reference.
8.

Defendant Dixie Title Company is a neutral escrow agent

which has no authority to act until all parties involved

in this

transaction have either completed all items necessary before closing
can

occur,

or

until

the

parties

are

094

all

agreeable

as

to

this

transaction, or until an order of the Court is entered instructing
Dixie Title Company on how to fulfill its obligations as to this
transaction.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Dixie Title Company

prays the Court as

follows:
1.

That Plaintiff1s Complaint on file herein be dismissed and

he take nothing;
2.

That

the

Court

Order

that

Dixie

Title

Company

not

be

further involved in this lawsuit until a determination is made by
the parties, or the Court, as to what Dixie Title Company should do
in regards to this transaction;
3.

That Defendant Dixie Title Company recover its costs and

disbursements incurred herein, including reasonable attorney's fees;
4.
and

That Defendant Dixie Title Company be granted such other

further

relief

as

may

appear

just

and

proper

circumstances.
DATED this

/,Jf

day of July, 1985.
GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was mailed, postage prepaid this

day of July, 1985,

to Counsel for Plaintiff, to wit;
Willard R. Bishopf Esq,
P. 0. Box 279
36 North 300 West
Cedar City, Utah 84720

ecretary

_j
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GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL
RUSSELL J. GALLIAN
Attorney for Defendant Leisure Sports, Inc.,
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET
P.O. BOX 1339
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770
(801) 628-1682
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE
CRANE, Husband and wife,
)
Plaintiffs,

ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIM

vs.
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a Utah
Limited Partnership; HEART
MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah Corporation, in its
capacity as general partner of
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.;
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., a Utah
Corporation; and DIXIE TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,

)
)
)
)

Civil No. S3

Jl 81

Defendants.
COMES NOW the Defendant Leisure Sports, Inc., by and through
its attorney, Russell J. Gallian, and hereby

answers

Plaintiff's

Complaint on file herein as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon

007

relief may be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Defendant admits and denies as follows:

pay

1.

Admits Paragraphs 1, 2, 3f 4, 5, 6, and 7.

2.

Defendant denies Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, and 11.

3.

Defendant admits Paragraph 12.

4.

Defendant denies Paragraphs 13.

5.

Defendant admits that Leisure Sports, Inc., has failed to

Plaintiffs

the

sum of

$175,000.00, but denies

the

remaining

allegations contained in Paragraph 14.
6.

Defendant denies Paragraph 15, 16, and 17.

7.

Defendant

admits

and

denies

as

set

forth

above

in

reference to Paragraph 18.
8.

Defendant admits Paragraph 19.

9.

Defendant Leisure Sports, Inc., is without knowledge or

information

sufficient

to

form

a

belief

as

to

the

truth

of

Paragraphs 20 through 22, so denies the same.
THIRD DEFENSE
10.

Defendant incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 9, and makes

the same a part hereof by reference.
11.

Defendant Leisure Sports, Inc., has not consummated

the

deal with Plaintiffs inasmuch as Plaintiffs changed the terms of the
deal such that the new terms in effect constituted a counteroffer by
Plaintiffs.
original

Defendant Leisure Sports, Inc., thereafter withdrew its

offer

to

Plaintiffs

before

the

Plaintiffs

accepted

Defendants1 original offer.
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12.

Defendant Leisure Sports, Inc., thereafter advised Dixie

Title Company that their offer had been withdrawn and not to accept
Plaintiffs1 acceptance of the offer.
COUNTERCLAIM
13•

Defendant incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 12, and makes

the same a part hereof by reference.
14.

Defendant/Counterclaim

Plaintiff

Leisure

Sports,

Inc.,

(hereinafter "Leisure Sports") borrowed money to pay Clifford Crane.
These moneys were place into escrow with Dixie Title Company.
15.

Because the Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants Clifford G.

Crane and Bonnie Crane

(hereinafter

"the Cranes") did not accept

Leisure Sports1 offer, and counteroffered, Leisure Sports withdrew
their original offer.
16.

The Cranes have initiated a claim against Leisure Sports'

funds in escrow, and because of such wrongful claim, Leisure Sports
has been denied the use of these funds.
17.

Leisure Sports has been damaged thereby in the amount of

ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($100,000.00), or such amount as may be
proved in Court.
WHEREFORE,

Defendant

Leisure

Sports,

Inc., prays

the

Court

as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein be dismissed and

they take nothing;
2.

That

Defendant/Counterclaim

Plaintiff

Leisure

Sports,

Inc., recover $100,000.00, or such amount as is proved at trial, for
damages as per its Counterclaim;
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3.

That

Defendant/Counterclaim

Plaintiff

Leisure

Sports,

Inc., recover its costs and disbursements incurred herein, including
reasonable attorney's fees;
4.

That

Defendant/Counterclaim

Plaintiff

Leisure

Sports,

Inc., be granted such other and further relief as may appear just
and proper in the circumstances.
DATED this

jJp~day

of July, 1985.
GALLIAtf, £>RAKE & WESTFALL

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was mailed, postage prepaid this /\S

*- day of July, 1985,

to Counsel for Plaintiff, to wit;
Willard R. Bishop, Esq.
P. 0. Box 279
36 North 300 West
Cedar City, Utah 84720

V 7 IKQ^L^^/

/Secretary

100
-4-

V

)9A^>

WILLARD R. BISHOP
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C.
Attorney for
Plaintiffs
P . 0 . Box 279
C e d a r C i t y , UT 847 20
Telephone:
(801) 5 8 6 - 9 4 8 3
IN

THE

PIPTH

f ±Or
^

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
I K II I l l

'FORD G. CRANr und BONNIE]
~*
h i r i h a r * 1 n~U w i f e .
P] a i i i t I f f s ,
rPTT.Y TO' COUNTERCLAIM

vs.
lIMBERBRO..i.

\ iJL.JLrMjJ.,

Utah Limited Partnership;
HEART MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT,
INC., a Utah Corporation, In
its capacity as general partner
Of TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD. ;
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., a Utah
Corporation; and DIXIE TITLE
COMPANY; a Utah Corporation,

Civil

No.

85-261

Defendants.
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3.

Answering paragraph 14, Plaintiffs admit the same upon

information and belief, but reserve the right to withdraw said
admission in the event that discovery proves the facts to be
otherwise

then as asserted

paragraph 14.

by Leisure Sports, Inc., in said

Plaintiffs assert upon information and belief that

the money was borrowed in connection with a much larger loan, for
other purposes.
4.

The

allegations

contained

in

paragraph

15

of

the

Counterclaim are denied.
5.

Answering paragraph 16, Plaintiffs admit that they have

initiated a claim against the sum of $17 5,000 held in escrow by
Dixie Title Company by reason of Leisure Sports1 failure to pay
said funds when due, but deny all other allegations contained in
paragraph 16.
6.

The

allegations

contained

in

paragraph

17

of

the

Counterclaim are denied.
THIRD DEFENSE
7.

As an affirmative defense, Plaintiffs assert the matters

set forth in their Complaint on file herein.
FOURTH DEFENSE
8.

The damages alleged by Leisure Sports, if any, have been

caused by Leisure Sports or third parties, and not by these
Plaintiffs.
FIFTH DEFENSE
9.

In

the

damages, which

event

that

Leisure

Sports has

suffered

any

Plaintiffs deny, Leisure Sports has failed to

mitigate its damages.
_2_
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SIXTH DEFENSE
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One
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of GALLIAN,

DRAKE
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South Main Street, P. 0. Box 133
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first

c l a s s mail,

postage fully

prepaid t h i s .. fy"

day of

August, 1985.

'/.., (... Ji{MtfMiu/&um-J«t

104
~4~

078

,

OCT .y, ^

WILLARD R. BISHOP
#03 44
BISHOP & RONNOW, P . C .
Attorney for
Plaintiffs
P . 0 . Box 279
C e d a r C i t y , U'.
. . .
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 ] x :; ->•- 9 4 8 3
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COURT
STATE 01
CLIFFORD G. CRANE a n d BONNII
C R A N! F i h lj r ba r: o a r\ c' r.-7 A * (

PRETRIAL ORDER
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Utah Limited Partnership;
HEART MARKETING and DEVELOPMENT, INC, , a Utah Corporation, in its capacity as
general partner cf TTMBERBRC ":VILLAGE, LTD. ; LEISURE SPORTb,
INC., a Utah Corporation; and
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,

Civil No. 85-281

Defendants.
This
(
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matter
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2.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE were admitted

by all parties

present, and were found to be proper by the Court.
3.

GENERAL NATURE OF THE CASE AND CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES;

Claims of the parties are generally as follows:
A.

CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFF;
(1)

In its First Cause of Action, Plaintiffs claim

to have entered into a certain "Agreement for Sale of
Limited

Partnership

Interest"

with

Timberbrook

Village, Ltd., by the terms of which Plaintiffs sold
a five percent (5%) interest in Timberbrook Village,
Ltd., to the partnership in return for a conveyance
to Unit 201, Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums.
Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to specific
performance

and

to

receive

a

conveyance

of

the

condominium from Timberbrook Village, Ltd., and Heart
Marketing and Development, Inc., its general partner.
Failing

specific

performance,

Plaintiffs

claim

damages in the amount of $150,000, and claim that
defenses raised by Timberbrook Village, Ltd., and/or
Heart

Marketing

Plaintiffs

to

and

Development,

reasonable

attorney

Inc.,
fees

entitle

under

the

provisions of U.C.A. 78-27-56 (1953, as amended).
(2)

In their Second Cause of Action, Plaintiffs

claim that they entered into a certain "Agreement for
Sale of Limited Partnership Interest" with Leisure
Sports, Inc., by the terms of which Plaintiffs were
to sell Leisure Sports a twenty percent (20%) limited
-2-
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fees if any defenses are asserted in bad faith, and
other relief.

Responding thereto, Defendants Dixie

Title has interpled, indicating its intention to be
bound by the Court's orders.
CLAIMS OF . CQUNTERC^AIMANT, LEISURE,..SPORTS., INC., , are
as follows:
Sports

In its Counterclaim, Defendant Leisure

claims

that

it

borrowed

money

to

pay

Plaintiffs, that said monies were placed in escrow
with

Dixie

withdrew
initiated

its
a

Title
offer
claim

Company,
to

that

Cranes,

against

the

Leisure

that
money

Sports

Cranes

have

in escrow,

wrongfully, and that Leisure Sports has thereby been
damaged in the amount to be proven.

Plaintiffs Crane

have replied to the Counterclaim, have asserted that
the Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, have admitted upon information
that Leisure Sports borrowed money to pay Plaintiffs
and that said monies were placed into escrow with
Dixie Title Company, but have denied the allegation
that they did not accept the offer, have denied that
they counteroffered, and have denied
Sports withdrew its original offer.

that Leisure

Plaintiffs admit

they have initiated a claim against the funds held by
Dixie Title Company, but have otherwise denied the
allegations

contained

in

the

Counterclaim.

As

affirmative defenses, Plaintiffs asserted the matters
set forth in their Complaint, have claimed that any
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in

documents to the Plaintiffs, executed by certain of
the Defendants, calling for Plaintiffs1 signatures.
These documents were included in a cover letter dated
on or about November 13, 1984, by Russell J. Gallian.
The discussions proceeding Mr. Gallian1s November 13,
1984, letter included a representation by Mr. Gallian
that

Mr.

Gallian

would

substitute

himself

on

Plaintiffs' loans as a condition to any agreement.
The

documentation

mailed

to

Plaintiffs

did

not

include the provision concerning

the release from

Plaintiffs1

Savings and Loan

guaranty

to Nebraska

Association.
On or about November 20, 1984, Russell J. Gallian
executed

a

document

entitled

"Substitution

of

Guarantor", the original of which was retained by
Nebraska

Savings

and

Loan

Association,

and

was

countersigned by its Vice President, simultaneously
with Gallian1s signature.
On January 16th and 17th of 1985, Willard R. Bishop
wrote

two

Defendants

demands

Timberbrook

Development,
returns

and

seeking

Plaintiffs1

at

and
the

a complete

Heart

financial

accounting

request

to

Marketing

and

records,

tax

of

Timberbrook

Village, Ltd,
Concurrently,
attorney, one
Gallian

on

Plaintiffs had retained a California
Dean
behalf

~6~

Mixon, to contact Mr. Russell
of

Plaintiffs
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regarding
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Gallian's second letter, also

dated February 11th, 1985, was sent to Plaintiffs1
Utah
K

attorney,

Mr. Willard

Bishop.

-ffhio—letter

-explaino—that—the—Plaintiffs were—g4r^en full—acccoo

v\iwto/thc beeks and records of the partnership,—and tha£
\\\/ -/jailiran—was—awaiting—documents—in—kke—possession—ef
* / -Pl-aint-if f s—to —be—placed—in—escrow—at—Dixie—¥-itlc
Compa-ny.

This

letter

was

California attorney, Mixon.

copied

to

Plaintiffs1

Attorney Bishop had no

prior knowledge of the November 13, 1984 documents or
of Mr. Mixon1s involvement.

Gallian assumed that Mr.

Bishop was aware of the negotiations with Mixon prior
to February 13, 1985.
Q.

On February 12th, 1986, the Plaintiffs, through their
Utah attorney, Willard R. Bishop, filed suit in the
Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County,
Civil No. 85-066 seeking, through judicial means, an
accounting on Timberbrook Village, Ltd.

On the 13th

day of February, Mr. Barry Church, an officer of
Heart Marketing, Timberbrook1s general partner, and a
signatore to Defendants1

offers in this case, was

served the summons and complaint in that lawsuit.
R.

One day after

that lawsuit was served, Civil No.

85-066, and the same day that Mr. Church received
service of process, February 13, 1985, Mr. Bishop
received the letter directed to him from Mr. Gallian
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February
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f 11:,

18th, 1985 f and

instructed

Mr.

transaction
from

"as

Nebraska

written

Westbrook
soon

that

he

could

as...[Westbrook

Savings

affirmation

and

Loan

of

'substitution of guarantor 1

the

close

had]

received

Association
validity

the

their

of

the

document along with their

warranty that Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane have
no

obligations

whatsoever

to

Nebraska

Savings

and

Loan Association, either jointly or severally, either
actual

or

contingent".

Mixon's letter

concluded

as

follows:
There are three conditions to closing from our side:
1)
Your mailing to me by registered mail, the
original of the above referenced affirmation and
warranty by Nebraska Savings and Loan Association;
2)
Your mailing to me by certified mail, a fully
executed warranty deed to Unit 210, Building 1, of
Timberbrook Condominiuns;
3)
Your disbursing by wire transfer, the sum of
$175,000 into my clients 1 account at Home Savings of
America, 179 North Tustin, Orange, California 92667,
account no. 125-900624-3.
Lastly, Mixon added the following language:
If the above-referenced closing does not occur by
Friday, March 8th, 1985, you are instructed to return
all documents to me and to terminate the escrow.
If
you have any question or comment, please do not
hesitate to call.
V.

On the morning
Crane
Loan,
office

of February

called Gallian's
Dixie

Title

again.
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that,

22nd, 1985, Mr.
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Defendant Dixie Title Company still holds in escrow
the

$175,000

deposited

therein,

through

a

trust

account at Gallian/ Drake & Westfallf in an interest
bearing

account,

Sports, Inc.
letter

paying

the

interest

to

Leisure

Said title company also holds Mixon's

dated

February

18,

1985,

the

enclosures

therewith, and the three mailgrams.
5.

ISSUES ...QF..FACT.. AND. £AW and any implicit in the foregoing

paragraphs, remain for trial as set forth below.

Plaintiffs view

the issues of fact and law as follows:
A.

Was an agreement reached between the parties prior to
November 13, 1984, which the subsequent documents
only serve to memorialize?

B.

If the signed documents mailed to Plaintiffs on or
about November 13, 1984, did not merely memorialize
an

existing

agreement,

and

if

they

constituted

"offers" as such term is legally defined, were such
offers accepted by Plaintiffs, and if so, when?
C.

Did the February 18, 1985 letter from Dean Mixon to
Dixie

Title

anticipated

Company,

contain

by the agreement

"conditions"

not

between the parties,

thus creating a counteroffer?
D.

Who was the cause, and what were the reasons for, the
delays

which

resulted

documentation on

in

February

Plaintiffs

signing

the

13, 1985, although such

documentation was mailed to them during the latter
part of November, 1984?
-12-

When did Dixie Title Company

receive Dean Mixon's

letter of February 18, 1985?
Did Russell J. Gallian ever communicate to either
Plaintiff, or to Dean Mixon, any withdrawal of the
documentation mailed on November 13f 1985, and if so,
did such withdrawal occur on or after February 22,
1985, and exactly when?
Did Russell J. Gallian communicate rejection of the
purported

"conditions"

contained

in

Mr.

Mixon's

February 18, 1985 letter, to Mr. Crane and/or Mr.
Mixon, and if so, when?
If

enforceable

contracts

exists,

have

Plaintiffs

suffered any damages, and if so, in what amount?
Have Plaintiffs acted

tortiously

in bringing this

suit?
If Plaintiffs acted tortiously in bringing this suit,
has Defendant

Leisure

Sports,

Inc., suffered

any

damages, and if so, in what amount?
Were any claims or defenses raised in bad faith in
this action, and if so, which?
If any party is entitled to an award of attorney fees
in this action, what is the amount of such reasonable
fees?
Did Dixie Title Company wrongfully fail and refuse to
deliver

money

and

documents

to

demand?

-13-
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Plaintiffs

upon

N.

Do

Plaintiffs

have

any

enforceable

Timberbrook Village, Ltd.f
Inc. ,

contract

or with Leisure Sports,

for

the

conveyance

of

Plaintiffs,

and

if

Timberbrook

so,

with

is

a

condominium

to

Village's

general partner also liable on such contract?
0.

If

Plaintiffs

have

Timberbrook Villager

an

enforceable

Leisure

condominium,

Sports,

are

with

Ltd., and Heart Marketing and

Development, Inc., as its general
with

contract

Inc.,

Plaintiffs

partner, and/or
concerning

entitled

to

the

specific

performance and to conveyance of the condominium, or
are Plaintiffs limited to an award of damages?
P.

Do

Plaintiffs

have

an

enforceable

contract

with

Leisure Sports, Inc.?
Q.

If so, are Plaintiffs entitled to delivery of the sum
of $175,000 from Defendant Dixie Title Company, plus
any reasonably forseeable consequential damages?

R.

Are Plaintiffs entitled to judgment against Defendant
Dixie Title Company, and if so, in what amount and
what form should the judgment take?

S.

Is Leisure Sports, Inc., entitled to judgment against
Plaintiffs based upon tortiously bringing this suit,
and if so, in what amount?

T.

Is any

party

attorney

fees

entitled
under

to an award
U.C.A.

of

78-27-56

reasonable
(1953,

amended)?
Defendants view the issues of law and fact as follows:
-14-
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as

(1) Did

the

Plaintiffs,

diligently

seeking

discharge

their

specific

performance,

duties; are

their

hands

clean?
(2) Was the Plaintiffs' tender, by cover letter of Dean
Mixon

dated

February

18,

1985,

an

unconditional

acceptance of Defendants' offers?
(3) Was

Defendants'

letter

of

tender,

Mixon

together

dated

with

February

18,

the

cover

1985,

a

conditional acceptance and by its essence a rejection
of Defendants1 offers?
(4) If

the

Defendants'

offers

were

rejected,

could

Plaintiffs reinstate their acceptance by subsequently
unilaterally waiving their conditional acceptance?
(5) Do the offers initially mailed by Defendants' or the
Plaintiffs' waiver(s) violate the statute of frauds?
(6) Can an offer, once rejected, be unilaterally revived
by the offeree without

the express consent

of

the

understanding

of

offeror?
(7) What

was

Plaintiffs

the
in

intent
executing

and/or

Defendants'

proposals

on

February 13th, 1985; was there a material difference
between their understanding and the actual terms of
the written proposal?
(8) Did the Plaintiffs filing a lawsuit for an accounting
and their proceeding with said lawsuit, constitute an
implied rejection of Defendants1 offers?

-15-

119
198

6

*

.EXHIBITS were marked, i d e n t i f i e d , offered and received as

follows:
EXHIBIT
->flff.T,.^

JTEM

OFFERED, gy

RECEIVED

Letter from Russell J. Gallian
to Clifford G. Crane, dated
November 13, 1984,
Enclosures to Mr. Gallian1s
letter to Mr. Crane of November
13, 1984, including agreements
for sale of limited partnership
interest, unsigned by Plaintiffs,
together with exhibits attached
thereto, unsigned by Plaintiffs.
Letter from Willard R. Bishop
to Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., dated January 16,
1985.
Letter from Willard R. Bishop
to Barry Church, President of
Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., dated January 17,
1985.
"Substitution of Guarantor11,
dated November 20, 1984,
executed by D. E. Crouch and
Russell J. Gallian.
Letter dated February 6, 1985,
from Willard R. Bishop to
Russell J. Gallian.
Letter dated February 11, 1985,
from Russell J. Gallian to Dean
Mixon.
Letter dated February 11, 1985,
from Russell J. Gallian to
Willard R. Bishop.
Letter from Willard R. Bishop
to Russell J. Gallian, dated
February 18, 1985.
Letter from Dean Mixon to
Douglas Westbrook of Dixie
Title Company, dated February
18, 1985.
-16-
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Enclosures to Dean Mixon's
letter to Douglas Westbrook of
February 18, 1985, including
agreements for sale of limited
partnership interst signed by
Plaintiffs, together with
exhibits which were attached
thereto, and were signed by
Plaintiffs.
Envelope postmarked February
21, 1986, which contained Mr*
Mixon's letter dated February
18, 1985, and enclosures.
Mailgram dated February 22,
1985, to Doug Westbrook over
name of Clifford G. Crane.
Mailgram dated February 27,
1985, to Doug Westbrook, over
name of Clifford G. Crane.
Mailgram dated March 7, 1985,
to Doug Westbrook of Dixie
Title Company, over name of
Kleinfeld and Mixon.
Limited Partnership Agreement
of Timberbrook Village, Ltd.
Guaranty made by Plaintiffs
to Nebraska Savings and Loan
Association.
Guaranty of completion made
by Plaintiffs in favor of
Nebraska Savings and Loan
Association.
Exhibits were returned to the party offering the same, to be
made available by that party at the time of trial.

If other

exhibits are to be offered and the necessity of the same can be
reasonably anticipated, copies of such additional exhibits shall
be submitted to opposing counsel prior to trial.

:^A

The parties stipulated that the Court could take judicial
notice

of

all

filings

in

the

case of

Crane v.

Timberbrook

ymagfe, kt.d^.. e.t...al, bearing Civil No. 85-066, in the Fifth
Judicial District Court of Iron County, State of Utah, and of all
filings

in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County,

State of Utah in the case of Conrad,.JK9.n1.ng„,..ajicL.Amy^JKonARg„„ys>
LeJLsLVure ,.SP9Xts./ Ins....r....et;„al/ bearing Civil No. 86-024
?•

HJ.TMSSJiS s

At trial, the following witnesses may be

called:
HME^Qg. WIT-BBSS

^ARTX^q^^^.^T^ElSff

Clifford G. Crane

Plaintiffs

Dean Mixon

Plaintiffs

Doug Westbrook

Plaintiffs/Defendants

Russell J. Gallian

Defendants

Barry Church

Defendants

Mark Griffin

Defendants

Russ Turner

Defendants

Bonnie Crane

Defendants

The witnesses named above who are parties, or officers or
employees of parties shall appear to testify at the time of trial
without the necessity of issuing and serving Subpoenas.

In the

event that other witnesses are to be called at trial, a statement
of the names and addresses of such witnesses and of the general
subject matter of their testimony will be delivered to opposing
counsel prior to trial.
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THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER
Michael D. Hughes #1572
Attorney for Defendants
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: 801/67 3-4 892

fos.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE
CRANE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HEART MARKETING and DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah corporation, in its capacity as
general partner of TIMBERBROOK
VILLAGE, LTD.: LEISURE SPORTS,
INC., a Utah corporation; and
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendants.

Civil No. 85-281

COME NOW the Defendants above-named, and by and
through

their attorney

of record, Michael D. Hughes, and

hereby move the Court for a summary judgment.

A memorandum

in support of this motion is attached an exhibit hereto.
DATED this 20th day of January, 1987.

/^r^C/< ^^fT>< .'

AEL D. HUGH&S-l^ ^
MICHAEL
rney for Defendants
Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and accurate
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, postage
prepaid, to Willard R. Bishop, Attorney for Plaintiffs, P.
0.

Box

279, Cedar

City,

Utah

84720,

this c91 *° 'day

January, 1987.

'J'/imflk')
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THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER
Michael D. Hughes #1572
Attorney for Defendants
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: 801/673-48 92
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE
CRANE, husband and wife,
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD,, a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HEART MARKETING and DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah corporation, in its capacity as
general partner of TIMBERBROOK
VILLAGE, LTD.: LEISURE SPORTS,
INC., a Utah corporation; and
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendants.
For purposes of

Civil No. 85-281
this Memorandum,

the Defendants

factual recitation will be brief but sufficient for accurate
judicial analysis of the real issue presented to the Court.
FACTS
The

Defendants,

Clifford

G.

Crane

and

Bonnie

Crane, residents of California, are owners of a twenty-five
percent
Village,

(25%) interest as limited partners
Ltd.,

"Timberbrook."

a

Utah

limited

In November of

in Timberbrook

partnership,

hereinafter

1984, Timberbrook,

125

through

its general partner, Heart Market and Developing, Inc., a
Utah

corporation,

sought

the

purchase

of

the

Cranes'

interest by a cover letter dated November 13th, 1984 over
the

signature

of

Russell

purchase offers.

J.

Gallian,

and

enclosing

two

The cover letter and offers are attached
lf f ,

hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibits

2 ' , "3",

and "4", having been xeroxed from the deposition of Clifford
Mr. Gallian1s letter, Exhibit "2" herein, requested

Crane.

that the Cranes

contact Barry Church, president of Heart

Marketing, in the event that they had any questions about
the

documents.

As

additional

consideration

for

these

transactions, however, Mr. Gallian personally guaranteed the
Cranes that Mr. Crane would be released from any liability
as

a

guarantor

on

two

construction

loans

Savings and Loan on the Timberbrook project.
of

Clifford

Crane,

hereinafter

from

Nebraska

See deposition

"C.C."

at

pp

13-14.

Accordingly, on the 20th day of November, 1984, Russell J.
Gallian

personally

guarantor

for

and

substituted
on behalf

himself

of

as

a

substitute

the Cranes with

Nebraska

Savings and Loan Association; the latter Association having
countersigned
president,

Mr.

said

document

Dewey

by

Crouch.

and
This

through

its

document

vice

was

not

immediately sent to Mr. Crane.
On February

11th,

1985, having

not

received

an

acceptance of the original offers made to the Cranes, Mr.
Gallian, by cover letter, mailed a copy of the substitution
of guarantor to the Cranes1 California attorney, Mr. Dean

Mixon.

Exhibit "9".

signature

that

the

This letter certified over Gallian's
substitution

of

guarantor

executed by himself and Mr. Dewey Crouch,

had

been

See Exhibits "9"

and "10".
On February 13th, both Plaintiffs testified under
oath that they executed Exhibits "2" and "3" as heretofore
set forth, although Mrs, Crane when deposed indicated that
she

had

no

opinion

whatsoever

whether

Exhibit

"10" was

acceptable consideration for substituting out her husband as
a guarantor on the loans to Nebraska Savings and Loan,
deposition

of Bonnie Crane, hereinafter

"B.C."

See

at p. 21.

Indeed, Mrs. Crane indicated that if, after February 13th,
her husband changed his mind

then her mind would also be

changed

in reference to accepting Mr. Gallian's proposal.

Id. at

26. Regardless, however, the acceptances were

sent

back

to

escrow,

but

rather

were

delivered

to

not
the

offices of Plaintiffs1 California attorney, Mr. Dean Mixon.
On the 18th day of February, 1985, Mixon drafted a
letter to Mr. Douglas Westbrook as the principal of Dixie
Title Company.
executed

by

This letter included Exhibits "2" and "3" as

the

Cranes,

together

with

the

copy

of

the

substitution of guarantor dated November 20th, 1984, earlier
enclosed to Mixon by Mr. Gallian's letter of February, 11th,
1985.

See Exhibit "12"; compare Exhibits "9" and "10". Mr.

Crane conceded

at his deposition

that Mr. Mixon 1 s

letter

enclosed Exhibit "10": Gallian's substitution dated November
20th,

1984.

Mixon 1 s

letter,

however,
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did

not

unconditionally
proposed

by

accept

Gallian,

Exhibits
though

in

"2",
May

"3"

of

and

1986,

"10"
Mr*

testified that Exhibit "10" was acceptable to him.

as

Crane

Both of

the Plaintiffs1 agent, Mr. Mixon, indicated otherwise.

See

"C.C"

the

at

p.

34;

compare

Exhibit

"12".

Indeed,

in

transmittal to Douglas Westbrook, the Plaintiffs1 acceptance
of Defendants1

offers was conditioned upon three factors.

This Memorandum, however, need only discuss one.
In his second paragraph, Mr. Mixon as Plaintiffs1
agent

was

apparently

unverified
Gallian,
Westbrook

Exhibit
and

with

"10" previously

that

may

unhappy

letter

close

only

non-existent document.

the
mailed

succinctly
upon

the

unnotarized
to

him

proposes
receipt

of

and

by Mr.

that
a

Mr.

third,

Mr. Mixon's words are as follows:

You may proceed to close the transaction referred
to in Mr. Gallian1s February 11th, 1985, letter to me,
copy enclosed, as soon as you have received from
Nebraska Savings and Loan Association their written
affirmation of the validity of the "substitution of
guarantor1 document along with their warranty that
Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane have no obligations
whatsoever to Nebraska Savings and Loan Association,
either
jointly
or
severally,
either
actual
or
contingent.
Mr. Mixon again conditioned closing on behalf of the Cranes
by

requiring

affirmation

"the

and

original

warranty

Association . . . "

by

of

the

Nebraska

above-referenced
Savings

&

Loan

Clifford Crane admits that the closing

was conditional upon all three conditions (See C.C. at p.37;
8-10).

Ultimately,

Crane

further

admitted

his

lawyer's

letter required different documents than the Exhibit "10"

wofi^/RG-flqfis

A
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previously provided by Gallian and thought by Gallian to be
a sufficient substitution as per the parties1 agreement.
pages

43

and

44

of

Clifford

Crane's

deposition,

On
the

questions and answers proceed as follows:
Question: Would you read the text around that
letter [Exhibit "12"] and not where it says the
conditions and the original of the above-referenced
affirmation, but where
he
speaks
of what
that
affirmation is? Read that to yourself.
Answer:

1 read it.

Question: Doesn't that speak about Nebraska
Savings and Loan providing you a document affirming the
validity of Exhibit "10", and further stating from
Nebraska Savings and Loan that you and your wife have
no further obligation to them?
Answer:

Yeah.

That's what it says, doesn't it.

Question: And is that not a separate document
from the Exhibit "10" that was already enclosed
Mixon?
Answer:

by

Apparently, from what I see.

Not only is it apparent, but it is clear that Mr. Mixon's
cover letter on behalf of the Plaintiffs desired a separate
verification of the authenticity of Exhibit "10" with this
separate
Mixon's

document
cover

being

letter

countersigned

conveyed

no

by

the

authority

to

bank.

Mr.

close

the

transaction without this additional affirmation in his file.
On

the

22nd

day

of

February

individually

at

8:57

in

the

morning, Clifford

Crane

called Mr. Gallian's

office directly.

This time, by reason of several factors,

Gallian indicated that the buyers were no longer interested
in

pursuing

interest

the

purchase

in the limited

wn6?/R6-aQ6R

of

Mr.

and

partnership.
^

Mrs. Crane's

joint

Subsequently, Crane
100

phoned

Nebraska

Savings

and

Loan

and

received

oral

confirmation that Gallian had indeed executed Exhibit "10"
and that the same was authentic as represented by Gallian.
Crane then sent, at 9:37 in the morning, a mailgram to Doug
Westbrook, over his signature alone, apparently

attempting

unilaterally to withdraw condition Number 1 of Mr. Mixon's
cover letter of February 18th, 1985.
signed by Mrs. Crane.

The mailgram is not

See Exhibit "13".

Five days later,

Mr. Crane attempted to unilaterally withdraw condition No. 2
in

Mr.

Mixon's

cover

letter.

See

Exhibit

"14".

And,

finally, on March 7th, Mr. Mixon attempted to unilaterally
withdraw

all

three

conditions

to

his

cover

letter.

See

Exhibit "15".
ANALYSIS
POINT I
AN ACCEPTANCE WHICH IMPOSES TERMS OR CONDITIONS
NOT PRESENT IN THE OFFER HAS NO VALIDITY
AND CAN ONLY BE RECOGNIZED AS A COUNTEROFFER.
The above-stated rule has been variously set forth
in several jurisdictions in the United States.
in the

1949 Utah

case of Hawaiian

For example,

Equipment Co, v. Imco

Corp. , 115 Utah 590, 207 P. 2d 794, the Utah Supreme Court
stated as follows:
An acceptance which imposes terms or conditions not
present in the offer has no validity and . . . its only
recognition is as a counteroffer.
Three years later in the case of R. J. Daum Construction Co.
v. Child, 247 P. 2d 817, the Utah Supreme Court approvingly
quoted the following language:
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Appellant's proposed written contract was not an
unconditional acceptance of respondent's offer, but was
a rejection and counter-offer.
To create a binding
contract the acceptance must unconditionally agree to
all the material provisions of the offer, and must not
add any new material conditions, but all of the
provisions of an offer need not be expressly stated
therein - some may be implied from the surrounding
circumstances* See Williston on Contracts, pp. 209, 22
to 225 and 227 to 229, Sees. 73, 77 and 78, and
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, pp.65 to 67, Sees.
58, 59 and 60.
Sec. 58 provides:
'Acceptance must be unequivocal in order to create
a contract.f
Sec. 59 provides:
'Except as this rule is qualified by §§45, 63, 72
an acceptance must
comply
exactly with
the
requirements of the offer, omitting nothing from
the promise or performance requested.1
Sec. 60 provides:
'A reply to an offer, though purporting to accept
it,
which
adds
qualifications
or
requires
performance of conditions, is not an acceptance
but is a counter-offer.
'Comment a. A qualified or conditional acceptance
is a statement of an exchange that the person
making it is willing to make, differing from that
proposed by the original offeror. A counter-offer
is a rejection of the original offer (see §38 and
Comment thereon). An acceptance, however, is not
inoperative as such merely because it is expressly
conditional, if the requirement„of the condition
would be implied from the offer, though not
expressed therein.' 247 P.2d 817 at 821.
The thrust of the Hawaiian Equipment, and the Daum
cases have been reiterated in several other opinions, among
them Trautwein v. Leavey, 472 P. 2d 776 (Wyoming 1970), and
Williams v. Espey, 358 P.2d 903 (Utah 1961).
POINT II
The

Plaintiffs

may

not

unilaterally

waive

the

conditions of their counteroffer as subsequently argued and
W 0 6 ? /P£_QQ£c;

subsequently accept the offer based upon Exhibits " 2 " , "3"
and

"10" standing

Coombs
this

preclude
Court

alone; the

lessons

the Plaintiffs

to

enter

learned

by

from prevailing

summary

judgment

on

Alan

and

H.

allow

behalf

of

Defendants•
In the mid-1970s, Mr. and Mrs, Herbert Burton of
St. George sued Alan H. Coombs.
at trial by

the Honorable

Mr. Coombs was represented

Joseph

Jackson.

Burton were represented by David E. West.

Mr. and Mrs.

At the beginning

of trial, Defendants Alan H. Coombs, et al., tendered
offer to settle.
conclusion

of

the

an

Plaintiffs rejected this offer but at the
case

their

counsel, Mr. West, made

a

statement purporting to accept Defendants' offer made before
trial.

Defendants1

counsel,

Joseph

Jackson,

Esq.,

repudiated that acceptance on the grounds that the earlier
rejection terminated responsibilities of Mr. Coombs and the
other Defendants and that the offer had not been renewed.
The

Supreme

Court's

language

regarding

this

issue

is

telling:
It is a well-settled, elementary principle of law
that if the offeree rejects the tendered offer,
obligations of the parties are terminated and neither
can force performance by the other. 17 Am.Jur.2d, Sec.
39 states as follows:
An offer is terminated by rejection and
cannot thereafter be accepted so as to create a
contract.
Having once rejected the offer, the
offeree cannot revive it by tendering acceptance.
Any words or acts of the offeree indicating
that he declines the offer, or which justify the
offeror in inferring that the offeree intends not
to
accept
the
offer
or
give
it
further
consideration, amounts to a rejection. [Emphasis
added.]
T/r A a o / o a o o r c
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This view is accepted by Restatement of Contracts
2d which states:
An
offeree's
power
of
acceptance
is
terminated by his rejection of the offer, unless
the offeror has manifested a contrary intention*
and by 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 51, p.713:
Rejection terminates an offer so that it
cannot afterward be accepted by the offeree
without the renewed consent of the offeror.
The above authorities are clear that when an
offer
is
rejected
by
refusal,
conditional
acceptance or by counter-offer, the party making
the original offer is relieved from liability and
the party who rejected the offer cannot, of his
own volition, create agreement by his subsequent
acceptance. 557 P.2d at 148-149. [emphasis added]
In so ruling that the offer, once rejected, could not be
subsequently

accepted

of

the

Supreme

offeree's

volition, the

Utah

Court

cited

Leavey case.

Importantly here, mailgrams

own

unilateral

the Trautwein

v.

sent twice over

the signature of Clifford Crane attempted

unilaterally

to

waive conditions of his counteroffer, and thus subsequently
accept Timberbrook*s

offer as originally

proposed

without

the renewed consent of the Defendants, to-wit, Timberbrook
and Gallian.

Mr. Crane's acts are

futile

and

he

cannot

proceed at law or in equity with a cause of action against
the Defendants.
Though

the

evidence

taken

of

Bonnie

Crane

at

her

deposition amply purports the contention that Bonnie v/ould
do

anything

acceptable

to

Clifford,

separate person under the law.

Bonnie

is

still

a

Once again, the lessons of

Alan H. Coombs are precise and poignant in the instant case.

W062/86-8965
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In the case of Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d
356, Mr. Coombs sought an extension of an option from the
Defendant Arthur Ouzounian.

The option was to be exercised

by July 30th, 1967, but as the Supreme Court stated, the
Plaintiff Alan Coombs, "invited Defendant Arthur Ouzounian
to his home and requested an extension of the option period
to September 30th, 1967."

Plaintiff crossed out the July

expiration date on the option and substituted the September
date.

The Plaintiff and Mr. Ouzounian signed the margin of

the agreement by this substitution.

In Coombs v. Ouzounian,

the

that the wife was

Supreme

Court

succinctly

bound by her husband's
Court

told

interest

Alan

that

held

actions.

Coombs

requires

that
the

In essence, the

when
same

both
to

be

parties
sold,

not

Supreme
own

an

i.e.,

in

writing, or when the terms are changed or modified, both
parties must execute the documents.

Absent this condition,

any extension or modification is invalid.
CONCLUSION
There is only one point necessary for the Court to
rule in the Defendants1
point succinctly stated
letter
Gallian

conditionally
in

Exhibits

counteroffer.

favor

in the instant case.

is as follows:

accepting
" 2 " , "3"

the
and

That

Mr. Mixon's cover

offer

presented

"10", amounted

to

by
a

Acceptance of the original offer cannot then

be made without a revival of such offer by the Defendants.
Waiver of the conditions unilaterally by Mr. Crane have no
effect and are futile, and, as the offer was never revived,
W062/86-8965
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the Plaintiffs cannot now maintain their action either for
specific

performance

or

for

damages.

Their

conditional

acceptance is nothing more nor less than a counteroffer or
rejection of

the original offer.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of January,
1987.

JT'
MICHAEL D. H U G H E S ^ ' ' //
Attorney for Defendants ^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and accurate
copy

of

the

foregoing

MEMORANDUM,

postage

prepaid,

to

Willard R. Bishop, Attorney for Plaintiffs, P. O. Box 279,
Cedar City, Utah

84720, this <?iji day of January, 1987.

>./ rt.
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GALLIAJST, D R A K E &

WESTFALL

ATTORNEYS ANO COUNSELORS AT LAW
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING

Bjih^ih "z."

1 SOUTH MAIN STREET
PO BOX 1339
RUSSELL J GALL1AN
LYLE R DRAKE
G MICHAEL WESTFALL
K E N D R I C K J HAFEN

S T . GEORGE, UTAH 6 4 7 7 0
TELEPHONE
<801l 6 2 6 - 1 0 8 2

November 13, 1984

Clifford G. Crane
Bonnie Crane
12671 Overbrooke Drive
Santa Ana, California 92705
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Crane:
Enclosed you will find documents which you should execute and
send to the closing agent in connection with your sale of your
Limited Partnership interest in Timberbrook Vxllage Ltd. The
closing agent is Dixie Title Co. Inc., 205 East Tabernacle, St.
George, Utah, 84770 (a self addressed envelope is enclosed for your
convenience).
We are handling your transaction in two steps. One to handle
the redemption with the Condo, one to handle the cash part. I hope
this is allright.
We hope you will find these documents in order. Please call me
or Barry Church (801-586-3090) if you have any questions.
Very truly yours,
GAWKI#N, DRAKE £QWESTFALL

ell

lan

RJG/kp

Depcsi'tcn Exrubit c3>
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AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF LTD. PARTNERSHIP INTEREST

Agreement
between

made

this

Timberbrook

(hereinafter

day of

Village,

"Buyer")

, 1984, by and

Ltd., a Utah

and Clifford

Limited

G. Crane

Partnership,

and Bonnie

Crane,

(hereinafter "Seller").
RECITALS
1.

Seller is the owner of a^5% interest in Timberbrook Village

Ltd. a Utah Limited Partnership.
2.

The parties hereto desire to set forth the terms of an

agreement

wherein

Seller

shall

purchase

the limited

partnership

interest on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants made
herein, the parties agree as follows:
1.

Buyer

Building

agrees

1

to assign

of Timberbrook

and convey

Condominiums,

<^L I Q

all of Unit
at closing

ail of

Seller's right, title and interest on the assignment form attached
hereto

at Exhibit

"A" .

existing construction

Said

Conveyance

loan which

shall be subject

loan shall be released

to an

from the

condominium upon completion of the sales of Units in Phase I.
2.

This agreement and closing hereon shall be contingent upon

closing of that certain loan between Seller and Nebraska Saving and
Loan Association.
3.
Company,

R20/13

Closing
Inc.,

i

shall

occur

through the offices

(Escrow Agent),

0 7
* ~

of Dixie

205 East Tabernacle,

Title

St. George,

Depos.bon Exhibit . 3

Deposition Exhibit ^

Dote 5~"->S{p

PctcS-^-^C

Laurie L Stuck., CSR, Notory Public

,

,

'^ * „r ,

ki

Ln •-«- \ *1 -k» C^i tlalrrv

-—•
Pub<.<

Utah.

The assignment

(Exhibit "A") shall be deposited with Escrow

Agent to be delivered! to Buyer upon closing.
Agreement made the date first mentioned above.

SELLER
Clifford G. Crane
Bonnie Crane
BUYER
LEISURE SPORTS, INC.
By

bCUV^y

CJ^t

B^j>r7Church, President
sell J.^^ctxjLjLcii
airman of the Board of
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EXHIBIT "A"

ASSIGNMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST

Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane (Seller) hereby assigns and
conveys to Leisure Sports Inc. a 5% interest as a limited partner,
in Timberbrook Village Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership.
Seller warrants as follows:
1.

That the interest conveyed is free and clear of all liens,

encumbrances or claims against Seller's title;
2.

That Seller has the full power to convey said interest;

3.

Seller hereby authorizes and directs the General Partner of

Timberbrook Village, Ltd", to show the change in interest as of the
date

of closing, and

Seller hereby

authorizes

the Escrow Agent,

Dixie Title Company to notify the General Partner in writing of the
date of closing.
DATED this

day of November, 19 84.

SELLER

Clifford G. Crane

Bonnie Crane
STATE OF UTAH,
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
On the

R20/13

)
: ss.
)

day of November, 1984, personally appeared before

139

me Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane, the Sellers

in the above

entitled Assignment, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed
this instrument for the purposes therein set forth.

My Commission Expires:

Notary Public
Residing In:

140
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AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF LTD. PARTNERSHIP INTEREST

Agreement
between

made

Leisure

this

day

Sports,

of

Inc.

(hereinafter

, 1984, by

and

"Buyer")

and

Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane, (hereinafter "Seller").
RECITALS
1.

Seller

is

the

owner

of

a

20% interest

in

Timberbrook

Village Ltd. a Utah Limited Partnership.
2.
agreement

The parties hereto desire to set forth the terms of an
wherein

Seller

shall

purchase

the

limited

partnership

interest on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants made
herein, the parties agree as follows:
1.

Buyer

hereby

agrees

to pay,

defined, the sum of One Hundred

at

closing

as

Seventy-Five Thousand

hereinafter
and no/100

Dollars ($175,000).
2.

Seller

agrees

to

assign

and

convey

at

closing

all

of

Seller's right, title and interest on the assignment form attached
hereto at Exhibit "A".
3.

This agreement and closing hereon shall be contingent upon

closing of that certain loan between Seller and Nebraska Saving and
Loan Association.
4.

Closing

shall

occur

through

the offices

of

Dixie

Company, Inc., (Escrow Agent), 205 East Tabernacle, St. George,

141
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Title

Utah.

The assignment

(Exhibit "A") shall be deposited with Escrow

Agent to be delivered to Buyer upon closing.
Agreement made the date first mentioned above.

SELLER
Clifford G. Crane
Bonnie Crane
BUYER
LEISURE SPORTS, INC.

By jSoJ^M
B&zz^

CzJLx^tJ^^

CKurch, President

fRussell J > Gallian
lairman of the Board of
Directors and Secretary

142
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EXHIBIT "A"

ASSIGNMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST

Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane (Seller) hereby assigns and
conveys to Leisure Sports Inc. a 20% interest as a limited partner,
in Timberbrook Village Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership.
Seller warrants as follows:
1.

That the interest conveyed is free and clear of all liens,

encumbrances or claims against Seller's title;
2.

That Seller has the full power to convey said interest;

3.

Seller hereby authorizes and directs the General Partner of

Timberbrook Village, Ltd. to show the change in interest as of the
date

of

closing, and

Seller

hereby

authorizes

the Escrow Agent,

Dixie Title Company to notify the General Partner in writing of the
date of closing.
DATED this

day of November, 19 84.

SELLER

Clifford G. Crane

Bonnie Crane
STATE OF UTAH,
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
On the

)
: ss.
)

day of November, 1984, personally appeared before

14 3
-3-

me

Clifford

Crane

and

Bonnie

Crane,

the

Sellers

in

the

above

entitled Assignment, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed
this instrument for the purposes therein set forth.

My Commission Expires:

Notary Public
Residing In:
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>ALLIAN, D R A K E & W E S T F A L L
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
DIXIE STATE BANK 8U1LD1NG
1 SOUTH MAIN STREET

£v4ub,t 'ICT

PO BOX t339

RUSSELL J GALL1AN
LYLE R DRAKE
G MICHAEL WESTFALL
KENORICK J HAFEN
JEFFREY C WILCOX

ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770

TELEPHONE
(SOU 628-1682

February 11, 198 5

Mr. Dean Mixon
WEINFELD & MIXON
601 North Park Center Drive
Suite 203
Santa Ana, CA 92705
Re:

Clifford Crane

Dear Mr* Mixon:
Enclosed is a copy of the Substitution of Guarantor which I certify
was executed by myself and Mr. Dewey Crouch, Vice President of
Nebraska Savings and Loan.
It is our understanding that Mr. and Mrs, Crane will execute the
documents conveying their interest to Leisure Sports (20%) and
redeeming 5% from Timberbrook. Upon receipt the Escrow Agent will
disburse $175,000 to your clients and Barry Church will execute a
warranty deed on behalf of the Partnership for the condo.
Thank you,
Very t

yours,

LLIAN,/DRAKE & WESTFALL

Gallian
RJG/sb
cc:

Doug Westbrook
Dixie Title Company

230
Deposition FxKikit

J4 5
R18/30

W.tnessC.

f
C$ArW&

Uur>« I Stucki, CSR. Notory PwW.?

Deposition
:>sition Exhibit

j ^

Date
—^ - h l b l t

'MO

laune L Stucki CS°„ Notary PubUc

Deposhion Exhibit

/_Q

Dote. S i l i S f i .
SUBSTITUTION

]/0

Agreement made this
Nebraska

Savings

and

Loan

OF GUARANTOR

day of

\.aul«. t Sw*v C5R, **<vy * ^

|\Jfj\}tW^f 1984, by and between

Association

(hereinafter

"Lender")

and

Russell J* Gallian (hereinafter "Substitute Guarantor").
RECITALS
1.

The parties hereto have entered into a Committment Letter

dated October 19, 1984, wherein Lender is making at Two Million Six
Hundred

Thousand

Dollar

($2,600,000)

loan

to

Leisure

Sports

Incorporated.
2.

Part

Timberbrook

of

said

Village

consideration

Ltd.,

is

Incorporated.

the

participation

Leisure

Sports,

of
Inc.

has purchased 39% of the limited partnership interest in Timberbrook
Village Ltd., including,
Crane

limited

personally

A certain Clifford G. Crane, and Bonnie

partners

signed

on

Timberbrook \Village

in

the

Ltd.

Timberbrook
note

on

the

The parties

Village

Ltd.,

previous

note

desire

to

who

have

issued

effect

a

on

change

wherein Russell J. Gallian shall be substituted as the Guarantor in
the place of Clifford Crane.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants made
herein, the parties agree as follows:
1.
Clifford

Nebraska

Savings

G.

and

Crane

and

Bonnie

Loan
Crane

Association

here^j

of

all

any

and

releases

liabilities

pursuant to the note secured by Deed of Trust on Timberbrook Village
Ltd. , dated

S&jpA- 3/7 (9^3

$7i.07y/flfflV93

in the original principal balance of
XlkMe^l^fj^/

and further dated

R20/29
1

AO

in the

original principal balance of $ A.OlSOX)^
2.

•

The parties hereto agree that Russell J, Gallian is hereby

substituted as Substitute Guarantor and Russell J. Gallian hereby
agrees to be bound by all of the covenants and agreements contained
in

that

certain

Guaranty

Agreement

associated

with

the

loan

stated above.

DATED this

<r

)£h> day of NIT\\C4AIU^

, 1984.
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£32

as

WEINFELD 6 MIXON
A LAW CORPORATE

BdhlHtk

"!£'

e O l NORTH f»ARKCENTER DRIVC. SUITE 2 0 3

TELEPHONE

SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA 9 2 7 0 5

(71-*) S-*»-«e-^a

February 18,1985

Mr. Doug Westbrook
Dixie Title Company
205 E. Tabernacle
St. George, Dtah 84770
RE:

CLIFFORD CRANE ESCROW

Dear Mr. Westbrook:
As I believe you know, our office represents Clifford
G. and Bonnie Crane. Enclosed please find the following
two original documents:
1. "Agreement For Sale of Limited Partnership Interest"
to which my clients and Timberbrook Village Limited are parties;
2. "Agreement For Sale of Limited Partnership Interest"
to which my clients and Leisure Sports Incorporated are parties.
Enclosed please find, further, a copy of a document
entitled "Substitution of Guarantee" dated November 20, 1984,
between Nebraska Savings & Loan Association and Russell J.
Gallian. You may proceed to close the transaction referred
to in Mr. Gallian1s February 11, 1935, letter to me, copy
enclosed, as soon as you have received from Nebraska Savings
& Loan Association their written affirmation of the validity
of the "Substitution of Guarantor" document along with their
warranty that Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane have no
obligations whatsoever to Nebraska Savings & Loan Association,
either jointly or severally, either actual or contingent.
There are three conditions to closing from our side:
1. Your mailing to me by registered mail, the original
of the above-referenced affirmation and warranty by Nebraska
Savings & Loan Association;
2. Your mailing to me by certified mail, a fully executed
Warranty Deed to Unit 210, Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums;
Deposition Exhibit

Date

Sl1~^^

tour.e l. StucU CSR Notary Pubtte

EXHIBIT A
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^
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- -U^W1N

A LAW CORPORATION

M r . Dd
Westbrook
February 18, 1985
Page two

3. Your disbursing by wire transfer, the sum of $175,000
into my client's account at Home Savings of American,
179 N. Tustin, Orange, California 92667, Account No, 125-900624-3.
If the above-referenced closing does not occur by Friday,
March 8, 1985, you are instructed to return all documents
to me and to terminate the escrow. If you have any question
or comment, please do not hesitate to call.
Very truly yours,
WEINFELD & MIXON

DEAN A. MIXON
DAM/mw
Enclosure
cc;

Mr. Clifford Crane
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SANTA ANA CA 92705 s£~ M

4 - 0 1 9 5 2 0 S 0 5 3 0 0 3 0 2 / 2 2 / 8 5 ICS IPMRNCZ CSP PRVB
2 7 1 4 9 9 7 1 7 3 9 MGM TDRN SANTA ANA CA 0 2 - 2 2 1237P EST

klkch.fc. "B"

DIXIE TITLE
ATTN DOUG VESTBROOK
205 EAST TABERNACLE
ST GEORGE UT 84770

THIS IS A CONFIRMATION COPY OF A TELEGRAM ADDRESSED TO YOU:
I HAVE RECEIVED VERBAL CONFIRMATION WITH A COPY TO FOLLOW THAT I HAVE
BEEN RELEASED FROM THE TWO TIMBERBROOK LOANS. PLEASE DO NOT HOLD UP
CLOSE OF ESCROW FOR THIS ITEM.
SINCERELY
CLIFFORD G CRANE
1 2 6 7 ! OVERBROOK DR
SANTA ANA CA 9 2 7 0 5
1240 EST
MGMCOMP MGM

Deposition Exhibit

Dote

/ 3

jT-7-YZJ

louno I Stuciu, CSR, Notary Public
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W
De?o ...!=-. Exhibit

EXHIBIT C

<.. .•

ff

;_
Mctsiy Public

t

A-G^'/tUOSOPbOOi 0 2 / 2 7 / 8 : ? ICS IPivthCZ CSP PRVA
2 7 N 9 S 7 1 7 3 9 IWi Ibhri SANTA A MA CA 0 2 - 2 7 0648P EST

/S^h.b.t "l^-'V
• buUG Wt-STbhuuK
CAnr. DIXIh. TITLE
20P tASl TAbt-rtuwCLE
SI ucUnuc Ul b « 7 7 0

IHIS l b A CUftFIhhATlOrt CuPY OF A TELEGRAM ADDRESSED TO YOU:
ktuARuIrtG Tli'icRLROuK

VILLAG& LTb SALE TO LEISURE SPORTS INC.

I , CLIrFunb G CRANe., HcncoY WAVE ThE SECOND CONDITION IN THE LETTER
UATLb FhUPi DCAH hlXulv l o YuU hcuARDIUu ThE FULLY EXt-CUTED WARRANTY
DE.HI> oF UwIT 2 1 0 bUILuIi.G
1.
I I N S T M U C T YOU TU uISob'RSc THc FUiwS
BulH PAhTIcS Iw iHc L S C R O U .
SI

($175,000)

NOW, AS AGREED BY

NCERELY

CLIFKuRb G CRAr«E
12671 uVcnnhOuK bR
SM„1A

I SGI

AuA

CA

92

703

tST

HGl'iCuf.P f',GiYi

ici
Deposition Exhibit

'..

l o j - w l Si cLi CS0., Notary P'jWIe
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Deposition Exhibit

Date

EXHIBIT V

' J

S-"?-?<b

Laurie L Slucki CSP, Moiwy *<Mi*

23&

SANTA ANATa-?270:>

O^J..

4-053195S0660G3 0 3 / 0 7 / 8 5 ICS IPMRNCZ CSP PRVA
2 7 U 5 4 1664 8 ttGM TURN SANTA ANA CA 0 3 - 0 7 0857P EST
Lditlo.-L " 1^"
• MR DOUG WESTBR00K, DIXIE TITLE CU
2 0 5 EAST TABERNACLE
ST GEORGE UT 8 4 7 7 0

THIS I S A CONFIRMATION COPY OF A TELEGRAM ADDRESSED TO YOU:
THc PARCH 8 CLOSING REQUIREMENT REFERRED TO IN MY LETTER OF FEBRUARY
1 8 , 1 9 8 5 , IS WAIVED. IHE tSCROW IS IRREVOCABLE. YOU ARE TO CLOSE AT
ONCE.
WEI NF ELD AivD MIXON
601 NORTH PARK CENTER # 2 0 3
SANTA ANA CA 92705

2 0 5 6 EST
MGMCOMP MGM

Depositor Exhibit
Date

> ~^_

^

Witness
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louno L Slucki, CSR. Notary Publid

Deposition Exhibit

Date

/S

S^Ir$[p

W.tness <L__£jf

AN<b

Laurie L Slucki, CSR, Notary Publ^ .
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FIFTH JUDICIAL bibi UHJ'.o
IRON COUNTY

WILLARD R. BISHOP #0344
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-9483

f£tf£-1987
I)J,A^J

IJ**JAS

c&

CLERK
DEPIT

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COORT OF IRON CODNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE
CRANE, husband and wife,

)
)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
CLIFFORD G. CRANE

TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HEART MARKETING and DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, in its capacity as
general partner of TIMBERBROOK
VILLAGE, LTD.; LEISURE SPORTS,
INC. , a Utah Corporation; and
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corpojcation,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

Civil No. 85-281

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
County of Iron )
COMES NOW CLIFFORD G. CRANE, who being first duly sworn,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

Affiant

competent

to

is a resident of State of California, fully

testify,

and

makes

this

affidavit

on

personal

knowledge.
2.
25%

In November of 1984, I reached an agreement to sell my

ownership

Village, Ltd.

interest

as

a

limited

partner

of

Timberbrook

My ownership of such interest is shown by the

15 8

Certificate of Limited Partnership of Timberbrook Village, Ltd.,
a copy of which

is attached and which is incorporated by this

reference.
3.

On

memorialized

February
our

13, 1985,

contract.

I signed

the

documents

As of the date, even Mr.

which
Gallian

admits that their was an agreement.
4.

According to Mr. Westbrook's answers to interrogatories,

Mr. Mixon's February 18, 1985 letter, with enclosures, was in the
office of Dixie Title Company on February 22, 1985.
5.
1985,

Russell

that

the

Gallian
deal

was

did not ever

tell me on February 22,

"off", or that the buyers would

not

purchase my limited partnership interests.
6.
1985.

I did

talk

with

Dixie

It was

only

then

that

Title

I learned

trying to back out of our deal.
with Mr. Gallian.

Company

on February

that Defendants

27,
were

I spoke by phone on that day

This was the very first time that Mr. Gallian

ever said they were not going to follow through.

See a copy of

my phone bill on February 27, 1985 , showing that I made 3 calls
to

628-1638

(Dixie Title

Company) , one

call

to 628-1682

(Mr.

Gallian) and then one call to 586-9483 (Mr. Bishop) on February
27, 1985.
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1987.

CLIFFORDG. CRANE

154

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 2nd day of February,
1987.

My Commission Expires:

Residing in

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY

that delivered

a full, true and correct

copy of the above and foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF CLIFFORD G. CRANE,
to Mr. Michael D. Hughes, Attorney

for Defendants, at the Iron

County Courthouse, at Parowan, Utah on February 3, 1987; and that
I also mailed a full, true and correct copy of the same document
to Mr. Michael D. Hughes, THOMPSON, HUGHES, & REBER, Attorneys at
Law, at 148 East Tabernacle Street, St. George, Utah 84770, by
first class mail, postage fully prepaid t h ^ 2nd day of February,
1987.
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CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF IRON

)
: ss.
)

-^

v;E, the undersigned,
ship

pursuant

to

;

<*-,

the

laws

desiring
of

the

to

form a limited

State

of

Utah,

<-^<-r"•> ^

partne

certify

as

fcllows:
1.

The

name

of

2.

The

purpose

the

partnership

is TIMBERBROOK

VILLAGE,

LTD.

business
Head,

of

is to purchase

Utah,

condominium

and

the

partnership

certain

develop

development

real

that

thereon,

and

property

property
and

to

character
located

by

engage

of

at

the

Brian

constructing
in

any

or

a
all

business legally permissible for a partnership.
3.

The principal place of business of the partnership

is

in Brian Head, Iron County, Utah.
4.

The name and place of residence of

the General

Partner

in the partnership is as follows:
NAME

PLACE OF RESIDENCE

HEART MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.

84 0 South Main
Cedar City, Utah

5.

The

names

and

places

of

residence

of

84720

the

Limited

Partners in the partnership are as follows:
NAME

PLACE OF RESIDENCE

t

CLIFFOFD CRANE

0*/9A>Oe

C#>

//fAXQfV^frO, A)lf,

ANGELINE Q. McBRIDE

156

FiGIiPY G. GRIFFIN a n d THAIS
GRIFFIN, j o i n t l y ,

R.
6scL4L++>t'<t/ uf~,

ROBERT CHURCH

S ^ p TaSe &A •

B - N - B PARTNERSHIP
LT. JOHN J .

L*S

KIKTA

;

^-QAS, AJU.

L*S Veg/iS,

A)(/.

MR. and MRS. JOHN DELANEY,
jdA.

jointly,
WILLIAM THURMAN

;

£/},

NEVADA HEART £ LUNG SURGICAL
GROUP DON L. BUNCH M.D.,
DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN
6.

LAS>

^ / t e / /^U

The term for which the partnership is to exist is from

the 29th day of September, 1982, and continuing thereafter until
December 31, 1982, and thereafter from year to year on a calendar
Year basis unless otherwise terminated.
7.

The

amount of

cash

and

the

description

and

anrcct6

value of the capital contributed by each Limited Partner is:
CAPITAL
CONTRIBUTION
1. CLIFFORD CRANE
SJiO, 0^>0
ANGELINE Q. McBRIDE
BOBBY G. GRIFFIN and THAIS R,
GRIFFIN, jointly,

tA3Lt

^3.3.,

0&

ooa>

4.

ROBERT CHURCH

5.

B-N-B PARTNERSHIP

6.

LT. JOHN J. KIKTA

7.

MR. and MRS. JOHN DELANEY, jointly,

^

lST,bOO

8.

WILLIAM THURMAN

'

P;^oO

9.

NEVADA HEART & LUNG SURGICAL GROUP DON L.
BUNCH M.D., DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN

*

3 QJ o o o

s; o o o

J/S-Oo€>

8.

Additional

contributions

to

the

capital

of

the

partnership may only be made at such times and in such amounts as
agreed upon by the partners, both General and Limited, and shall
be treated as loans to the partnership.
9.

The contribution

withdrawn

from

time

to

of the Limited

time, and

Partner may

shall only

be

termination or dissolution of the partnership..
paid

to

the

Limited

Partners

from

time

to

not be

returned

upon

Profits may be

time

in

the

sole

discretion of the General Partner.
10.

The share of profits or other compensation by way of

income which the Limited Partner shall receive by reason of his
contribution is:
NAME

PERCENTAGE

1.

CLIFFORD CRANE

25%

2.

ANGELINE 0. McBRIDE

13%

3.

BOBBY G. GRIFFIN and THAIS R.
GRIFFIN, jointly,

5%

A.

ROBERT CHURCH

5%

5.

3-N-B PARTNERSHIP

4%

6.

LT. JOHN J. KIKTA

2%

1.

MR. and MRS. JOHN DELANEY, jointly,

2%

8.

WILLIAM THURMAN

1%

9.

NEVADA HEART & LUNG SURGICAL GROUP DON L.
BUNCH M.D., DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN

2%

11.

The

Limited

Partner

may

contributor in his place.

158

substitute

an assignee

as

12.

Additional

limited partners may be admitted by the

General Partner upon payment of a sum set by the General Partner
for the additional Limited Partnership

interest and by

signing

the Limited Partnership Agreement, and/or a subscription agreement .
13.

Upon the death, retirement or incapacity of a General

Partner, any remaining General Partner or the Limited
shall

have

the

right

to

continue

the

business

Partners

by

unanimous

the

right

agreement and notice to the other Partners.
14.

The

Limited

Partners

demand or receive

property

contribution,

and

no

entitled

priority

to

one

other
or

over

shall
than

more

not have
cash

Limited

other

in return
Partners

Limited

Partners

to

for

his

shall

be

as

to

contributions or as to compensation by way of income.
15.
partners,

The Partnership
both

partnership.

General

and

Agreement
Limited,

provides
may

be

that

additional

admitted

to

the

This Certificate may and shall be amended from time

to time to reflect the admission of additional partners.
GENERAL PARTNERS:
HEART MARKETING AND DEVELOPMENT,
INC.

By

&as^M^

its <=te«
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LIMITED PARTNERS:

CLIFFORD CRANE

ANGELINE Q. McBRIDE

BOBBY G. GRIFFIN

THAIS R. GRIFTIN

ROBERT CHURCH

B-N-B PARTNERSHIP
By
11 s

LT. COL. JOHN J. KIKTA

MR. JOHN DELANEY

MRS. JOHN DELANEY

1G0

WILLIAM THURMAN

NEVADA HEART & LUNG SURGICAL
GROUP DON L. BUNCH M.D., DEFINED
BENEFIT PENSION PLAN

By

DAVID MORRIS

J(J1
«w-1r<b

PAaFKHBELL,
714

530-34Q8-002-S

MAR 14 1985

3 OF

PAGE

i#AT&T
AT*T COMMUNICATIONS CALLS
P L A C E_ AND_NUMBER CALLED
1 DATE TIME] HIH T
3 DN ST GEQRCE UT" 801 6 28 1638^
FEB 27 755A
Q
17 DD ST GEORGE UT 801 628 1638- t>»>**
FEB 27 835A
1 DD ST CEORGE UT 801 628 1638^
FEB 27 852A
11 DD ST GEORGE UT 801 628 1682
FEB 27 853A
7 DD CEDAR CITY UT 801 58b 9483
FEB 27 907A

CHARGE

.53
6.79
.55
4.45
2.89

Q<»%15 . 2 1
* KEY DN-DIAL NIGHT

DD-DIAL DAY

ft»S\i«>f

i<>2

24T

WILLARD R. BISHOP #0344
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
P. 0. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE
CRANE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HEART MARKETING and DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, in its capacity as
general partner of TIMBERBROOK
VILLAGE, LTD.; LEISURE SPORTS,
INC., a Utah Corporation; and
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

C i v i l No. 85-281

Defendants.
This Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is submitted pursuant to
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., (hereinafter TIMBERBROOK V I L L A G E ) ,

is a Utah limited partnership which is in the business of real
estate development and sales in southern Utah.

HEART MARKETING

AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., (hereinafter HEART MARKETING), is a Utah
corporation

which

serves

TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE.

as

general

or

managing

partner

of

Plaintiff, CLIFFORD CRANE, is a limited

163
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partner of TIMBERBROOK, owning twenty-five percent
partnership interest.
is

a

"community

(25%) of the

California, where the Plaintiffs reside,

property"

state.

LEISURE

SPORTS,

INC.,

(hereinafter LEISURE SPORTS), is also a Utah corporation.
Barry

Church

is the President

LEISURE SPORTS.

of

HEART MARKETING

as well

Mr.
as

Mr. Russell Gallian is Chairman of the Board of

LEISURE SPORTS.
In

or

about

November,

1984,

Plaintiffs

entered

into

an

agreement with LEISURE SPORTS and TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, drafted by
Russell

Gallian,

for

the

sale

of

limited partnership interests.

Plaintiff

CLIFFORD

CRANE'S

Plaintiffs don't know why BONNIE

CRANE'S name was included, but it was.

It may be that Gallian

included BONNIE CRANE because of his knowledge that California is
a

"community

property"

state.

Two

separate

agreements

were

prepared by Mr. Gallian and signed by the parties.
One

agreement

outlines

the

sale

of

a

five

percent

(5%)

interest in TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE TO LEISURE SPORTS in exchange for
Unit 210, Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums.
was

encumbered

Savings

and

by

an existing

construction

Loan

Association

and

This property

loan with

conveyance

was

to

subject thereto, but title later was to be cleared.

Nebraska
be

made

Attached to

the agreement was an Assignment of Limited Partnership Interest
signed by Plaintiffs on February 13, 1985.
The other agreement recited provisions which would transfer a
twenty

percent

(20%)

interest

in

TIMBERBROOK

VILLAGE

from

Plaintiff CLIFFORD G. CRANE to LEISURE SPORTS in exchange for the
sum

of

One

Hundred

Seventy-Five
-2-

Thousand

Dollars

($175,000).

Attached to this agreement was a second Assignment of Partnership
Interest which was also signed on February 13, 1985, conveying
Plaintiffs1

interest

to LEISURE SPORTS.

Both agreements were

placed with DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah corporation operating out
of St. George, Utah, which was to serve as escrow agent for the
transaction and deliver the documents and cash upon closing.
On or before February 22, 1985, Mr. Doug Westbrook of DIXIE
TITLE

COMPANY

Plaintiffs1

received

a

letter

from

Mr.

Dean

A.

Mixon,

California attorney, dated February 18, 1985.

This

letter instructed DIXIE TITLE COMPANY to proceed in closing the
transactions

with

confirmation

was

Association

that

obligations

by

agreement

LEISURE
received

acceptance
between
of

and

from

Plaintiffs

entered

Gallian, Chairman

SPORTS

Nebraska

had
of

that

TIMBERBROOK

a

been

as

Savings

and

released

Substitution
Association

and

soon

of

of

as

Loan
their

Guarantor
Russell

J.

the Board of Directors of LEISURE SPORTS

(Substitution of Guarantor was dated November 20, 1984).
The February 18th letter contained the following language:
There are three conditions to closing from our
side:
1. Your mailing to me by registered mail, the
original of the above-referenced affirmation
and warranty by Nebraska Savings and Loan
Association;
2. Your mailing to me by certified mail, a
fully executed Warranty Deed to Unit 210,
Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums;
3. Your disbursing by wire transfer, the sum
of $175,000 into my client's account at Home
Savings of America, 179 N. Tustin, Orange,
California 92667, Account No. 125-900624-3.
-3-
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If the above-referenced closing does not occur
by Friday, March 8, 1985, you are instructed
to return all documents to me and to terminate
the escrow.
If you have any question or
comment, please do not hesitate to call.
Defendants
that

on

the

claim,
same

although

day

Plaintiffs

Mr. Westbrook

dispute

received

said

the

claim,

above-noted

letter, Mr. Gallian, after learning of the letter and speaking
with his clients, attempted to withdraw the offer of purchase and
terminate the escrow by telephone.
The following series of transactions then ensued:
(1)

A

telegram

was

sent

by

Plaintiffs,

COMPANY on February 22, 1985, which

to

DIXIE

TITLE

stated the following:

"I

have received verbal confirmation with a copy to follow that I
have been released from the two Timberbrook loans.

Please do not

hold up close of escrow for this item."
(2)

On February 27, 1985 a second telegram was sent to Doug

Westbrook as follows: "Regarding Timberbrook Village Ltd. sale to
Leisure Sports Inc. I, Clifford G. Crane, hereby waive the second
condition
the

in the letter dated from Dean Mixon to you regarding

fully

executed

warranty

deed

of

Unit 210

Building

1.

I

instruct you to disburse the funds ($175,000) now, as agreed by
both parties in the escrow."
(3)
to

Mr.

closing

And on March 7, 1985, a telegram was sent from Mr. Mixon
Westbrook

with

requirement

1985, is waived.

the

referred

following
to

in my

message:
letter

The escrow is irrevocable.

"The

March 8

of February 18,

You are to close at

once. n

-4-
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To this date Defendant, DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, has refused to
deliver funds held in escrow to Plaintiffs, and has not delivered
the applicable conveyance.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
POINT I
DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT.
Paragraph 10 of the Pretrial Order signed by the Court, states:
"DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS, including Motions for
Summary Judgment, etc. , may be made to the
Court until fifteen (15) days prior to the
time set for trial." (Emphasis added)
Despite the Court's order that dispositive motions be brought
before it not less than 15 days prior to trial, Defendants filed
their "Motion for Summary Judgment" on January 23, 1987, (only 12
days prior to trial) and now are attempting to argue it to the
Court on February 3, 1987, (only 1 day prior trial).
For this reason alone, the motion should be denied.
POINT II
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL
TRIAL.

FACT REMAIN FOR

Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied on
the basis

that they

have failed

to meet the requirement of

establishing that there are no remaining genuine issues as to
material facts and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure indicate that:
(b) A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any
-5-

time,
move
with
or
without
supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
as to all or any part thereof.
(c) . . .The judgment sought shall be
rendered
forthwith
if
the
pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions
on
file,
together
with
the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and its accompanying
Memorandum attempt to ignore the primary question of fact and law
that gives rise to the dispute at hand:
between

Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs

have

CRANE

continually

and

Was a contract formed

TIMBERBROOK

asserted

that

VILLAGE,
a

binding

LTD.?
verbal

contract was entered between these parties prior to November 13,
1984, when Mr. Russell Gallian, acting as agent for TIMBERBROOK
VILLAGE, and LEISURE SPORTS sent written agreements to the CRANES
as a memorialization of the prior agreement.

Defendants, on the

other hand, persist in viewing the documents sent by Mr. Gallian
as an offer requiring acceptance by the CRANES.

At no point in

the procedural history of this case has this central issue been
resolved.
Furthermore,

by

their

own

admission

Defendants

have

indicated that the facts and circumstances surrounding a series
of communications entered into between Plaintiff CLIFFORD CRANE
and Defendants, acting

through

agent, Russell Gallian, remain

their

authorized

in dispute.

attorney

and

In the Pretrial

Order, signed on October 2, 1986, by the Honorable Judge J.
-61 ttft

Harlan Burns and approved as to form and content by attorneys by
both

parties,

the

parties

agreed

that

the

substance

conversations occurring on February 22, 1985, is disputed.

of
See,

Pretrial Order, p. 11.
The substance of conversations conducted on February 22,
1985

is

crucial

to

determining

the

outcome

of

this

case.

Defendants contend, but present no evidence in support of their
contention,

that

a

revocation

of

the

"offer"

to

purchase

Plaintiff CLIFFORD CRANE'S partnership interest was communicated
to Mr. CRANE by Mr. Gallian on this day.

On the other hand,

while admitting that conversations did pass between himself and
Mr. Gallian, Mr. CRANE denies that any revocation was suggested
until February 27, 1985.

See, Deposition of Clifford Crane,

p. 22, and Affidavit of Clifford G. Crane.
Furthermore,

in the

same

Pretrial

Order Defendants have

indicated their belief that eight issues of fact and law remain
for

trial.

See, Pretrial

inconsistent with

Order, p. 15.

the Defendants1

This position is

Motion for Summary Judgment

which asserts that there are no remaining issues of fact and that
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 'of law.
POINT III
BONNIE G. CRANE'S SIGNATURE ON DOCUMENTS WAS
NOT NECESSARY TO THE CREATION OF ANY BINDING
CONTRACT, NOR WAS IT NECESSARY TO ANY
CORRESPONDENCE.
Plaintiffs are husband and wife, and at all times pertinent, have
resided and till reside in California.

Defendants know this.

See Deposition of Bonnie Crane.

~7~
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Plaintiff CLIFFORD G. CRANE was the owner of a 25% interest
as a limited partner of TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.

See Affidavit

of CLIFFORD G. CRANE, and Certificate of Limited Partnership of
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.
California is a community property state.

The interest in

the limited partnership, listed as being owned 25% in the name of
CLIFFORD G. CRANE, is personal and not real property.
C.C.P. 5125(a) provides in pertinent part:
" (a)...(E)ither spouse has the management and
control of the community personal property,
whether acquired prior to or on or after
January 1, 1975, with like absolute power of
disposition, other than testamentary, as the
spouse has of the separate estate of the
spouse."
(Emphasis added)
Even if BONNIE CRANE had not authorized her husband to deal for
her,

as

she

did,

he has

full

power

to deal

personal property, either under Utah law
interest

is owned

property law.

by him alone) or

with

respect

to

(where the partnership

under California community

Therefore, BONNIE CRANE 1 s signature was not and is

not necessary to any documents or correspondence involved in this
case.
Defendants cannot rely upon U.C.A. 25-5-1 and 25-5-3 (1953,
as amended) , nor upon Coombs vs. Osgouman, 465 P.2d
1970) .

356 (Utah,

There, the extension of an option on real property was

held invalid because the optionor's wife failed to sign it. Here,
the

agreements

against
Plaintiff
property

whom

are
they

CLIFFORD
over

his

signed
are
G.
own

by

sought
CRANE

TIMBERBROOK
to
has

signature.

be

and

LEISURE SPORTS,

enforced.

conveyed

his

If Defendants

-81 ?fl

Also
own

here,

personal

claim

BONNIE

CRANE has an interest in the partnership as community property,
then

C.C.P.

5125(a)

disposition.

gives

Finally,

Mr,

BONNIE

Crane
CRANE

absolute

power

of

its

authorized whatever

her

husband did.
POINT IV
EVEN IF THERE WERE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT REMAINING FOR TRIAL, AND EVEN IF
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WERE PROPERLY
BEFORE THE COURT, DEFENDANTS STILL WOULD NOT
BE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE NO
"COUNTEROFFER" WAS MADE BY MR. MIXON'S LETTER
OF FEBRUARY 18r 1985.
Defendants have

also asserted

that

"an acceptance which

imposes terms or conditions not present in the offer has no
validity

and

can

only

be

recognized

as

a

counteroffer."

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants1
Motion for Summary

Judgment, Point 1.

Their own citations,

however, clearly indicate that requirements that are immaterial
or those that would ordinarily be implied from the offer will not
render

the offer

inoperable.

Defendants quote the following

language:
. To create a binding contract the
acceptance must unconditionally agree' to all
the material provisions of the offer, and must
not add any new material conditions, but all
of the provisions of an offer need not be
expressly stated therein - some may be implied
from the surrounding circumstances.
•

*

*

.An
acceptance, however, is not
inoperative as such merely because it is
expressly conditional, if the requirement of
the condition would be implied from the offer,
though not expressed therein.
(Citations
omitted.)
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Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants'

Motion for Summary Judgment, Point 1.
Defendants

argue

that Plaintiffs' California attorney, by

letter dated February 18, 1985, created additional conditions to
the

escrow

nullified

agreement

the

which

original

constituted

"offer".

In

a

other

counteroffer
words,

that

Defendants

contend such conditions acted as a rejection of LEISURE SPORTS'
and TIMBERBROOK'S agreements while proposing a counteroffer which
was unacceptable.

Defendants' position is untenable under the

law as well as on the facts.
The facts do not demonstrate that Plaintiffs' attorney was
trying

to

include

agreement.

additional

conditions

to

the

existing

The letter under consideration was clearly addressed

to DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, an entity that was not a party to the
original agreement at all.
agreement

the logical

Had Plaintiffs wished to amend the

approach would

be to negotiate

directly

with LEISURE SPORTS and TIMBERBROOK, and to propose changes to
the agreements themselves.
The

only meaningful

conclusion that can be drawn from

the

letter is that the provisions contained therein were intended to
serve as instructions to the escrow agent and nothing more.

In

fact, if the provisions under consideration are closely examined
it becomes

apparent

that

Mr.

Mixon

has clearly

addressed

his

requests to the title company only with regard to the manner in
which relevant documents and funds were to be handled.
reason the so-called
having

any

effect

"conditions" should

whatever

on
-10-

For this

not be considered

Plaintiffs'

acceptance

of

as
the

purchase agreements.

They only applied to the escrow agent and

related to administrative provisions, and to required performance
under the agreements*
In any event, the Court should reach the same conclusion
under the law of offer and acceptance as the following passage
indicates:
The rule is fundamental that an acceptance
must comply with the terms of the offer—that
is, in order to form a contract, the offer and
acceptance must express assent to one and the
same thing, and there must be no substantial
or material variance between them....
17

AmJur2d,

Contracts,

Section

62,

see

also,

17

AmJur2d,

Contracts, Section 40. Appended to this general statement of law
is the following clarification:

"Immaterial or minor difference

or variances between the offer and acceptance will not prevent
the formation of a contract."

17 AmJur2d, Contracts, Section 62,

Footnote 20; see also, Steele v. Harrison, 552 P.2d 957 (Kan.
1976) .
The provisions upon which Defendants base their claim are
precisely the type of "immaterial or minor differences" which
should have no effect on the contract formation/

"It must not be

inferred, from the rule that an acceptance must be unconditional,
that the mere mention in a letter of acceptance of matters upon
which the acceptance of the proposition does not depend prevents
the contract from being completed...."

17 AmJur2d, Contracts,

Section 65.
In a case with facts that are parallel to the present, the
Alaskan

Supreme

Court

reached

the conclusion that additional

discussion of the terms of payment in a letter of acceptance is
not sufficient to preclude formation of the contract:
[Wlhen the acceptance of the offer is
initially unconditional, the fact that it is
accompanied by a request or a direction
looking to the performance of the contract
does not render the acceptance ineffective nor
give it the character of a counter-offer so
long as it does not limit the contract.
Here, [offeree! unequivocally accepted the
[offeror's] offer. The fact that assent was
accompanied by a suggestion as to terms of
payment, a detail not inconsistent with the...
offer, did not convert it into a counteroffer. [The offeree's] proposed payment terms
were in accord with the standard contract
terms used by the [offeror] in its land sales
contracts....
Kodiak Island Borough v. Large, 622 P.2d 440, 448 (Alaska, 1981);
see also, Hall v. Add-Ventures, Ltd., 695 P.2d

081

(Alaska,

1985) .
It can hardly be argued with credibility that Mr. Mixon's
letter adds significant terms to the agreement.
The first "condition" requests that the original affirmation
and warranty of Plaintiffs' release from their obligation under
the loan held by Nebraska Savings and Loan Association be sent by
registered

mail.

Certainly

providing

such

verification

and

information to Plaintiffs was anticipated by the original sale
agreement.
Plaintiffs

The Defendants had provided only a photocopy, and
were

entitled

to

the

original,

as

well

as

to

verification that it had been signed by Nebraska Savings and Loan
Association.
The second

"condition" also lies within the ambit of the

parties' intentions as a mere request that the Warranty Deed to
-12-
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Unit 210, Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums be forwarded by
certified mail.

The agreement did not specify what type of deed

was to be used.

In such a case the law implies a warranty deed.

Further, Mr. Gallian himself, in his letter to Dean Mixon dated
February 11, 1985, stated that a warranty deed would be provided.
See Exhibit 9, Deposition of Clifford G. Crane.
Finally, the third "condition" simply requests that the funds
in escrow be transferred by wire to Plaintiffs1 bank account.

In

no way do these provisions alter the original intentions or the
essential nature of the agreement and should not, therefore, be
considered a counteroffer.
The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected an argument similar to
that of Defendants in a case where the acceptance came much
closer to changing the intent of the parties than the "acceptance
in the present case.

The court outlined the facts and stated the

law in these terms:
Defendants next contend that Plaintiffs*
attempted acceptance was not identical to the
original
offer.
They
argue
that the
telegraphic reply imposed a new condition. It
is not disputed that New Mexico enforces the
general rule of contracts to the effect that
an offer must be accepted unconditionally and
unqualifiedly by the offeree. In the instant
case, defendants offered to purchase the
property subject to an eight months lease
thereon.
Plaintiffs attempted to accept the
offer subject to the existing lease, "if
leasee (sic) will release additional years
option after eight months tenent/see (sic) or
sooner...."
Almost as general in its application as the
rule
that
an
offer
must
be
accepted
unconditionally, is the qualifying rule that
"an acceptance, however, is not inoperative as
such
merely
because
it
is
expressly
conditional, if the requirement
of the
-13-

condition would be implied from the offer,
though not expressed therein." In the present
case, the lease on the property in question
had eight months left to run at which time the
tenants held an option to renew the lease for
an additional year.
This was known to
defendants who agreed to accept the property
subject to the eight months lease, but did not
make mention of the renewal option.
The
necessary implication of the offer was that
they did not purchase subject to the renewal
option and that the relinquishment of the
option was a condition upon which their offer
to buy the property was made dependent. Thus,
the plaintiffs acted with an abundance of
caution and inserted a condition in their
acceptance which merely expressed what would
be implied in fact from the offer. Such an
act does not negate the existence of a valid
acceptance and contract. (Citations omitted.)
Pickett

v.

Miller,

412

P.2d

400

(N.M.

1966).

The

clear

implication when comparing the Pickett case with the present is
that the supposed "conditions" do not rise to the level of a
counteroffer

which

would

justify

a

rejection

by

Defendants

LEISURE SPORTS and TIMBERBROOK.
In summary, as the Court considers the Defendants' claim that
the February 18th letter provides an adequate basis for allowing
Defendants to escape their obligations under the contract, it
should keep in mind (1) that the letter was addressed only to the
escrow

agent

and,

beyond

accepting

the

purchase

offer, was

intended only to serve as imparting administrative instructions;
(2) that the letter does not add any material or differing terms
or conditions to the original purchase agreement; and, (3) that
the "conditions" discussed therein were matters that are easily
implied from the terms and conditions of the contract and do not
add any material or significant differences which would justify
-14-
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Defendants' contention.

For this, and all reasons cited above,

the Court should find that Defendants are not entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be overruled
and denied.
DATED this 2oJ[

day of February ,/198J,

JILLARD R. BIS
Attorney for
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY AND MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I delivered a full, true and correct
copy

of

the

AUTHORITIES

above
IN

and

foregoing

OPPOSITION

MEMORANDUM

TO DEFENDANTS'

OF

MOTION

POINTS
FOR

AND

SUMMARY

JUDGMENT to Mr. Michael D. Hughes, Attorney for Defendants at the
Iron County Courthouse, Parowan, Utah, on February 3, 1987; and
also mailed

to Mr. Michael D. Hughes, of THOMPSON, HUGHES &

REBER, Attorneys at Law, at 148 East Tabernacle, St. George, Utah
84770,

a full, true and correct copy of the same document, at

THOMPSON,

HUGHES

&

REBER,

Attorneys

at

Tabernacle Street, St. George, Utah 84770,
February 1987.
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ir

Law,

at

148

this ZL^J>C.

East

day of

WILLARD R. BISHOP #0344
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
P. 0. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE
CRANE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ADDENDUM TO MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD. , a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HEART MARKETING and DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, in its capacity as
general partner of TIMBERBROOK
VILLAGE, LTD.; LEISURE SPORTS,
INC., a Utah Corporation; and
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,

Civil No. 85-281

Defendants.
COME NOW

PLAINTIFFS, and submit

this Addendum

to their

Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, having inadvertently

omitted the

following POINT V from said memorandum.
POINT V
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE
OVERRULED AND DENIED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS AND
DEFENDANTS
ENTERED
INTO A
CONTRACTUALLY
BINDING IRREVOCABLE AGREEMENT FOR THE SALE OF
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS IN TIMBERBROOK
VILLAGE, LTD., AND, INASMUCH AS PLAINTIFFS
HAVE FULFILLED THE CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED BY
THE ESCROW AGREEMENT, DIXIE TITLE COMPANY IS
OBLIGED
TO
RELEASE
DEPOSITED
FUNDS
TO
PLAINTIFFS.
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In November
entered

into

1984, Plaintiff

a

valid

and

and Defendant

binding

verbal

LEISURE SPORTS

agreement

for

the

purchase and sale of Plaintiff's limited partnership interest in
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE.
and

intended

to

The fact that Defendants clearly believed

treat

the

demonstrated by their actions.

oral

agreement

as

binding

is

On November 13f 1984, Mr. Russell

J. Gallian acting as agent for LEISURE SPORTS sent Plaintiff a
letter which speaks of the sale as a "fait accompli" subject only
to

the

memorialization

documentation.

process

of

signing

subsequent

The following language is instructive:

"Enclosed

you will find documents which you should execute and send to the
closing

agent

in connection with your

sale of your

Partnership interest in Timberbrook Village, Ltd."

Limited

Nothing in

this language would suggest that the parties remained in the
process of negotiation.
In addition, on several occasions following receipt of the
above-noted letter Mr. CRANE1s California attorney was informed
by Mr. Gallian in the course of telephone conversations that the
agreement was complete and that Mr. CRANE would be bound thereby,
despite the fact that documentation was as yet unsigned.
Whether the parties to an oral or informal
agreement become bound prior to the drafting
and execution of a contemplated formal writing
is a question depending largely upon their
intention, or, as is sometimes expressed, upon
whether they intend the formal writing to be a
condition precedent to the taking effect of
the agreement. If the written draft is viewed
by the parties merely as a convenient memorial
or record of their previous contract, its
absence does not affect the binding force of
the contract. . . .
. . . In other words, where all the substantial terms of a contract have been agreed on
-2-

and
there
is nothing
left
for
future
settlement, the fact alone that it was the
understanding that the contract should be
formally drawn up and put in writing does not
leave the transaction incomplete and without
binding force, in the absence of a definite
intention or positive agreement that it should
not be binding until so reduced to writing and
formally executed.
17 AmJur2df Contracts, §28.
Mr. CRANE'S deposition and consistent statements throughout
the course of these proceedings are that he believed an agreement
had been consummated during the month of November 1984.
Deposition of Clifford Crane, pp. 15, 27, and 48.

See

All of the

writings and letters requesting that Defendants send a Warranty
Deed and original Substitution of Guarantor were merely incident
to

the

LEISURE

SPORTS1

performance

of

the

original

verbalagreement to purchase Plaintiffs1 personal property limited
partnership interest in TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.
arrangements

which

were

set

up

by

LEISURE

The escrow

SPORTS

for

the

convenience of closing the agreement were in no way an indication
that negotiations were still underway.
The concept of "escrow" has been described as:
tAl written instrument which by its terms
imports a legal obligation and which is
deposited
by the grantor, promisor, or
obligor, or his agent with a stranger or third
party, to be kept by the depositary until the
performance of a condition or the happening of
a certain event, and then to be delivered over
to the grantee, promisee, or obligee.
28 AmJur2d, Escrow, Section 1.
A valid escrow must be of such a nature that neither party is
in control of the items given to the depositary, which means that
the agreement is irrevocable.
-3-
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An instrument cannot be said to be delivered
in escrow, and, moreover, does not constitute
an escrow, where possession by the depositary
is subject to the control of the depositor. In
order to constitute an instrument in escrow,
it is essential that the deposit of such
instrument be in the meantime irrevocable—
that is, when the instrument is placed in the
hands of the depositary, it should be intended
to pass beyond the control of the depositor,
and the depositor should actually part with
all present or temporary right of possession
and control over it....
Until the delivery of the escrow instrument to
the depositary upon the agreed condition or
conditions, it may be revoked at any time by
the one so delivering, but when the delivery
of the instrument
is accompanied by the
conditions
mutually
beneficial
to
both
parties, and in which each has an interest, it
then becomes irrevocable during the period it
is to remain in escrow.
Thus, once a valid
deposit has been made in accordance with the
contract of the parties, neither party can
revoke the escrow during the escrow period
without the consent of the other.
28 AmJur2d, Escrow, Section 8.

See also, Gammon v. Bunnell, 64

P. 958, 959 (Utah 1900); Goldberg v. Sanglier, 616 P.2d 1239, 27
Wash. Appl. 179, reversed 639 P.2d 1347, 96 Was. 2d 874, opinion
changed

647

P.2d

489

(1980);

and

Home-Stake

Royalty

Corp. v.

McClish, 103 P.2d 72 (Okla. 1940) .
Under

the

facts of

the

present

case

Plaintiffs entered a

valid agreement with LEISURE SPORTS and TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE for
the sale and purchase of their interest in TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE.
Escrow arrangements were instituted merely as an aid to closing
the

transaction.

Nevertheless,

the

agreement

was

made

in

consideration of mutual covenants and once LEISURE SPORTS placed
funds in the hands of the depositary, DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, the
agreement

became

irrevocable

and

-4-

not

subject

to

withdrawal.

Furthermore, when escrow is established the grantor cannot forbid
delivery to the grantee once the conditioned performance has been
met.

See, Kauffman v. Kauffman, 278 P.2d 179, 183 (Colo. 1954).
On

February

22,

1985,

Defendants

LEISURE

SPORTS

and

TIMBERBROOK claim that through their attorney they attempted to
revoke

their

agreement

to

purchase

Plaintiffs'

limited

partnership interest, such offer being the subject matter of the
binding escrow agreement.

Plaintiffs deny this.

At no time have

Plaintiffs communicated their consent to such a revocation and,
therefore, the depositary

has no authorization to modify the

terms of the escrow agreement.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs have

complied with all of the conditions outlined in the agreement, a
fact which automatically vests title and ownership in Plaintiffs
of those funds being held in escrow.
It has been said that a constructive delivery
of the instrument held in escrow occurs when
all conditions of the escrow have been met.
Thereafter the escrow holder ceases to be the
agent for both parties and becomes the agent
for each party in respect to the things placed
in escrow to which each party has thus become
completely entitled.
When the condition has
been performed or the event has happened upon
which a deed in escrow is to be delivered, the
grantee is entitled to possession, and the
grantor cannot thereafter prevent delivery
from taking place by obtaining possession of
the deed or by its destruction.
28 AmJur2d, Escrow, Section 28.

The Utah Supreme Court is in

agreement with this position as evidenced by the case of Gammon
v. Bunnell:
The delivery of this deed in escrow rendered
it absolute when the condition upon which it
was made was f ulf illed. . . The purpose of the
escrow having been accomplished, the Plaintiff
held the deed in the same manner he would have
-.«;-

held it if it had been delivered to him in the
first instance....
Gammon at 959.
The obligation of the depositary to deliver the materials
held in escrow upon the occurrence of all conditions has been
well documented as the following passage would indicate:
The depositary is under a duty imposed by law
not to deliver the escrow to anyone except
upon strict compliance with the conditions
imposed.
The depositary, being as much the
agent of the grantor as of the grantee, is as
much bound to deliver the deed on performance
of the condition or happening of the event as
he is to withhold it until such performance or
happening....
28 AmJur2d, Escrow, Section 17.
Therefore, on the basis of the irrevocability of the offer
and escrow and the fact that Plaintiffs now possess an absolute
ownership interest in the deposited funds, DIXIE TITLE COMPANY
should be ordered to release such funds and pay the damages for
which the Plaintiffs have prayed.

Necessarily, then, the Motion

for Summary Judgment should be overruled and denied.
DATED this 3rd day of February,

Attorney for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that delivered a full, true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing ADDENDUM TO MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES
JUDGMENT,

IN
to

OPPOSITION
Mr.

Michael

TO DEFENDANTS1
D.

Hughes,

MOTION
at

the

FOR

SUMMARY

Iron

County

Courthouse, Parowan, Utah, this 3rd day/of>E^6ruary, 1987.

M4R

9/S57

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE
CRANE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

MEMORANDUM RULING ON
DEFENDANTSf MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 85-201

TINBERBROOK VILLAGE, ET AL.,
Defendants.

The above-entitled natter having come before the
Court on defendants1 Motion for Sunnary Judgment and plaintiffs
having been represented by their attorney, Willard R. Bishop
arv4 defendants having been represented by their attorney,
Michael D. Hughes, and the Court, having heard the arguments of
counsel and having reviewed the file, together with the
memorandums, and being fu]]y advised in the premises, hereby
makes the following ruling;
Defendants' flotion for Summary Judgment should be and
hereby is, DENIED, for the reason that there exist material
issues of fact to be resolved at trial, including but not
limited to, whether a contract was formed and whether the Nixon
letter imposed conditions precedent, or restated the existing
agreement, or was simply intended as instructions to
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the escrow agent.
Plaintiff to prepare an Order reflecting the ruling
of the Court,
DATED this £>-iC
- day of March, 1987

riSTRICT JUDGE BY ASSIGHHE

HAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the //^^~~day of March, 1987,
copies of the foregoing document were nailed, first class
postage prepaid, to Willard P. Bishop, P. 0. Box 279, Cedar
City, UT 847 20 and Michael D. Hughes, 148 East Tabernacle, St.
George, UT 84770.

^--^C<r

,0
A
Rose

Sheila G.
Trial Court Executive
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY

DISTRICT

OF IRON, STATE OF UTAH

CIVIL

DIVISION

85-281

CIVIL NO: .

TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., et al.,

CLIFFORD G. CRANE and
BONNIE CRANE,

Plaintiff

V s.

Appeared

X

Defendant

Appeared

X

Attorney

Appeared

WILLARD R. BISHOP, ESQ.,

Attorney

Appeared

JUDGE:

J . P h i l i p Eves

REPORTER:

Laurie

CLERK:

David I . Yardley

BAILIFF:

Donald W. Murdock

PROCEEDING:

Stucki

Non-Jury T r i a l
MINUTE ENTRY

August 4, 1987:

M I N U T E ENTRY

Opening statement by

P-15a, P-16, P-17, P-18 , P-19a, P-20, P-21,]

[ Willard R. Bishop.

Opening statement by

Michael D . Hughes.

Recess at 10:45 A,M.

Reconvene d at 11:05 A.M.

Objection sustained.

Exhibits

P-l, P-2, P-3, P-4, P-5, and P-6 identifie d, offered and received.

received.
Motion

1 P-8, P-9,P-lOa,

Minute Book No.

Exhibits P- 7,

l
P- 11a, P-13, P-28, P -14,

I'clRC N<

Exhibit P-27,
Objection.

P -27, re-offered and

Lunch break at conclusion of

direct testimony at 12: 11 P.M.
at 1:34 P. M.

by Defense to publish de position of
Clifford Crane, granted.

offered, and received.
identified and offered.

Clifford G.

Crane sworn and testifie d.

P-22, P-23 , P-24, P-25,P-26 all identified

stand.

Reconvened

Clifford Crane back on

Cross-examination.

Exhibits D-29

J and D-30, identified, c ffered, and received

Dale:

August 4 & 5,

1987

f IFTH JUDICIAL OIST COURT
IRON C O U N T Y

^

SEP i 1987
p£W*^f? \hA<Us$
THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER
Michael D. Hughes #1572
Attorney for Defendants
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: 801/673-4 892

CLERK
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLIFFORD

G.

CRANE and BONNIE

CRANE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs .
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HEART MARKETING and DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah corporation, in its capacity as
general partner of TIMBERBROOK
VILLAGE, LTD.: LEISURE SPORTS,
INC., a Utah corporation; and
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendants.

Civil No. 85-281

THIS MATTER having come on for trial on the 4th
and

5th of August, 1987, and the Plaintiffs, Clifford

Crane

and

Bonnie Crane, having

been

represented

by

G.

their

attorney of record, Willard R. Bishop, and the Defendants
collectively represented by their counsel of record, Michael
D. Hughes, and the Court having heard the testimony of the
witnesses, having received the evidentiary support, both of
the

Plaintiff's

complaint

and

the

1ft7

defenses

proposed

by

Defendants, and the matter having been submitted upon oral
argument by both counsel,
NOW

THEREFORE,

the

Court

hereby

enters

its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The

Court

finds

that

the

pleadings

were

properly joined for trial.
2.
purchased
Utah

The Court

finds that Clifford

a 25% interest

limited

G. Crane had

in Timberbrook Village, Ltd., a

partnership,

with

its

principal

place

of

business in Iron County, Utah.
3.
Utah

The Court finds that Leisure Sports, Inc., a

corporation,

together

with

Heart

Marketing

and

Development, Inc., a general partner of Timberbrook Village,
Ltd., desired to repurchase the interest of Clifford Crane
in said partnership.
4.
1985,

The

Plaintiffs

principle

an

oral

writing,

signed

Court
and

finds
these

agreement
by

the

that

as of November

Defendants
which

was

Plaintiffs,

13 th,

had

reached

in

to be

reduced

in

deposited

by

the

Plaintiffs at Dixie Title Company, along with assignments of
their

partnership

interests, and

that

these

requirements

were necessary to complete the transaction.
5.

The Court finds that some but not all of the

items had been discussed and settled in the oral agreement,
but

that

they

included,

among

other

money, release of the Plaintiffs

things, transfer

of

from the guarantee of a

construction loan, preparation of a deed by the Defendants,
and the preparation and completion of two assignments by the
Plaintiffs.
6.

The Court finds that on November 20th, 1985,

the Defendants, Leisure Sports, Inc., a Utah corporation,
and Heart

Marketing

and

Development, Inc., caused

to

be

placed in escrow $175,000 in reliance upon their belief that
a deal had been struck and that, further, Leisure Sports,
Inc.,

by

and

through

principals,

obtained

construction

loan.

Mr.

Russell

release
The

of

Court

Gallian,

the

one

Plaintiffs

finds, however,

of

its

from

the

that

said

release was not placed in escrow at this time and was not
communicated to the Plaintiffs.
7.
Russell

The Court finds that on November 13th, 1984,

Gallian, on behalf

of

Leisure

Sports, Inc., and

Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., did enclose documents
requesting

their

execution

and

delivery

to

Dixie

Title

Company to the Plaintiffs Clifford Crane and Bonnie Crane.
These documents were marked at trial as P-7, P-8, and P-9,
respectively, and were received into evidence.
8.
significance

The

Court

happened

finds

until

that

January

nothing
of

1985,

more
when

of
the

Defendant Clifford Crane, acting through his attorney, Dean
Mixon,

contacted

Mr. Bishop, an

attorney

in Cedar

City,

Utah, and retained Mr. Bishop for the purposes of obtaining
an accounting on Timberbrook Village, Ltd.
that

Crane's

action

in

retaining

both

The Court finds

Mixon

and

Bishop

evidences Crane's feeling there was no binding agreement at
the time, but that he was in a position of being in receipt
of an offer regarding which he was either free to accept or
reject.
9,
thrust

of

The Court
Mixon*s

finds

from the evidence

conversations

with

that the

Gallian

were

to

increase the amount of money to be paid Plaintiffs, but that
in February

of

1985, Mixon expressed

a concern

over

the

releasing of the Plaintiffs from a loan guarantee which had
heretofore been a part of the parties' negotiations.
Court

finds

forwarded

that

to

substitution
Plaintiffs

by

the
of

were

Exhibit

offices
guarantor,

both

P-13,

Mr.

Mr.

Mixon

of
by

released

the
from

Russell

text
any

a
of
loan

The

Gallian

copy

of

which

a
the

guarantees

related to the Timberbrook Village, Ltd. partnership.

The

Court further finds that the original of such substitution
was retained by the bank.
Defendants
Leisure

Heart

The Court finds that by P-12, the

Marketing

Sports, Inc., once

and
again

Development,
renewed

Inc.,

and

their offer

for

Crane to execute Exhibits P-8 and P-9 and return the same to
the Defendant Dixie Title Company so that escrow could be
completed.

In this letter, Gallian once again redefined the

terms on behalf of these Defendants, of what he understood
the

agreement

to

be,

including

transfer

Leisure Sports and the 5% to Timberbrook.
stated

in

such

letter

that

the

escrow

of

the

20%

to

Gallian further
agent

would

then

disburse $175,000 to the Plaintiffs and that Barry Church,

1 on

on

behalf

of

Heart

general partner
execute

a

Marketing

and

to Timberbrook

warranty

deed

Development,

Inc.,

Village, Ltd., would

for

the

condominium

a

then

which

was

additional consideration in the transaction.
10.

The Court finds that simultaneous with the

transfer of the letter to Mixon, Gallian, by way of P-13,
wrote

a

letter

contact of

to Mr. Willard

the Defendants

attorney, and

reaffirming

terms of the offer.
the

with

accounting

R.

Bishop

explaining

Mixon, Cranes1

the

California

to Bishop the existence of the

Gallian further stated his belief that

problems

appeared

to have

been

solved

by

Crane's prior inspection of the books and, once again, the
question

indicated

that

documents

to be placed

these

Defendants

in escrow

were

awaiting

at Dixie Title Co. , at

which time the closing would be completed and the accounting
problems resolved.
11.

The Court finds that on February 12th, 1985,

the lawsuit was filed for an accounting against Timberbrook
Village, Ltd., and Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., a
Utah

corporation,

and

that

on

February

13th, Mr.

Barry

Church, as a principal of Heart Marketing and Development,
Inc., was served with the complaint in said lawsuit.
Court

finds that on February

Bishop,

his

Utah

counsel,

The

13th, Mr. Crane advised Mr.

that

he had

not

accepted

the

outstanding offer made to him by the Defendants, Heart
Marketing

and Development, Inc. and Leisure Sports, Inc.,

and that Crane desired to proceed with an accounting until

the

settlement was eHH^xed.

accept

it.

The

Court

Crane did

finds

that

not

the

in

fact

ever

of

this

thrust

information^relayed to Gallian orally by conversation on the
15th day

of February,

1985, and

reconfirmed

by a

letter

received as Exhibit P-15 over the signature of Willard R.
Bishop, dated February 18th, 1985.
12.
Plaintiffs

The

executed

Court
P-8

finds

and

with Mr. Mixon, Plaintiffs1

that

P-9, deposited
attorney

13th, figS. %

February
said

exhibits

in California.

The

Court finds, however, that such information was not conveyed
to Mr. Bishop, Plaintiffs1

attorney

in Utah.

The

Court

finds that by reason of the same, Bishop advised Gallian on
February
offer

15th, 1985, that Crane had not yet accepted

based

upon Crane's

February

13th conversation

the
with

Bishop, but that during that discussion, terms of the offer
were still outstanding and had not yet been revoked.
13.

The Court finds that on the same day that Mr.

Bishop sent his letter, Exhibit P-15, to Mr. Gallian, that
Gallian
Ltd,

and Church met on behalf

Heart

Sports,

Marketing

Inc., and

and

decided

of Timberbrook

Development,
that

the

Inc.,

deal

was

and

Village,
Leisure

off.

decision, however, was not then communicated to anyone.

This
The

Court finds that while Mixon dictated a letter on February
18th, 1985, said letter was not mailed until the afternoon
of February 21st, 1985, as per the postmarked envelope which
had been received

into evidence.

In this letter, sending

Exhibits P-7 and P-8, Mixon also stated certain conditions,

1 no

including
which

additional documents which were to be received,

Mixon

stated

were

necessary

prerequisites

to

the

closing of escrow.
14.
February

The

Court

finds

that

on

the

morning

of

22nd, 1985, Mr. Crane called Mr. Gallian and the

Court finds that in the first portion of that conversation,
Gallian advised Crane that the deal was off.
15.

The Court also finds that subsequent to this

conversation with Gallian, Crane phoned the bank in Nebraska
to determine the status of the release of the Plaintiffs
from the construction loan and called Mr. Westbrook of Dixie
Title to determine the status of the escrow.
16.

The Court finds, basing its finding on the

testimony of Mr. Westbrook, Mr. Crane, and Mr. Gallian, as
well as the postmark on the Mixon letter, that the title
company had not received Plaintiffs1 acceptance as per the
terms

of

1985.

The Court finds that the agreement states, as do the

cover

letters

executed

the agreement

and

of

on

Gallian,

delivered

by

the morning

said
the

of February

agreements
Plaintiffs

complete their end of the transaction.

were
in

22nd,

to

be

escrow

to

The Court finds that

this event had not occurred when Mr. Crane had been told, as
had Mr. Westbrook, by Mr. Gallian that the deal was off.
17.

The Court finds that up through and including

the date of February 22nd, 1985, the Plaintiffs considered
sales agreement documents P-8

and P-9 merely as an offer

which he free to accept or reject, not a memorialization of

1

fl

'A

an agreement binding upon him.

This finding is evidenced by

the actions of the Plaintiffs and the communications of Mr.
Crane to his attorneys, Mr. Mixon and Mr. Bishop, and their
communications

to

Mr.

Gallian

on

behalf

of

Timberbrook

Village, Ltd., Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., and
Leisure Sports, Inc.
18.

The Court further finds that Mr. Gallian, as

a representative of these Defendants, considered the status
of the parties1 dealings in the same posture, to-wit, that
the oral agreement, if any, was tenuous and unenforceable,
and that what was outstanding was an offer that Crane was
considering, but could accept or reject.
19.
Dean

Mixon

The Court further finds that the letter of
of

February

18th,

1985,

which

accompanied

Exhibits P-8 and P-9, and deposited in escrow, in fact, only
conditionally accepted the outstanding offer and requiring
that Defendants submit yet additional documents into escrow.
As a result, the Court finds that Mixon's cover letter on
behalf of Plaintiffs created a counteroffer requiring

the

Defendants to supply a new document not previously part of
the

offer,

authenticity

that
of

document
the

being

release

of

a

verification

the

Plaintiffs

of

the

from

the

construction loan on Timberbrook Village, Ltd.
20.

The Court further finds that at the close of

evidence, the Plaintiffs moved that Defendants1 counterclaim
be dismissed and that the Defendants so stipulate.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based

upon

the

foregoing

Findings of Fact, the

Court hereby concludes as follows:
1.

The Court concludes that both parties dealt

with this transaction on the basis of an outstanding offer
which required acceptance by the Plaintiffs.
while

the Court

concludes

that

Gallian

As a result,

believed

an

oral

agreement had been reached, the terms of the same remained
subject

to

the

specifically

Plaintiffs'

concludes

acceptance

and

the

Court

that both parties understood

there

was an offer outstanding which Crane could either accept or
reject.
2.

The Court concludes that the Plaintiff seeking

specific performance, has the burden of proving in a clear
and convincing manner the terms of the agreement
formation

of

the

concludes

that

contract,

the

and

Plaintiff

in

this

has

failed

and

case, the
to

the

Court

carry

that

burden.
3.
were

The Court further concludes ,that P-8 and P-9

indeed

offers

open

to

the

Plaintiffs'

acceptance

without consideration, and, thus, could be revoked at any
time prior

to proper

acceptance

by

the

Plaintiffs.

The

Court finds that proper acceptance under these circumstances
called for the deposit of Exhibits P-8 and P-9 executed by
the Plaintiffs, in escrow at Dixie Title Company
George, Utah.

195

in St.

4.

The Court concludes that the Defendants orally

revoked their offer to Crane and communicated the same to
the Plaintiffs prior to their acceptance of the offer and
prior to any communication called for by the agreement or
otherwise, by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants that their
offer had, in fact, been accepted.

The Court finds that

thet subsequent receipt of P-8 and P-9 in escrow after such
oral revocation of the offer, did not thereafter create an
enforceable contract; this is so especially in light of the
that Mixon f s cover letter, received

Court's conclusion

as

P-18, imposed an additional condition upon the closing and
thus

constituted

a

counteroffer

conditioning

Plaintiffs1

acceptance of Defendants' offer upon Timberbrook

Village,

Ltd., supplying separate verification of the substitution of
guarantor

document

previously mentioned.

The Court

finds

that there was no enforceable contract created under these
facts because the offer was properly revoked prior to its
unequivocal

acceptance

and

that

the

purported

acceptance

thereafter received by Defendant Dixie Title Company, was in
fact a counteroffer which was never accepted, and that the
Defendants never reinstated their offer.
5,
counterclaimed

The
on

Court
the

concludes

basis

of

that

the

Plaintiffs1

Defendants
motion

and

Defendants1 acquiescence in the same should be dismissed.
6.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs1 case as

against Defendants should also be dismissed with prejudice

JM)

on the basis of the aforementioned

Findings of Fact

and

Conclusions of Law; no cause of action.
DATED this ^ V ^ d a y of August, 198 7.
BY THE COURT:

IES

district Cctart Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and accurate
copy

of

the

foregoing

document,

postage

prepaid,

to

Willard R. Bishop, Attorney for Plaintiffs, P. 0. Box 279,
Cedar

City, Utah

84720,

this J^-day

of

QjiKjUph

1987.

icrli,

-fianifshM

SECRETAR
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:*1r;

WILLARD R. BISHOP #0344
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
P. 0. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-9483

'RONCOU^'"

*- • u is ,
£,

0CT

-H987
Qcp/ir.

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE
CRANE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD. , a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HEART MARKETING and DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, in its capacity as
general partner of TIMBERBROOK
VILLAGE, LTD.; LEISURE SPORTS,
INC., a Utah Corporation; and
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,

C i v i l No. 85-281

Defendants/Respondents.

NOTICE OF APPEAL IS HEREBY GIVEN that CLIFFORD G. CRANE and
BONNIE

CRANE,

Plaintiffs

appeal

to the Supreme

and

Court

Appellants

named

above, hereby

of the State of Utah from the

Judgment and Decree executed in this action on or about August
24, 1987, which was duly filed and entered on September 4, 1987.
Inasmuch

as

all

matters

and

issues

pertaining

to

the

above-entitled action are now final, Plaintiffs/Appellants now
file this Notice of Appeal.
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DATED this ^ ? W ^ d a y of ^^fj^u^ef

/

, 1987.

WILLARD R. BI$HOP
Attorney for
Plaintiffs/Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to Mr. Michael D.
Hughes, Attorney for Defendants/Respondents, of THOMPSON, HUGHES
SL REBER, Attorneys at Law, at 148 East Tabernacle, St. George,
Utah 84770,
of

first class postage fully prepaid on this

f^4fc^ Lr

day

1987.

1 9 J)
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AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF LTD. PARTNERSHIP INTEREST

Agreement
between

made

Timberbrook

(hereinafter

this

day

Village,

"Buyer")

and

Ltd.,

Clifford

of
a

, 1984, by
Utah

G.

Limited

Crane

and

and

Partnership,
Bonnie

Crane,

(hereinafter "Seller").
RECITALS
1.

Seller is the owner of a .5% interest in Timberbrook Village

Ltd. a Utah Limited Partnership,
2.

The parties hereto desire to set forth the terms of an

agreement

wherein

Seller

shall

purchase

the

limited

partnership

interest on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants made
herein, the parties agree as follows:
1.

Buyer

Building

}

agrees
of

to

assign

Timberbrook

and

convey

Condominiums,

all
at

of

Unit

closing

<=D, / O
all

of

Seller's right, title and interest on the assignment form attached
hereto

at

existing

Exhibit

"A".

Said

Conveyance

construction loan which

shall be

subject

loan shall be released

to

an

from the

condominium upon completion of the sales of Units in Phase I.
2.

This agreement and closing hereon shall be contingent upon

closing of that certain loan between Seller and Nebraska Saving and
Loan Association.
3.
Company,

Closing
Inc.,

shall occur

through

(Escrow Agent),

205

the offices

East

of Dixie

Tabernacle,

p 7 PLAINTIFFS 1
if ; EXHIBIT, \ t\

Title

St. George,

Utah.

The assignment

(Exhibit "A") shall be deposited with Escrow

Agent to be delivered to Buyer upon closing.
Agreement made the date first mentioned above.

SELLER
Clifford G. Crane
Bonnie Crane
BUYER
LEISURE SPORTS, INC,
By

Ba^ir7Church r P r e s i d e n t
(seHJ.v
i a i r m a n of t h e Board of

o n /1 i
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EXHIBIT "A"

ASSIGNMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST

Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane

(Seller) hereby eissigns and

conveys to Leisure Sports Inc. a 5% interest as a limited partner,
in Timberbrook Village Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership.
Seller warrants as follows:
1.

That the interest conveyed is free and clear of all liens,

encumbrances or claims against Seller's title;
2.

That Seller has the full power to convey said interest;

3.

Seller hereby authorizes and directs the General Partner of

Timberbrook Village, Ltd. to show the change in interest as of the
date of

closing, and Seller hereby

authorizes

the Escrow Agent,

Dixie Title Company to notify the General Partner in writing of the
date of closing.
DATED this

day of November, 1984.

SELLER

Clifford G. Crane

Bonnie Crane
STATE OF UTAH,
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
On the

)
: ss.
)

day of November, 1984, personally appeared before
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r>n n / n ~>

me Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane, the Sellers in the above
entitled Assignment, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed
this instrument for the purposes therein set forth.

My Commission Expires:

Notary Public
Residing In:
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AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF LTD. PARTNERSHIP INTEREST

Agreement
between

made

Leisure

this

day

Sports,

of

Inc.

(hereinafter

, 1984, by

and

"Buyer")

and

Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane/ (hereinafter "Seller").
j

RECITALS
1.

Seller

is

the

owner

of

a

20%

interest

in

Timberbrook

Village Ltd. a Utah Limited Partnership.
2«
agreement

The parties hereto desire
wherein

Seller

shall

to set

purchase

forth the terms of an
the

limited

partnership

interest on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants made
herein, the parties agree as follows:
1.

Buyer

hereby

agrees

to

defined, the sum of One Hundred

pay,

at

closing

as

hereinafter

Seventy-Five Thousand

and no/100

Dollars ($175,000).
2.

Seller

agrees

to

assign

and

convey

at

closing

all

of

Seller's right, title and interest on the assignment forn attached
hereto at Exhibit "A".
3.

This agreement and closing hereon shall be contingent upon

closing of that certain loan between Seller and Nebraska Saving and
Loan Association.
4.

Closing

shall occur

through

the offices

of

Dixie

Company, Inc., (Escrow Agent), 205 East Tabernacle, St. George,
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Title

Utah.

The assignment

(Exhibit "A") shall be deposited with Escrow

Agent to be delivered to Buyer upon closing.
Agreement made the date first mentioned above.

SELLER
Clifford G. Crane
Bonnie Crane

y

BUYER
LEISURE SPORTS, INC,

By Q&f^l

(Ji|luA^X^__

B a r ^ Cnurch,

Pr>&-sident

[sell J. Gallian
lairman of the Board of
Directors and Secretary
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EXHIBIT "A

ASSIGNMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST

Clifford G. Crane (and Bonnie Crane/ (Seller) hereby assigns and
conveys to Leisure Sports Inc. a 20% interest as a limited partner,
in Timberbrook Village Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership.
Seller warrants as follows:
1.

That the interest conveyed is free and clear of all liens,

encumbrances or claims against Seller's title;
2.

That Seller has the full power to convey said interest;

3.

Seller hereby authorizes and directs the General Partner of

Timberbrook Village, Ltd. to show the change in interest as of the
date

of

closing,

and Seller

hereby

authorizes

the Escrow Agent,

Dixie Title Company to notify the General Partner in writing of the
date of closing.
DATED this

day of November, 1984.

SELLER

Clifford G. Crane

Bonnie Crane
STATE OF UTAH,
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
On the

)
: ss.
)

day of November, 1984, personally appeared before

me

Clifford

Crane

and

Bonnie

Crane,

the

Sellers

in

the

above

entitled Assignment, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed
this instrument for the purposes therein set forth.

My Commission Expires:

Notary Public
Residing In:
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GALLIAN, DRAKE &

VESTFALL

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING
1 SOUTH MAIN STREET
P.O. BOX 1330
RUSSELL J. GALLIAN
LYLE R.DRAKE
G. MICHAEL WESTFALL
KENDRICK J. HAFEN

S T . GEOIIGK, U T A H 6 4 7 7 0
TELEPHONE
(801)026-1682

November 13, 1984

Clifford G. Crane
Bonnie Crane
12671 Overbrooke Drive
Santa Ana, California 92705
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Crane:
Enclosed you will find documents which you should execute
send _££L_the_ closing agent in connection with your safe of your
Limited Partner~sTTip interest in Timberbrook Village Ltd.
The
closing agent is Dixie Title Co. Inc., 205 East Tabernacle, St.
George, Utah, 84770 (a selr addressed envelope is enclosed for your
convenience).
We are handling your transaction in two steps. One to handle
the redemption with the Condo, one to handle the cash part. I hope
this is allright.
We hope you will find these documents in order. Please call me
or Barry Church (301-586-3090) if you have any questions.
Very truly yours,
GALZulu,

DRAKE jr\WESTFALL

RJG/kp
fJctk^

*+& zhodtr

CtLc&iri: fc>v cio<^

^^<^k.

Cc/TW\W'

£^\WV t.
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WEINFELD 8 MlXON
A UA.W C O R P O R A T I O N

GO! NORTH PARKCCNTER DRIVE,SUITE
SANTA ANA.CAUFORNtA

TELtPMONC

Z03

(71<4) B 4 1 - 6 6 A 8

9 2 7 0 5

February 18 # 1985

Mr. Doug Westbrook
Dixie Title Company
205 E. Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
RE:

CLIFFORD CRANE ESCROW

Dear Mr. Westbrook:
As I believe you know, our office represents Clifford
G. and Bonnie Crane. Enclosed please find the following
two original documents:
1. "Agreement For Sale of Limited Partnership Interest"
to which my clients and Timberbrook Village Limited are parties;
2. "Agreement For Sale of Limited Partnership Interest"
to which my clients and Leisure Sports Incorporated are parties.
Enclosed please find, further, a copy of a document
entitled "Substitution of Guarantee" dated November 20, 1984,
between Nebraska Savings & Loan Association and Russell J.
Gallian. You may proceed to close the transaction referred
to in Mr. Gallian's February 11, 1985, letter to me, copy
enclosed, as soon as you have received from Nebraska Savings
& Loan Association their written affirmation of the validity
of the "Substitution of Guarantor*' document along with their
warranty that Clifford G. Crane and Bonnie Crane have no
obligations whatsoever to Nebraska Savings & Loan Association/
either jointly or severally, either actual ox contingent.
There are three conditions to closing from our side:
1. Your mailing to me by registered mail, the original
of the above-referenced affirmation and warranty by Nebraska
Savings & Loan Association;
2. Your mailing to me by certified mail, a fully executed
Warranty Deed to Unit 210, Building 1 of Timberbrook Condominiums ;
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EXHIBIT

r ^ r t L D tt MiXON
A CAW C O R P O R A T I O N

Mr. Douf rtestbrook
February 18, 1985
Page two

3- Your disbursing by wire transfer, the sum of $175,000
into my client's account at Home Savings of American,
179 N. Tustin, Orange, California 92667, Account No. 125-900624-3
If the above-referenced closing does not occur by Friday,
March 8, 1985, you are instructed to return all documents
to me and to terminate the escrow. If you have any question
or comment, please do not hesitate to call.
Very truly yours,
WEINFELD & MIXON
yi,
t-v

BY: '"
DEAN A. MIXON
DAM/mw
Enclosure
cc:

Mr. Clifford Crane

21.1

GAI.T.TAK, D R A K E &

WESTFALL

ATTOAMffYO AMO COUttSClOfta AT LAW
OiKIE STATC SANK tlHLOtMO
I SOUTH MAIN «TH«CT
P O BOX 1330
RUSSELL J GALL1AN
LYLE R DRAKE
G MICHAEL WESTFALL
KENOR1CK J HAFEN
JEFFREY C WILCOX

S T . G E O R O C , UTAJX

8*770

TELEPHONE
(001) 6 2 0 - 1 C S 2

February 11, 1985

Mr. Dean Mixon
WEINFELD & MIXON
601 North Park Center Drive
Suite 203
Santa Anaf CA 92705
Re:

Clifford Crane

Dear Mr, Mixon:
Enclosed is a copy of the Substitution of Guarantor which I certify
was executed by myself and Mr. Dewey Crouch/ Vice President of
Nebraska Savings and Loan.
It is our understanding that Mr. and Mrs. Crane will execute the
documents conveying their interest to Leisure Sports (20%) and
redeeming 5% from Timberbrook. Upon receipt the Escrow Agent will
disburse $175,000 tq_3rour_^ients_£nd Barry^ Church will execvTtIe""l[
warranty deeRT^on befialf of tKe Partnership tor the condo.

•

V&tL '

Thank y o u .
V e r y jp^rirj/ y o u r s ,
JLIAN J DRAKE & V7ESTFALL

11 J. Gallian
RJG/sb
cc:

Doug Westbrook
Dixie Title Company
SSaSDEESBBSOSBi

;

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
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SUBSTITUTION OF GUARANTOR

\\)

Agreement made this
Nebraska

Savings

and Loan

day of;

iv^l^^y

Association

1984, by and between

(hereinafter

"Lender") and

Russell J. Gallian (hereinafter "Substitute Guarantor")•
RECITALS
1.

The parties hereto have entered into a Committment Letter

dated October 19, 1984, wherein Lender is making a Two Million Six
Hundred

Thousand

Dollar

($2,600,000)

loan

to

Leisure

Sports

Incorporated•
2.

Part

Timberbrook

of

said

Village

consideration

is

Ltd., Incorporated.

the participation
Leisure

of

Sports, Inc.

has purchased 39% of the limited partnership interest in Timberbrook
Village Ltd., including,
Crane

limited

personally

partners

signed

A certain Clifford G. Crane, and Bonnie
in Timberbrook

on the note

Timberbrook \ Village

Village

on the previous

Ltd. The parties

desire

Ltd., who have
note

issued on

to effect

a change

wherein Russell J. Gallian shall be substituted as the Guarantor in
the place of Clifford Crane.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants made
herein, the parties agree as follows:
1.
Clifford

Nebraska

Savings

and Loan

G. Crane

and Bonnie

Crane

Association

hereby

releases

of any and all liabilities

pursuant to the note secured by Deed of Trust on Timberbrook Village
Ltd. , dated

S*f/yf

S^Cn^ft^QO

X ? (9^3

in t h e

and further dated

original principal balance of
XanpTlfi^/

in the

original principal balance of $
2.

Z07S(K)O&

The parties hereto agree that Russell J. Gallian is hereby

substituted as Substitute Guarantor and Russell J. Gallian hereby
agrees to be bound by all of the covenants and agreements contained
in

that certain Guaranty

Agreement

associated with

the

stated above.

DATED this <J2^day of K/^h^*jL^ , 1984.

JD UHzrU^k
jje

\ AJO
jri

tie

p\&WKZ.?i-xc^^

&fi*)*t**{

^-r.f.CTtu^

£>y

lU?r<&&

^ < ' W

*j£ U'.

Ci^ltl^y. >6 ide/e$&L p&iy W OTH&2- ^lX>£~
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